Disclaimer: oddly, given my interests, I’ve never read much G.A. Cohen before picking up Rescuing Justice and Equality for this little event. (I understand his friends call him ‘Gerry’, but I won’t presume, on such slight acquaintance.) This matters only because my reading of the book is still preliminary and a bit scattershot. I’m not sure I get it. Also, I typed this post out like a maniac, just for the exercise of it. Also, I’m writing this post without access to my Rawls books, which I forgot to bring home, so I can’t quote. Well, I’m sorry about that. So stuff I say that is just plain wrong should be corrected in comments, without anger if you please. And we’ll just do our best, shall we? Also, I’m about to go on vacation for a few days, but I promised to participate. Also, I’m about to embark on an internet-free weekend getaway. Hence will not be very helpful in comments myself. Best I can do.)
Again: I’m not sure I quite get it. But I like it. It looks pretty simple. The basic claim, although Cohen doesn’t put it in one sentence, like this, is that Rawls’ famous difference principle is an example of Moore’s Paradox.
OK, let stop right there and back up. For those of you who aren’t academic philosophers: Rawls has two basic principles of justice, and the difference principle is one half of the second. It says that social and economic inequalities are permissible only to the extent that they benefit the least well off, relative to a situation in which the inequalities would be eliminated. If I have $10 and you only have $1, this is ‘just’ if any attempt to eliminate the inequality would leave you holding less than $1. Maybe we shift to a position in which I have only 99 cents, and you have 99 cents, and the rest of it goes wherever money goes when it dies. We are equal, but you are actually worse off, absolutely. Rawls says it isn’t necessary to get all drastically Harrison Bergeron, like that. Justice doesn’t demand it. Turning the point around: I can’t permissibly (justly) move from $10 to $11, widening the gap, unless the effect of this trickles down to you to the tune of $1.01 or more. But if you get that extra penny, my extra dollar is acquired consistent with the difference principle.
Now you are going to object: pull the other one. I am supposed to believe that there might be no way to move from Johnny having $10 and Suzy having $1 to a more equal situation in which Suzy has more than 1$? You just can’t get there from here without blowing up all the money? (Really? There might just be no way? Really? When did the treasury start minting the currency out of unstable TNT so that you just … can’t …. move it around safely?)
Well, yes. And no.
In part the strength of Cohen’s argument really is that he is just pointing out that this obviously makes no sense. But it’s a bit more complicated. The complication has to do with Rawls’ view that the difference principle isn’t something that it is Johnny’s job to apply to his own wallet. It is society’s job—government’s job—to apply it to Johnny’s wallet, via some tax scheme or whatever policy measure. And obviously government isn’t going to have a Johnny-centric or even Johnny-specific justice/tax code. So the general procedure/principle isn’t going to anything like: ‘look here, Johnny. Suzy would have more money if you gave her some. So justice requires it.’ And, after all, maybe Fred is standing next to both Johnny and Suzy, with $1000 dollars. So it really truly isn’t obvious that justice requires, narrowly, that Johnny – and no one else – is required to fork over in this case.
Rawls’ way of putting this is: justice applies to ‘the basic structure’ of society. Johnny and Fred and Suzy are all standing at the bus stop. Johnny isn’t responsible for knowing how much money his neighbors have—the economic ‘basic structure’ of this group. He isn’t peeking in all their wallets every minute of every day. Nor can he. Nor should be held responsible for knowing what the ‘basic structure’ is. The idea is that we can have a division of labor. He can go on living his life. He has a family, job, interests, projects. And the government will tax him and regulate his activities. And those taxes and regulations will, in as liberty-preserving a manner as possible, look to economic relations between Johnny, Fred and Suzy. Maybe the bus driver will charge them different rates as they get on. And so forth.
At this level of analysis there is at least some plausibility to the notion that you can’t get there from here, regarding Johnny’s $10 and Suzy’s $1. Because taxing the wealthy might, conceivably, cause them to work less hard, causing the economy to contract, causing all the Suzies to lose the money that was transferred to them from the Johnnies of the world, plus their initial single dollar stakes, making them worse off overall. (Never mind whether this incentive argument is valid or sound. It is, at least, not absurd: whereas the ‘this rich Johnny might be obscurely debarred from just transferring money directly to that poor Suzy, standing right next to him, even if he wanted to’ is patently absurd.)
Now, Moore’s paradox (G.E. Moore, that is). ‘It’s raining, but I don’t believe it’. For any given individual – let’s call him Johnny, at a rainy bus stop – it can be true both that it is raining, and that he doesn’t believe it’s raining. (More denialism about various possibilities of direct trickle-down, I suppose.) But Johnny cannot sincerely (sanely), first-personally avow this potentially true statement. Mild logical curiosity, then. There are possibly true statements that one cannot sincerely (sanely) assert.
Now justice. Cohen is saying that, oddly, lots of individuals won’t be able to avow the difference principle. Not that it is false. It might be true, but they can’t coherently, sincerely avow its truth. Why not? Because they are like Johnny at the bus stop with $10 in pocket, next to someone with only $1. That’s all it takes.
Cohen’s way of explaining this is in terms of kidnapping cases. ‘Your money or her life’ cases. I take it the threat structure is plain enough. In ‘your money or her life’ cases, it is often prudent to fork over. Indeed, it may be prudent to formulate a general policy of forking over. (Maybe it isn’t prudent to publicize such policies, lest you incentivize aspirant criminals. But we won’t worry about that.) But it’s obviously not the case that we have to say that paying off blackmail/ransom/threats is just. The kidnapper can’t say: look, the difference principle says you should pay me. (Because there’s no way that I can keep my money without making someone seriously worse off.) Indeed, I, the kidnapper, am just encouraging you to be a good Rawlsian.
Obviously the problem here is that presumably no one was holding a gun to the kidnapper’s head, forcing him to hold a gun to someone else’s head. So treating the kidnap set-up as though it were just a thing that happened—a kind of ‘given’ background condition—is obviously insane.
But now it become clear that the difference principle is just a device for negotiating kidnap cases left and right. That is, it may be prudent policy, but it can’t be a statement of what justice requires. The hostage holders are now all those who, if their taxes were raised, would work so much less that the Suzies of the world would be worse off.
Now a libertarian will object: are you saying that a person’s potential labor is like a hostage they are holding? Not only do we not own the fruits of our labor, but someone else owns them, so that if we fail to work, we are guilty of kidnapping our own labor? (‘Don’t move, or I’ll smear my own labor’s brains across my own brains!’ A bit like that scene in Blazing Saddles, only even weirder.) What a bizarre thought.
No, no. That’s not it. The idea is, rather, that if I object to raising taxes on the ground that I – talented, well-paid person that I am – would work less, and therefore the poor would end up worse off overall, and we can’t have that, I can’t expect you to believe I am sincere. Because obviously what I do is not some background condition that I have no role in deciding. I cannot seriously justify my own selfishness with reference to the difference principle, because my threat (statement, prediction promise, call it what you will) shows that I can’t really believe the difference principle expresses what justice demands. That, or I just don’t care about justice.
Maybe you think you are entirely justified in working less, if taxes go up, because you think all this Rawls stuff is collectivist nonsense. You believe in Ayn Rand. You are John Galt. Now maybe there’s a real problem just with this, in that even John Galt isn’t justified in working less, just out of petty ressentiment at the grasping poor (and that would indeed seem the most psychologically plausible motivation for planning work-stoppage, just because your tax rate notches up.) Notes From An Overman Underground is a pretty weird ethical production. But maybe there are non-ressentiment-based reasons why the talented might stop doing what they were good at, if they weren’t paid a truly sweet premium for doing so. This much is for sure: if you think Rawls’ difference principle is ethical nonsense, you cannot sincerely justify your own actions with reference to Rawls difference principle. No more so than you can sincerely avow ‘it’s raining’ if you don’t believe it’s raining.
There’s a slight twist here, in that kidnappers can avow a prudential version of the difference principle: ‘since they don’t want to be fishing pieces of the kid out of the harbor for the next six months, the best thing for them to do is pay up real quiet-like.’ But if the ability to use the word ‘best’ here gives the kidnappers a warm feeling of having helped to ensure that justice is done, the kidnappers are crazy.
Getting back to Johnny. If he is standing at the bus stop and doesn’t know that Suzy is so poor, he has no reason to reach into his pocket and fork over a couple bucks. But if he somehow comes to know, he can’t say that he is still justified in not forking over because he pays his taxes, and that is supposed to be enough – basic structure and all. He knows that his taxes are just an indirect, highly imperfect way of seeking a result that he could now achieve directly. But he is refusing to. So he can hardly think it’s important to seek this result indirectly. So he can hardly believe in the difference principle. (But shouldn’t Fred pay? Yes, but if he doesn’t, that’s not an excuse for Johnny not to. A world in which Fred has $1000 and Johnny has $5 and Suzy has $5 is less unjust than one in which Fred has $1000 and Johnny has $10 and Suzy has $1. The perfect isn’t the enemy of the good—or the right, in the case of justice.)
Now: can’t Rawls just say, ‘OK, fine, the difference principle isn’t a pure expression of the content of justice. It’s a proposed policy for dealing with the fact that, even though rich people ought to be more generous with poor people, they won’t be. They are stubborn that way. They are moral failures, or they don’t believe in Rawlsian justice.’ Cohen points out that Rawls is committed to a bit more than this: the difference principle is supposed to be something that everyone signs on to, even if only ‘society’ – the state, which doesn’t have its own life to lead – has to worry about it all day long. There is supposed to be richer moral community.
Cohen agrees. We need something richer than we will have if Rawls scales back in this way:
It is often said that it is unrealistic to expect a modern society to be a community, and it is no doubt inconceivable that there should be a standing disposition of warm mutual identification between any pair of citizens in a large and heterogeneous polity. But community here is not some soggy mega-Gemeinschaftlichkeit. Instead, my claim about the incentive justification is that, to appropriate a phrase of Rawls, it does not supply “a public basis in the light of which citizens can justify to one another their common institutions” and that the justification is therefore incompatible with Rawls calls “ties of civic friendship”. (45)
In short, Johnny explaining to Suzy about how the wonders of the difference principle mean he doesn’t have to give her a couple bucks doesn’t cut it. If he really believed this stuff, he would give her a couple bucks. Ergo, he doesn’t believe this stuff.
My real concern, which I will voice, without elaborating: Cohen wants more. What more? This ain’t your great-great-grandfather’s soggy mega-Gemeinshaftlichkeit. Fair enough. But isn’t it sure to be just some newer, slightly less soggy, mega-Gemeinshaftlichkeit? Rawls falls foul of the fact that it is very unlikely that everyone will agree to Rawlsianism. The difference principle is like a quiet stick, there to deal with a problem Rawls is pretending won’t arise. (Not to put too fine a point on it.) But I feel sure whatever Cohen puts in place of Rawlsianism will also fall short of these very high standards of common justification. Because absolutely everyone isn’t going to sign on to Cohenism. Somehow that bar is always placed too high, to meet seminar-room standards that are not appropriate to the more rough-and-tumble arena of society at large. So to object to Rawls on the ground that he can’t provide enough community, while not mistaken—I think Cohen’s right about the Moore’s Paradox point—risks just boxing Cohen in to some analogous awkward corner. I dunno. what do you think
{ 77 comments }
Neil 01.22.09 at 10:15 am
Three things. Empirical grounds for doubting that the difference principle is applicable is not, as you say, evidence that it doesn’t” make sense”. It’s an empirical claim. I could believe that the principle is true, but that the antecedent of the conditional it states is true.
Second, I don’t see why the rich person can’t affirm the difference principle, given the hypothesis that higher taxes = less labor from the rich. First, they can be talking about the rich as a class, not about themselves. Second, I see no reason why I can’t engage in self-prediction, even regretful self-prediction (just as someone might oppose lowering taxes on cigarettes because they will then smoke more).
Finally, so far as I can see, whatever strength the argument has depends on the analogy between witholding labor and kidnapping. But there may be reasons why a class of wealthy people are good for the worse off, independent of this will incentivize the talented. For instance, it might be that pooling wealth in a small number of hands creates the conditions for private provision of public goods. I am sure that it only my limited imagination that prevents me from coming up with more possibilities (if only someone would incentivize my imagination).
JoB 01.22.09 at 10:52 am
As far as I can see the problem only arises (if it arises at all, I don’t have time to read the book) when the difference principle necessarily falls together with the argument on the Original Veil. Only in that case there is a need for the persons involved to make an “I” statement (but even in that case they first need to suitably remove from that “I” coincidental things like being rich – if you follow Rawls at least).
I don’t think the difference principle so falls a.o. because I think it is valuable and because I’m convinced the Original Veil argument is not only superfluous but also false – it is quite possible to argue for the principles based on the fact that only within that context a fair society can at all evolve.
novakant 01.22.09 at 11:04 am
Just a friendly hint: it’s spelled “Gemeinschaftlichkeit” and not “Gemeinshaftlichkeit”. The German equivalent to “sh” is “sch”, as in “ship” = “Schiff” or “sheep”=”Schaf”.
You and Cohen are not alone – I’d say approximately half of the time German words are used in English texts, they are used incorrectly in one way or another, which is quite amusing but also slightly embarrassing.
Chris Bertram 01.22.09 at 11:19 am
#3 FWIW, Cohen gets it right.
Slocum 01.22.09 at 1:47 pm
No, no. That’s not it. The idea is, rather, that if I object to raising taxes on the ground that I – talented, well-paid person that I am – would work less, and therefore the poor would end up worse off overall, and we can’t have that, I can’t expect you to believe I am sincere. Because obviously what I do is not some background condition that I have no role in deciding. I cannot seriously justify my own selfishness with reference to the difference principle, because my threat (statement, prediction promise, call it what you will) shows that I can’t really believe the difference principle expresses what justice demands. That, or I just don’t care about justice.
Ah, well, in that case it’s pretty simple to demonstrate that there are no philosophers who believe the difference principle or care about justice, isn’t it? Because virtually all philosophers have chosen work that pays less than other jobs their high mental abilities would have qualified them for. So philosophers have all gone John Galt in their very choice of profession — and these are people who fully understand the difference principle. Have they no shame? And, of course, it’s worse that it seems because although philosophers do pay taxes, when they work for publicly funded universities their salaries are paid out of tax revenues that might otherwise have gone to Suzy standing at the bus stop with a $1 in her pocket.
It happens that I have advanced degrees that would qualify me for teaching. So what if, in response to elevated tax rates, I decided that my well-paying but somewhat stressful work was no longer worth it and I decided to work not less but less lucratively and stressfully? Maybe it would be nice to teach a course or two at the local community college and fill in whatever hours were left working at a bike shop (I like bikes). Could I ‘really believe the difference principle expresses what justice demands’ and ‘care about justice’ and still make such a career choice? If not, how would that differ from choosing philosophy as a career from the beginning?
harry b 01.22.09 at 2:44 pm
Cohen is very clear that he agrees with Scheffler (and nearly everyone else) that there is some self-regarding prerogative, so we are justified in paying some attention, when making choices about such things as what career to adopt, to our own interests. He says nothing (ever, as far as I know — well, maybe there are clues in “How Come You’re an Egalitarian…”) about what, exactly, that prerogative licenses. It clearly does not license objecting to changes in tax rates on the grounds that such changes would alter the incentives one faces in such a way that one would end up making different choices. The problem is that if it licenses what slocum thinks it shouldn’t license, then that weakens the force of Cohen’s argument against Rawls.
(I think things aren’t quite as clear as slocum says — many well paid and stressful alternatives in our society are at least as valueless to the least advantaged as philosophising or being an academic generally, and many are positively harmful — but at least some of those options generate sufficient discretionary income that focussed divestment of that income could really help the least advantaged a lot).
OneEyedMan 01.22.09 at 3:06 pm
“The idea is, rather, that if I object to raising taxes on the ground that I – talented, well-paid person that I am – would work less, and therefore the poor would end up worse off overall, and we can’t have that, I can’t expect you to believe I am sincere.”
Isn’t it possible that I could believe in the difference principle (in the sense of I acknowledge the axioms that motivate it as well as the logic that establishes it, yet know that the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak? That is, I could accept that morality of the difference principle while knowing that many (including me) will fail somewhat in its implementation, and therefore output will vary with the actual level of redistribution?
Even if my conscious mind is fully committed to it, I have selfish unconscious motivations that have an effect on my behavior, and they could have an important aggregate effect.
dsquared 01.22.09 at 3:10 pm
I’ll take advantage of the same loophole Slocum’s discovered to use this thread to comment on the book not having read it, to suggest this: that you really don’t know how hard you’re capable of working until you’re put on an aggressively geared performance-related compensation scheme.
I think it makes sense to shake the examples around a bit so that we can hopefully average out everyone’s particular class prejudices, so instead of talking about my bonus, let’s talk about unionised workers, who earn higher wages than non-unionised ones, even though in some cases the lack of flexibility in union shops might lead to efficiency losses.
In general, this union premium can be justified in a Rawlsian context, because empirically union shops have higher output per head, because the workers operate better together, co-operate with one another more and make more investments in firm-specific human capital.
But isn’t this the same sort of blackmailer’s logic that GAC is complaining about? How dare these trade unionists say that they’re only willing to display workplace solidarity and perform better at their jobs if we give them guarantees of security? Couldn’t they do this anyway? The answer is, no they couldn’t. And in some (not all) cases, I don’t necessarily agree that it would be possible for someone to work as hard at a higher tax rate (not least, his or her spouse and kids would object a lot more vociferously). I think that the empirical case (that actually a lot of the compensation of high-earners is pure rent extraction) is stronger than a case which seems to rely on the logical impossibility of such a thing as an efficiency wage.
Chris Bertram 01.22.09 at 3:24 pm
Hmm, … the way I had anticipated running things was that I would post the initial piece and then others would comment. But JH seems to have interpreted things differently by doing a separate main post with its own thread. Whilst it is slightly inconvenient to have two threads in parallel, it does reduce the effort I need to make in policing mine where the rule is that if you haven’t read the book, then you can’t comment. So think of this thread as a kind of quarantine for Slocum, dsquared etc.
harry b 01.22.09 at 3:30 pm
If you’re right empirically, Daniel — that the incentives really, really, are needed to extract the production — then Cohen has no problem with incentives (well, I’ll revise that in a moment); there is some very strict version of the difference principle that he accepts, and one way of seeing what he is doing is forcing the Rawlsians to be much less forgiving of existing inequalities than they typically are.
Now I’ll revise that. He does have a problem with the incentives, though he doesn’t have a problem with the policy of creating them. He thinks that a world in which such incentives were unnecessary to benefit the least advantaged would be more just than one in which they were necessary. I think I agree with that, though having said that I’m not absolutely sure what I’m agreeing with.
Chris Bertram 01.22.09 at 3:31 pm
I refer the rt hon. dsquared to my reply on the other thread:
https://crookedtimber.org/2009/01/22/cohen-on-justice-and-equality-reading-group-1/#comment-264095
Slocum 01.22.09 at 3:43 pm
It clearly does not license objecting to changes in tax rates on the grounds that such changes would alter the incentives one faces in such a way that one would end up making different choices.
But there’s nothing at all special about tax rates–net income is net income. And we all trade off income vs many other factors (interestingness, security, status, working conditions, control, etc). Many people choose academic careers because the many non-monetary benefits more than make up for the lower pay than they might have obtained. But obviously money is still a non-trivial issue. If the pay of academic philosophers was reduced to minimum wage, surely some people would leave the field and many other prospective philosophers would avoid it because the monetary and non-monetary rewards would no longer be in balance.
How does that differ, in principle, from changing careers when one’s net income is reduced by tax rate changes which throw the monetary vs non-monetary rewards of an occupation out of balance?
My answer is that it clearly does not. If I may, with justice and in good conscience, choose academic philosophy as a career because I like the balance of monetary and non-monetary benefits, then I certainly may choose, with justice and in good conscience, to change careers when the balance of monetary rewards and non-monetary rewards changes. And it doesn’t matter if the balance changes because income is reduced by market changes in supply & demand or by increased tax rates or, on the other side of the equation, because of the deterioration in previously pleasant working conditions. Or even because what I used to find fascinating, I now find tedious.
So I really don’t see why I cannot say, in good conscience, that if tax rates are raised significantly, I will likely choose another occupation that offers greater non-monetary benefits (say, interesting ideas, lifetime job security, summers off, sabbaticals, conferences around the world–just for example). And I don’t see why I might not also point out that such good faith choices on my part (and many others) may make society less wealthy and Suzy at the bus stop worse off.
JoB 01.22.09 at 3:45 pm
dsquared,
that you really don’t know how hard you’re capable of working until you’re put on an aggressively geared performance-related compensation scheme.
What a depressing idea! Even if it’s true that performance pay makes people work harder (iso my reality where it just makes them suck up to bosses harder), who cares? What value is there in working harder on senseless topics or without any talent for the task at hand?
dsquared 01.22.09 at 4:05 pm
Thanks Chris. I think that this situation is a lot more ubiquitous than it’s perhaps given credit for – I’d tentatively advance the view that someone who has spent his entire career working at the highest level in a field which he loves is probably not all that well placed to judge the psychological realities of how the rest of us motivate ourselves to get up at five o’clock every morning.
Chris Bertram 01.22.09 at 4:24 pm
Actually, he seems rather alive to the fact that many talented people in well-paid jobs get a lot of enjoyment from their work and that a lot of poorly paid people don’t.
harry b 01.22.09 at 4:32 pm
slocum, just to be clear I wasn’t saying that you haven’t pressed at what I think is the sorest spot here (I think you have). I agree that it is very difficult for Cohen to get out of it. My vision is a bit fuzzy about this, but my thought is that everything turns on what the content is of the legitimate self-interested prerogative we are entitled to deploy in justification of our choices. I don’t know what Cohen thinks that is (he won’t say) or, worse, what I think it is (haven’t thought enough about it to have a stable view, even though I’ve thought a lot about it). You are assuming that the space of the self-interested prerogative is quite large, and if so everything you say goes through. I’m saying that (for Cohen) it must be quite small, because it is sufficiently small that it does not license objections to changes in tax rates on self-regarding grounds. If that’s right, then Cohen may, indeed, be committed to the view that people who are talented enough to be productive in ways that benefit the least advantaged are unjustified in becoming philosophers (in a just society — all this is going on under the assumption of full compliance, so there is no straightforward implication about what we are justified in doing in a world in which, like ours, there is far-from-full-compliance). That view doesn’t seem at all counterintuitive to me, by the way.
dsquared 01.22.09 at 4:39 pm
15: hmmm, but it’s quite difficult to separate the extent to which these jobs are fun and well-paid from the extent to which they’re fun because they’re well-paid. I enjoy my job, but I wouldn’t do it as a hobby, and if it paid a tenth of the salary, I doubt I’d put in 13 hours a day for the fun alone. And even if I did, my wife and kids would definitely object much more vociferously than they in fact do.
harry b 01.22.09 at 4:42 pm
But isn’t that a reason to pay attention (at the very least in ideal theory) to the occupational structure and its design? I’ve been meaning to write something for CT about this for ages. Maybe I will…
dsquared 01.22.09 at 4:46 pm
But isn’t that a reason to pay attention (at the very least in ideal theory) to the occupational structure and its design?
But surely the person who’s objecting to higher rates of tax is going to do so on the basis of some theory of the economy which is at its base Hayekian, and which implies that this sort of central planning can’t be done at all, let alone done in a state of ignorance?
Chris Bertram 01.22.09 at 4:49 pm
I’d do the teaching, writing and thinking parts of my job for half the money. In fact, I think I’d do some of those things if I was on the dole (though it is hard to be sure). I wouldn’t do the management stuff though, I need compensation for the pain of that. But compensation (rather than incentive) is OK.
dsquared 01.22.09 at 5:06 pm
Hmmmm, I think it’s looking like the distinction between “compensation” and “incentive” is going to have to bear an awful lot of weight here. Specifically, it’s going to drag in an awful lot of the problems of value theory that we know and hate, in order to make a distinction between what might be considered a “fair compensation” for the added time and hassle of doing university admin (say, the amount of money that a reasonably competent freelance administrator might get for the job in an an ideally-organised planned economy), and the actual amount of money that the person who gets given the job wants to persuade them to do it. I have a strong suspicion that this is going to end up in a version of the transformation problem.
Slocum 01.22.09 at 5:52 pm
Actually, he seems rather alive to the fact that many talented people in well-paid jobs get a lot of enjoyment from their work and that a lot of poorly paid people don’t.
So what would you all think of calculating tax obligations based on ‘total compensation’ which would be defined as cash benefits plus all tangible and intangible benefits (enjoyment, status, job security, working conditions, physical demands, etc) as a form of imputed income?
That way, the problem of talented shirkers is solved — by all means choose an interesting, enjoyable but lower paid job, but realize we’re going to tax your psychic income as well as your cash income and plan accordingly. So we survey workers without tenure how much lower a salary they would accept for that kind of security — and then we add that to the income of the tenured for tax purposes. We ask working mothers what they would pay, if they could afford it, to be able to stay at home with their kids — and then we impute that income to stay-at-home moms and tax them on it.
notsneaky 01.22.09 at 5:54 pm
17 and 20 together seem to imply that it is not in fact that hard to separate the jobs that are well-paid and fun (Chris’ teaching, writing and thinking) and fun because they’re well paid (daniel’s and Chris’ management stuff). Maybe not easy but not necessarily hard either.
dsquared 01.22.09 at 6:00 pm
23: maybe, but I think probably at the cost of having so much in the second category that the original distinction between “compensation” and “incentive” loses its force.
I quite like Slocum’s #22 and suspect that actually Cohen probably would endorse some version of this proposal – I don’t think it’s inconsistent at all.
Chris Bertram 01.22.09 at 6:52 pm
The distinction between incentives and compensation might be hard to _operationalize_, but it is surely a perfectly sensible distinction in principle. Incentives are all about getting people to act differently, but compensation can come in even when there’s no prospect of doing so. If Adam and Eve work all day long in at the only work there is to do, then there’s no room for incentives. But if Eve finds the work more painful than Adam does, then there’s an egalitarian case for paying her more to compensate.
Martin James 01.22.09 at 8:16 pm
I’m trying to get a grip on the distribution of income and the meaning of justice separate from the incentive effects on labor.
So consider the following thought experiment a perfectly just society exists where income is justly distributed at time t. At time +1 two things happen.
1. A group of the highest income people decide to have a winner take all contest such that the first one to climb a mountain get half of everyone’s income. Is this unjust because it creates more inequality without improving anyone’s lot?
2. A group of the lowest income decides to have a lottery where the winner gets half of everyone’s income. Is this unjust because it creates more inequality without improving the lot of the poorest?
Most people think they are better (and luckier) than average. Is it really unjust for them to have winner-take-all contests based on that belief?
dsquared 01.22.09 at 8:33 pm
If Adam and Eve work all day long in at the only work there is to do, then there’s no room for incentives. But if Eve finds the work more painful than Adam does, then there’s an egalitarian case for paying her more to compensate
I think, though, that it’s essential to this example that you’ve constructed a case in which the output required and length of the working day have been decided by an omniscient planner. Surely if left to choose the amount of work they did by themselves, we’d end up with an equilibrium in which Eve worked less than Adam, and it would be necessary to incentivise Eve to work the extra hours. And I think this is quite a weakness if the argument is going to have much purchase with the kind of people who claim they’d work less hard if the tax rate was higher; surely such a person would make the point that societies which start by planning the socially optimal work to be done and then compensating, tend in the long term to have worse outcomes than societies which allow people to choose their own equilibrium and then adjust toward the social optimum by incentivising. Or equivalently, when you say that the distinction is difficult to operationalize, I think that the difficulty of doing so is actually equivalent to the socialist calculation problem. If there’s no solution to the calculation problem (controversial but arguable either way), then this operational difficulty is a difficulty in principle.
LizardBreath 01.22.09 at 8:49 pm
Surely if left to choose the amount of work they did by themselves, we’d end up with an equilibrium in which Eve worked less than Adam, and it would be necessary to incentivise Eve to work the extra hours.
Say that both Adam and Eve value the compensation for each hour of work more than any leisure, so that they’re both working every available hour. But that Eve values leisure (or dislikes work) more than Adam. I think that rescues the example, without needing to assume an omniscient planner.
Daniel 01.22.09 at 9:30 pm
I think that rescues the example, without needing to assume an omniscient planner.
No; or at least not in the absence of another mechanism to explain why the wage rate has been set at a level that leaves economic rents for both workers; surely Adam would bid to do an hour of Eve’s work at Eve’s reservation wage minus an epsilon.
Daniel 01.22.09 at 9:35 pm
(and also note that whatever Chris’s compensation scheme was, it could be supported as an equilibrium of such a bargaining game; one of the Arrow-Debreu theorems unless I’ve totally forgotten which damn theorem in which, which is likely).
harry b 01.22.09 at 9:36 pm
I also think Cohen would endorse something like slocum’s #22 (just to add, I’m not sure I would endorse it) — but I’d like to hear from those closer to Cohen (including, for example, Cohen, who is not completely ignorant of CT) whether that’s right, and if not why not.
harry b 01.22.09 at 9:42 pm
By the way, in the 70s there was a rather technical debate between Rawls and Alexander and Musgrave in American Economic Review and Quarterly Journal of Economics on how to impute the length of the workday for these purposes. Basically, some omnisicient planner does, indeed, fix the length of the workday at 8 hours (or thereabouts).
Oh, and I wanted to say that I assume we’re all assuming away all the practical problems with slocum’s #22.
virgil xenophon 01.22.09 at 9:53 pm
That dsquared @24 “quite likes” Slocum’s theoretical solution@22 is fine as it goes as long as one is evaluating the logic of theoretical constructs. But I shudder to think he is seriously proposing Slocum’s proposal as a real-world solution. I’ve got a real mental picture of just how society would go about not only deciding who should sit in judgment of the definition of the scope and depth of “psychic incomes” but of the very efforts to frame a working definition and scale of measurements. Just another example of the classic theoretical “good idea” that will never, ever, work in practice in the real world–and therefore all analytical effort concerning such proposals a waste of time as specious indeed–as dsquared acknowledges@27: “If there’s no solution to the calculation problem……..then this operational difficulty is a difficulty in principle.”
dsquared 01.22.09 at 10:23 pm
There’s definitely one of Cohen’s books where he seems to endorse a comprehensive theory of psychological income along the lines of slocum’s #22; either that or I am having the most extraordinarily vivid hallucinations of political philosophy textbooks. I’ll try and find the bit I’m thinking about.
Phil 01.22.09 at 10:40 pm
D^2: it’s quite difficult to separate the extent to which these jobs are fun and well-paid from the extent to which they’re fun because they’re well-paid
This becomes a lot easier if one’s job isn’t well-paid. Fortunately for me, I enjoy almost everything I’m paid to do (even marking). (I don’t enjoy starting some of the things I’m paid to do, I have to admit.) My experience supports Daniel’s argument ex negativo to some extent, inasmuch as the pervasive atmosphere of underpayment, lack of appreciation and insecurity is what I don’t enjoy about work. But the stuff I do? The stuff I do is great, and I know for a fact that I’d be doing at least some of it if I wasn’t getting paid – because I was doing some of it without getting paid, in the days when I had a secure and well-paid job which I hated.
Tax that.
Yarrow 01.23.09 at 12:16 am
dsquared @ 27: Surely if left to choose the amount of work they did by themselves, we’d end up with an equilibrium in which Eve worked less than Adam, and it would be necessary to incentivise Eve to work the extra hours. … If there’s no solution to the calculation problem (controversial but arguable either way), then this operational difficulty is a difficulty in principle.
The non-existence of an exact solution surely doesn’t mean a difficulty in principle. I think it’s quite likely that under capitalism there’s not even a rough solution; but say we were organized as anarchist affinity groups, where compensation between affinity groups was allocated in a fairly objective manner that looked a lot like Slocum’s 22, and within affinity groups compensation was allocated as in a family, or a commune; then it seems a rough solution would be possible. Maybe Eve would work a little less and Adam a little more; maybe Eve would get her favorite cheese at every meal and first pick of the chocolates.
harry b 01.23.09 at 12:28 am
Slocum — how do you feel about this?
dsquared 01.23.09 at 12:43 am
say we were organized as anarchist affinity groups, where compensation between affinity groups was allocated in a fairly objective manner that looked a lot like Slocum’s 22, and within affinity groups compensation was allocated as in a family, or a commune; then it seems a rough solution would be possible
Whoooa. Surely our imaginary Republican-Rawlsian would be entirely within his rights to point out that “say we were organized as anarchist affinity groups rather than along capitalist lines” might be equivalent to “say we were organized in a way which produced far less resources for the worst off in society”. My point here is that the kind of measurement you need to make the distinction between compensation and incentivisation is only possible under some systems of economic organisation, and it’s not obvious that they’re the best ones.
My guess is that this line of argument is going to end up having to deny (probably on environmentalist grounds) that capitalism is actually the most efficient mode of production, but it’s worth being aware of the size of the bullet we’re swallowing here.
dsquared 01.23.09 at 12:49 am
Ahhhh, I’ve found the bit I was hallucinating about in #34. “Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality“, p170, footnote 10, talking about an economy of pure abstract pleasure. In this imaginary economy, the gifted pleasure-givers still have to put in as many hours as the rest, suggesting that I was wrong to say he endorsed a full psychological income model, I think.
Slocum 01.23.09 at 2:20 am
Slocum—how do you feel about this?
Me? I’m a libertarian. I had intended #22 more as a reductio ad absurdum than a practical policy proposal. I think the idea of calculating and taxing imputed income would be a nightmare and make for an oppressive society. Not quite Harrison Bergeron — but bad enough.
There actually is a group of people who are already taxed not on what they earn but on what a government official determines they should be able to earn — namely non-custodial parents with child support orders. I understand this is not a pleasant situation for those finding their choice is either to stay in the traces and slog away or face contempt of court and what is, effectively, debtor’s prison. Imagine a society where everyone was under similar court supervision for his or her entire working life.
What’s the alternative? Pretty simple — tax cash incomes only and do so at lower, revenue-maximizing rates rather than higher, ‘equality maximizing’ rates that drive productive people to consider emigration, career changes, or early retirement (and reduce overall prosperity). Use tax revenues to provide education and a solid safety net. And then leave people to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ in whatever form they like. In a society where everyone lives well above subsistence levels, attempts to minimize inequality cannot be justified; such will inevitably lead to both oppression and reduced prosperity for everyone — rich and poor.
Russell Arben Fox 01.23.09 at 3:41 am
First, my thanks to John for this post, and to Harry, Slocum, dsquared, Chris, and others, for carrying on this fascinating thread on incentives, choice, and taxation. I mean it; this has all been of great benefit to my thinking, and I truly appreciate it.
But second, a question, or maybe just an observation: why is it that the concluding point of both Cohen’s argument and John’s summary of it has not been addressed even once? That is, namely, the question of what conditions need to obtain in modern society for something approximating, or at least coming close to appoximating, a “newer, slightly less soggy, [crunchy, perhaps?] mega-Gemeinschaftlichkeit” to be achieved. That sort of socialistic, communitarian reflection may not be of interest to many; as John notes such concerns might involve dwelling upon a “bar [that] is always placed too high…[for] the more rough-and-tumble arena of society at large.” But if that is the case–if political philosophy really doesn’t want to spend too much time addressing why modern mass society is as rough and tumble as it apparently is, and whether it can eventually be (re)made otherwise–then doesn’t that strengthen Rawls against Cohen’s critique? Rawls could simply say to Cohen, as John implies, that his political liberalism at least proposes, through the difference principle, a nice policy that may trick some wealthy, talented people into allowing our divisive, selfish world (which, he might contendly add, will not fundamentally change) to be slightly more egalitarian without freaking them out too much, thus alerting their inner John Galts.
Z 01.23.09 at 7:05 am
Slocum—how do you feel about this?
But, Harry (and theoretically Slocum, but I understood your reductio ad absurdum endeavor), isn’t there an asymmetry in taxing all psychological goods on the one hand, and considering only monetary good in the difference principle on the other, and isn’t this asymmetry the key to generalizing the hypocrisy accusation to the point where it becomes meaningless? Concretely, I am an academic and my career choice certainly does not maximize the tax return I could obtain with my qualifications (so I am one of Slocum’s example). Am I a hypocrite in defending the difference principle? I don’t think so, because even though I readily admit that my production does not maximize tax return (so there is a Suzy somewhere who has 1$ less because I don’t work in a financial firm), I do sincerely think that my career choice maximizes my total net contribution to society (or at least is close to the optimum). So even though Suzy has only 10$, and not 11, because of my career choice; she was also better educated for free, and I personally think that the value of the education she got from me is worth more than 1$. So no, I don’t think the charge of hypocrisy can be employed so easily and I don’t think philosophers can be presumed to not caring about the difference principle as in Slocum’s 12. More generally, whenever an individual faces trade-offs (income vs. spare time, say), one should also take a good look at what the trade-offs for the society are (tax revenue vs. free public good, say).
However, I do think the hypocrisy charge can be used sometimes: if I change communities to do the exact same job because it is better paid (or less taxed), or worse if I register my income in a fictive place to exploit a loophole in the tax system of my community, then it can be reasonably inferred that I don’t care about the difference principle within my original community and Cohen argument applies.
To sum up, I am not nearly as convinced as Harry seems to be that Slocum’s questions significantly weakens Cohen’s argument.
dsquared 01.23.09 at 7:45 am
Rawls could simply say to Cohen, as John implies, that his political liberalism at least proposes, through the difference principle, a nice policy that may trick some wealthy, talented people into allowing our divisive, selfish world (which, he might contendly add, will not fundamentally change) to be slightly more egalitarian without freaking them out too much, thus alerting their inner John Galts.
I doubt Cohen would particularly want to deny that a Rawlsian society is easier, practically, to construct out of a modern capitalist one, but surely his point in the book is that this isn’t what “justice” and “fairness” mean?
dsquared 01.23.09 at 8:13 am
Chris responds via mobile comms:
Jon Mandle 01.23.09 at 4:03 pm
I think the issue of community cuts to the heart of Cohen’s position. It is not only a question of feasibility but also of the attractiveness of this model. When contrasted with selfishness, community certainly has its attractions. But it also conflicts with diversity. I point this out obliquely in a comment on Chris’s post (#11) but perhaps it bears some elaboration.
For Cohen, when we share a community, we owe each other a justification for our behavior: “if their reason for refusing to justify [their behavior] is that they do not think themselves accountable to their interrogators, that they do not think they need to provide a justification, then they are forswearing community with the rest of us in respect of the policy issue in question.” (p.44) Cohen’s argument against incentives depends on assuming that that there is a society-wide community in that we must be able to justify our behavior to each other whenever our behavior has economic effects on others: “The incentives argument is not problematic … when it is thought acceptable to view the rich as outside the community to which the poor belong.” (p.65)
My claim is not only that such a society-wide community is unrealistic, it is also unattractive. Think first about religious diversity. We don’t think we do (nor should we) owe each other each other a public justification of our religious beliefs. Within a very broad range of beliefs, “That’s just what I sincerely believe” is good enough, but this is no justification at all to someone who sincerely believes something else – rather, it’s a rejection of the need for justification. If we are not all part of a religious community, this isn’t because of our selfishness but because of our diversity. And even if being part of a religious community has its attractions, being part of a diverse society has its attractions, too.
So what about our preferences concerning how we balance our work and leisure – the trade-off between hours at work and hours with our families, for example? I claim that like our religious faith, we don’t owe each other a public justification (within broad limits) for how we balance these – again, in the name of diversity. It can’t be that we owe each other justification whenever our behavior affects the economic fortunes of others since our religious beliefs do that, too. On the other hand – and here I’ll just assert it – I think we do owe each other a public justification for the design of the tax scheme (and basic structure generally).
Russell Arben Fox 01.23.09 at 5:45 pm
My claim is not only that such a society-wide community is unrealistic, it is also unattractive.
A couple of brief thoughts on your important contribution, Jon. 1) I think there is a lot of uncomplete and potentially arguable work being assumed under the “society-wide” adjective you put before “community.” How big is this society? What is its relation–spatially, federally, commercially–to other societies? Must it be essentially sovereign, reasonably self-sufficient, effectively self-contained, or may there be a level of mutualism here? It may be that smller discreet societies can achieve a sufficient level of “community” for Cohen’s emphasis on shared egalitarian justifications to become operable, without necessarily losing all or maybe even most of those attractive social goods which we have come to assume as appropriate or necessary to societies that function on a larger plane. 2) If we do want to reserve our assumptions about the practicability or attractiveness of “community” to arenas of public action which really are “[larger, modern, state-associated] society-wide,” then even there I think there can be some reflection upon what kind of shrared justifications can be sustained, without simply breaking things down along lines which say that religious beliefs ought not be subject to the demand for egalitarian public justifications, but the basic economic structure of society can be. You have a plethora of “civil society” institutions and structures–public and parochial schools, parks and sports clubs, charitable and civic organizations–that, to varying degrees, might be effectively subject to and/or used to promote such shared justifications. That would at least allow certain policies which could move us more fully on towards what Cohen, I think rightly, presents as a correction to a weakness in Rawls’s own egalitarian scheme.
Jon Mandle 01.23.09 at 6:09 pm
These are certainly good questions – and interesting issues – Russell. Let me just say, I am following Cohen’s lead and talking about countries like the US and Britain. I agree with your suggestion that we may have different justificatory burdens toward others with whom we have additional special relationships – i.e. with whom we form other communities. Let me emphasize again that Cohen’s argument depends on the assumption that we share a community: “Whether they should be in a community with one another is a separate question… In my own (here undefended) view, it diminishes the democratic character of a society if it is not a community in the present sense, since we do not make policy together if we make it in light of what some of us do that cannot be justified to others.” (p.45) Notice that it is not just the policy that we must justify to one another, it is also whatever individual preferences and behaviors are relevant to the policy that we must justify to one another. It is this that I find unattractive, not only unrealistic.
engels 01.23.09 at 8:14 pm
Notice that it is not just the policy that we must justify to one another, it is also whatever individual preferences and behaviors are relevant to the policy that we must justify to one another. It is this that I find unattractive, not only unrealistic.
Is this right?As I understand it, it is indeed only the policy that has to be justified, not ‘whatever individual preferences and behaviors are relevant to the policy’. But when justifying this policy the rich would have to say something like ‘you’d better not raise our taxes because if you do we are not going to work as hard as before’ and he thinks that the structure of this explanation means that it fails as a justification (for similar reasons that a blackmailer’s threat does; not because the counterfactual behaviour has not been justified.)
To take an example which seems to show that your formulation isn’t right, it might be argued that the NHS should have single-sex wards and the justification for this might be that many patients strongly prefer this. The policy then is justified by reference to preferences, and these preferences have economic consequences for others (it’s more expensive to organise the wards this way) but I don’t think Cohen would say that these preferences would have to be justified in order for the policy to be. So I think the claim he is making is more limited than what your remarks above suggest. But perhaps I’m missing the point.
virgil xenophon 01.23.09 at 8:29 pm
Regarding justification to the community and economic utility, I would suppose that Michalangelo, if criticized while lying on his back painting the ceiling of the Sistine
Chapel for not white-washing the slums of Rome instead (for a more immediate betterment of the lives of his fellow citizens) would have replied that he was doing what was both pleasing to him and to his God (never mind the Popes) and that that was justification enough. Pretty hard to fit that picture into Cohen’s “shared sense of community.”
ingrid robeyns 01.23.09 at 9:02 pm
I’m finally catching up – since only one parent in my household could attend the Cohen conference in Oxford, and it wasn’t me, I’m caring a double parental care-load these days. And I realise I am missing out on all the fun in Oxford. Oh well. I’m trying not to feel too envious.
Just a quick practical comment responding to Chris @ 9, yes – I also thought only one of us (in this case you) would write a post – and I think that’s what we should do for the following chapters. I don’t find these two parallel posts very convenient, and if I have any substantive comment on this first chapter, I’ll write them in in the comments section of Chris’s post.
harry b 01.23.09 at 9:04 pm
Maybe we should have a parallel quarantine thread for all the chapters — I like the “have to have read the book” rule in principle but have learned a lot from daniel and slocum here.
Pete 01.24.09 at 2:10 pm
To engels @ 48:
I believe Jon has it right that, for example, the rich must justify their choice not to work as much given higher taxes to the poor. This is because of Cohen’s desire for what he labels comprehensive justification. The first step in comprehensive justification is to justify the policy: say, lower taxes would be justified if they would encourage the more productive to work more, benefiting everyone. But, Cohen then thinks that this behavior (working more given lower taxes, or working less given higher taxes) must itself be justified, by any member of society to any other member of society. So, in this example, the rich person must justify their choice not to work as hard given a higher tax, thus depriving the poorer person of the results of the rich person’s labor, to the poor person. It is this kind of justification (of individual behaviors and preferences) that I understand Jon to be saying he does not think is realistic or attractive (please correct me if I’ve misconstrued your point, Jon).
engels 01.24.09 at 2:30 pm
Pete, I think you have misunderstood my point (so sorry if I wasn’t clear). I never disagreed about the specific point you are repeating here: Jon has it right that, for example, the rich must justify their choice not to work as much given higher taxes to the poor. My query was about the more general claim which Jon attributes to Cohen. It seems unattractive to me as well (see my example) and I’m not convinced that Cohen defends it.
engels 01.24.09 at 2:35 pm
(On the other thread, Jon puts the claim like this: For Cohen… I have a general obligation to justify to my community any preference that is relevant to the design of a public policy. Is this right? As I have said, it seems odd to me, and I didn’t get it from my reading of the present chapter, but I could be wrong as may not have read carefully enough and I don’t have it to hand now in order to check.)
Yarrow 01.24.09 at 3:05 pm
dsquared: Whoooa. Surely our imaginary Republican-Rawlsian would be entirely within his rights to point out that “say we were organized as anarchist affinity groups rather than along capitalist lines†might be equivalent to “say we were organized in a way which produced far less resources for the worst off in societyâ€.
Perhaps a Rawlsian, whose imaginary society, though capitalist, is just (in Rawl’s sense), might rightly raise that question. The Republican, though, must paraphrase Rumsfeld and go with the capitalism we have — not the capitalism the Rawslian might wish or want to have at a later time.
What I like about Cohen is his emphasis on an ethos of justice as well as just institutions. I think that as long as we keep an ethos of capitalism rather than an ethos of justice, we’re going to find ourselves with something very like the capitalism we have — a mixture of kinder, gentler kleptocracies and totally rapacious kleptocracies.
Matt 01.24.09 at 3:45 pm
The idea that under Rawls’s system there is an “ethos of capitalism” is a common but mistaken position, I think. (It’s often encouraged by the way that Cohen and some others, Van Parijs, for example, tend to present the difference principle as if it were a version of trickle-down rather than its opposite.) The idea that this is so comes from the fact that Rawls doesn’t _require_ an “ethos of justice”, misunderstanding the difference principle, and then thinking this misunderstood difference principle is the only egalitarian feature of Rawls’s view. Each step is wrong. It also ignores the arguments about the stability of justice, both in the earlier and later works. This sort of stuff can’t really be cleared up in a blog comment- they are fairly complicated arguments with many steps, and involve parts of the books that most people don’t read, so I’ll just baldly assert here that the idea, at least suggested above, that our choices are to explicitly include an “ethos of justice” directly into the concept of justice or else settle for, at best, an ethos of capitalism, a sort of kinder and gentler kleptocracy, is a false choice and not really an accurate account of the dispute between Rawls and Cohen. (It seems to me that Cohen sometimes suggests this, but insofar as he does I think he’s wrong.)
ingrid robeyns 01.24.09 at 6:16 pm
Matt, I would find it hard to believe that Cohen or Van Parijs have not read the entire Rawls. I think another plausible story is that Rawls’s work is multiple-interpretable; and that even among those who have read Rawls, even most or the entire Rawls, there are many unclarities and possible interpretations. I have firsthandedly experienced that several former PhD students of Rawls, who are Rawlsians and have publsihed widely on Rawls, give conflicting answers if you ask them a question about how to interpret Rawls. So rather than blaming those who are ‘misunderstanding’ Rawls, one could ask how it is possible that scholars who have studied with Rawls understand him so differently. (and I am not talking about just one person who has an outlier view, but half a dozen of such scholars who have significant different interpretations).
Matt 01.24.09 at 6:58 pm
Ingrid- I didn’t mean to suggest that either Van Parijs or Cohen hadn’t read all of Rawls (though I see how it might look like I meant that- not very clear on my part) but just that most people, when they read Rawls, don’t read the part of Theory, for example, that has the stability argument- the 3rd section. It does seem to me, though, that both Cohen and Van Parijs, at least sometimes, act as if the difference principle were the only egalitarian aspect of the two principles, and don’t for example, give enough attention to the ways that fair equality of opportunity and the need to protect the worth of the basic liberties, perhaps especially the political liberties, work in conjunction with it. (For example, this seems to me to be a problem in Van Parijs’s otherwise very interesting chapter in the Cambridge Companion to Rawls.) These two aspects of the two principles, for example, plausibly put limits on inequalities beyond that placed by the difference principle, so if one talks about inequalities allowed by Rawls but focus only on the difference principle, you’ll get a distorted view. As for why people disagree, well, the books are long, the arguments complex, and Rawls didn’t always work out the details very clearly. But I think people also, because of the complexity of the argument (and because many people don’t read all of it!) focus more narrowly than is justified.
Yarrow 01.24.09 at 8:39 pm
Matt: “The idea that under Rawls’s system there is an “ethos of capitalism†is a common but mistaken position…”
It seems to me that Rawslianism is an ethos of capitalism (or more precisely the ideology of one ethos of capitalism). Cohen several times (e.g., p. 88) quotes Rawls as asserting that “deep inequalites” are “inevitable” in modern societies, and it seems to me that the participants in the Original Position are representatives of an enlightened Homo economicus (enlightened because they selfishly pursue all social primary goods rather than selfishly pursuing wealth alone). Starting from (an enlightened) Homo economicus, proceeding to a justification of (certain varieties of) deep inequality: seems like a capitalist ethos to me — certainly by my lights to be preferred to the “taxing my factory to feed the poor is like frying up my leg to give them bacon” formulations of right-wing capitalist apologetics, but capitalist apologetics nevertheless.
Now not only haven’t I read the parts of Rawls that Matt says most people don’t read, I haven’t read the other parts either, so I may well be talking through my hat about Rawls. But maybe not about Rawlsians — if in fact most people don’t read the parts that call for more equality, maybe that says something about why people read Rawls. I’m interested in him partly because his theory explains how people like Hilzoy, who can write so eloquently about the necessity for the minimum wage can nevertheless take capitalism as the almost unstated of course background for talking about what a good society would be like. (Come to think of it, Hilzoy is also my primary source of knowledge about Rawls.)
engels 01.25.09 at 1:59 am
Sorry: now that I look at it again what I wrote above looks a bit confused, and Pete’s explanation of comprehensive justification does in fact address the query I had, so thanks for that. To quote from the Tanner Lecture:
This seems close enough to what Jon said (although it does talk about justifying behaviour rather than preferences, if that makes any difference).
I suppose what I was worried about was the idea that we might want to base policies on preferences which are widely shared and unobjectionable but are nevertheless hard to justify rationally. I was wondering if the demand for justification of every individual preference that bears on policy might demand a sort of tyranny of the rational over people’s harmless and perhaps deeply held preferences and the examples I gave here and on the other thread were intended to bring that out (perhaps not very successfully). I thought Cohen would be averse to such a thing but it seemed to follow from each of us having a general obligation to justify to my community any preference that is relevant to the design of a public policy.
engels 01.25.09 at 2:33 am
(One last try at giving an example: in England I believe we spend a great deal of public money trying to reduce accidents on railways, even though rail travel is known to be already much safer than other forms of transport. So perhaps the government’s concern with safety on the railways is ‘irrational’ but it nevertheless reflects the preferences of most of the public, who apparently care more (irrationally and unjustifiably perhaps) about railway accidents than accidents on the roads. Is this policy then unjust?)
John Holbo 01.25.09 at 10:14 am
“You and Cohen are not alone – I’d say approximately half of the time German words are used in English texts, they are used incorrectly in one way or another, which is quite amusing but also slightly embarrassing.”
Well, sorry, it was just a typo. I took German for several years, so I know about the ‘schaft’ thing, even if my fingers apparently forget now and then. (My fingers are like the ‘near abroad’, as the Russians say. Sometimes recalcitrant.)
I’m catching up on this thread at a cafe on vacation. So I haven’t quite absorbed all the comments yet. What I would emphasize is what harry b says, upstream:
“Cohen is very clear that he agrees with Scheffler (and nearly everyone else) that there is some self-regarding prerogative, so we are justified in paying some attention, when making choices about such things as what career to adopt, to our own interests.”
In a sense, his complaint about the difference principle, then, is that it is TOO stringent. What keeps it from being too stringent in practice is that governments apply it, not individuals. So the slackness in its application that gives you space to pursue your self-regarding prerogatives is, paradoxically, impossible if YOU are required to believe it personally.
JoB 01.25.09 at 11:18 am
John, Matt,
Here’s my difficulty (only having read parts of Rawls) – my understanding was that his Original position was designed so as to require participants to wear a Veil of ignorance by which the participants lost the partiality to their specific interests. As far as I knew this means that the rich would not be able to weigh in their particular state of richness nor would the religious be able to weigh in their particular state of faith nor vice versa.
Having followed this discussion (and not having the time to read Cohen) it seems to me that the discussion here (& what it intimates of what Cohen says) is at odds with Rawls’ basic thought experiment since constant reference is made to what people would do in case they would weigh in their personal interest based on their particulars (‘being rich’ seems the example at hand). Now, whatever one may think of Rawls’ argument (I have always thought his conclusion was intuitively more powerful than this way of reaching it via rational argument): isn’t it unfair to attack his conclusions on the assumptions he took specific care to avoid i.e. the partiality of the moral agents to their particular way of life?
Yarrow,
You say:
It seems to me that Rawslianism is an ethos of capitalism (or more precisely the ideology of one ethos of capitalism).
Rawls says (footnote on p.8 of Justice as Fairness, A Restatement):
(..) distinguishes between a property-owning democracy and a capitalist welfare state and maintains that the latter conflicts with justice as fairness.
Maybe you have a very clear distinction between Rawls and Rawlsians maintaining the latter necessarily disagree with the former on this point but, failing that, what versions of capitalism are you referring to that Rawls did not sunsume under capitalism?
On the point of ‘ethos’: see above, I think the ‘ethos’ part is excluded from the Rawlsian view – or at least that’s what I always read him as saying – and replaced by pure rational choice. Not that I want to argue that he succeeds, I just want to ensure I understood it as he meant it.
LFC 01.25.09 at 12:38 pm
Skimming through this thread, my eye was caught my Matt’s point @58 that the difference principle isn’t the only limit on inequality in Rawls. This useful (I think) point was made long ago by Robert Amdur in his article “Rawls and His Radical Critics,” Dissent, Summer 1980.
Pete 01.25.09 at 6:49 pm
Engels, thank you for your clarification. I do not think that I understood or responded to your original point. As I understand your point now, the worry is that Cohen’s demand for comprehensive justification of national policy will deny justification to any policy defended on the basis of a preference that is not universally shared (such as a demand for safer rail travel when the money could go to other things, including improving the safety of forms of travel already more dangerous than rail).
I’m worried about this consequence too, but I’m not exactly sure what to say about it. Cohen says in footnote 15, “It follows, harmlessly, that penal policies adopted to reduce the incidence of crime lack comprehensive justification. The very fact that such a policy is justified shows that all is not well with society” (p. 41). So, apparently, that a policy lacks comprehensive justification can sometimes be “harmless.” I’d like to see how we are supposed to distinguish the times when we do require comprehensive justification from the times we don’t. This amounts to asking when we need to justify our individual behaviors and preferences (I think: insofar as our behavior is based on these preferences) to our fellow citizens, and when we do not. Rawls, of course, does give an answer to this question; a very rich answer in his account of public reason and its proper place.
Here’s another example, to add to the pool (consisting so far of religion and rail travel among other): let us say we are considering a policy to form a series of grants to promote ballet, including need-based grants to those who lack the money to pay for ballet classes and such, to be paid for out of tax revenues. A good majority of people in the society at issue believe that the fine arts, and ballet in particular, are important and worthy of promotion as part of the national culture. Still, when considering comprehensive justification, consider the case of the poor ballet dancer trying to justify this policy to someone who is not in this majority, and thinks there is little value to the fine arts (let’s call this person “Phil” (…istine… ba dum bum)). The poor ballet dancer says, “Phil, I cannot afford to pay for ballet classes, so I would like to use taxes on your income/payroll/spending (whatever) to pay for my ballet classes.” Phil, of course, finds this to be ridiculous. So, the policy lacks comprehensive justification. Does this matter? Is this like the crime case, or like the difference principle case?
Yarrow 01.25.09 at 11:36 pm
JoB : “Rawls says … (..) distinguishes between a property-owning democracy and a capitalist welfare state and maintains that the latter conflicts with justice as fairness.
“Maybe you have a very clear distinction between Rawls and Rawlsians maintaining the latter necessarily disagree with the former on this point but, failing that, what versions of capitalism are you referring to that Rawls did not sunsume under capitalism?”
As I confessed above, my knowledge of Rawls is beyond sketchy — so I needed Google to tell me what “property-owning democracy” means. The first three hits are (1) a paper by Wonsup Jung maintaining, apparently contra Rawls, that democratic socialism is not compatible with Rawls’ liberalism (but property-owning democracy is); (2) a 1987 article in Time headlined with the Margaret Thatcher quote “We Are Building a Property-Owning Democracy”; and (3) a paper by Amit Ron which “argue[s] that Rawls inherited a discursive matrix from the British Conservatives in which the notion of ‘property-owning democracy’ refers to the limits that should be set on democratic practices to make it compatible with the needs and interests of property-owners”, but that Rawls, following James Meade, turned that around “to re-examine the distribution of property-ownership from the perspective of what is required for viable democratic deliberations.”
Another paper, by Martin O’Neill, gave me a few more details: he mentions “wide dispersal of the ownership of the means of production, with individual citizens controlling productive capital (and perhaps with an opportunity to control their own working conditions).
Perhaps to control their own working conditions! Sounds like capitalism to me — either (a) the idyllic Adam Smith picture of capitalism, only for real, where oligopoly doesn’t happen because none of the individual actors are large enough to sway the market, or (b) something like Bush’s “ownership society”, only for real, where everyone starts out with a fairly equal distribution of stock in the oligopolists. (Presumably in the first instance, but not the second, workers would have an opportunity to control their own working conditions.) In either case, this still sounds to me like (an ideology of) an ethos of capitalism.
JoB: “On the point of ‘ethos’: see above, I think the ‘ethos’ part is excluded from the Rawlsian view – or at least that’s what I always read him as saying – and replaced by pure rational choice. Not that I want to argue that he succeeds, I just want to ensure I understood it as he meant it.”
That sounds something like the Rawls that Cohen is arguing against, anyway. (And “pure rational choice”, of course, is a big part of capitalist ideology.)
Mark Stenekes 01.26.09 at 9:10 am
“So, the policy lacks comprehensive justification. Does this matter? Is this like the crime case, or like the difference principle caseâ€(#65)
Consider that each case: the principle imbalance of safety, the deficit of participatory culture and the criminally neglected – all have the opportunity to achieve equilibrium through an alternative or sometimes dually competitive means such as philanthropy and other forms of trade that are not taxed or even monetized. This is where the monetary and non-monetary benefits (#12) of incentive versus compensation and empiricism versus rationalism evolve into multiple complex dimensions. Phil happens to be a prosecutor who is not a fan of the ballet, his taxes are decreased which helps to supplement a generous donation (monetary) to “MADD(Mothers against drunk drivers)†The experience of Phil’s life (empirical) and conflict of interests (rational) are imposed on his will, luckily for the poor ballet dancer Phil does her a favour (non-monetary) within his circles of philanthropy. This is about as simple as I can put it without going further. Now, reconsider the implications of comprehensive justice of a higher income tax and how the money is distributed. If Phil could not afford a university education, should this be a tax funded priority, or should it be left to philanthropy? How can tax dollars build a social conscience which benefits society? It seems to me that a comprehensive justification cannot be rationally achieved in a monopolized monetary environment. The functions of non-monetary benefits provide empirical engagement within our native boundaries which evolve into a more rationally inclusive consciousness. The almost limitless boundaries of monetary incentives and compensations are dissociating the inclusive nature of our being. Phil provides legal services to the victims of drunk drivers as a charity (non-monetary), his close contact to the horrible pain these victims are suffering has an emotional effect on him; Phil successfully takes on legislators to enforce tougher penalties. If Phil donated money instead of his time, would the result have been the same? If Phil had to pay more income tax would he donate time instead of money? These types of questions are endless. The more relevant question is why would Phil want to do either charity in the first place and how can we balance monetary with non-monetary forms of trade to achieve a more comprehensive justification of policies?
Chris Armstrong 01.26.09 at 9:56 am
I’ve just gotten to my computer after attending the Cohen-send-off-intellectual-slugout at Oxford, and it was a great event. I have to say that we got no closer on the topic of the range of the personal prerogative, and not much decisive was said about the basic principles / non-basic principles argument, but it was hugely illuminating nonetheless. The kind of conference that, I suspect, will lead me to look back at the end of my career and say, ‘yep, it didn’t get any better than that!’. I don’t say this to annoy Ingrid (sorry!).
Seana Shiffrin’s paper was hugely thought-provoking on the topic of incentives. She argues that we need not assume that individuals must show adherence to the difference principle in their individual decisions about work, BUT that if they accept that principle, they must treat their talents as morally arbitrary for the purposes of determining their own marketplace rewards – hence they will not rent-seek on the basis of higher talents. For Shiffrin, this makes the basic structure debate somewhat arcane (because principles of justice need not apply to individual decisions, but one of the justifications of the difference principle, the point about the arbitrariness of talent, does apply there, at least in one context. We can assume that individuals accepting the difference principle do so at least partly because they accept that justification). It was also very interesting to get a more nuanced approach to the arbitrariness of talent: for Shiffrin (and Rawls), it is not wrong for one’s talents to influence the positions one fills. The Aristotelian argument means we are quite entitled to choose a job we can only get because of our own talent, and to earn the ‘psychic’ reward of being fulfilled in it. What we’re not entitled to do is unduly materially benefit (vis-a-vis the less talented) in so doing (other than in the form of compensation). Gerry didn’t really say what he thought about it, but it was a fine paper.
harry b 01.26.09 at 3:08 pm
Yarrow — the O’ Neill article cites Richard Krouse and Michael McPherson,
“Capitalism, ‘Property-Owning Democracy,’ and the Welfare State,†in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) which, if you can get hold of it, is still the best thing on this. I’d say that Rawls is deliberately agnostic about whether POD is a form of socialism or a form of capitalism, and also that whatever he says about this is not authoritative about the institutional implications of his theory of justice.
JoB 01.26.09 at 9:02 pm
Yarrow,
Thanks.
I didn’t mean to do a hit-and-run and imply that my quote settled anything definitely. I merely wanted to indicate that the connection between Rawls and ‘capitalism’ wasn’t so easy to make as it seemed to come out here. Words like ‘capitalism’, ‘socialism’ and – as you googled out – a term like ‘property-owning democracy’ are too imprecise to be of a lot of value in a discussion like this.
On a more to-the-point note: I continue to take issue with your reference to capitalism & ethos.
On the latter and following Seana Shiffrin mentioned by Chris, disallowing a personally motivated view on the general conception of justice is exactly Rawls’ programme. So it is not fair (a strawman) to take issue with his argument based on on the ethos involved, taking the ethos out is precisely what he sets out to do. If he didn’t he would be into the type of comprehensive doctrine regulating society he set out to relegate to a 2nd plane.
(as said, I don’t have the time to read Cohen but if Cohen understands Rawls’ principles as creating obligations for individual personal & particular decisions, he’s off the mark)
On the former and as I understand your idea of capitalism (rather laissez-faire): there’s a huge difference. Capitalists of the sort you seem to refer to (say Hayekians) do firmly believe that private property combined with a free market and individual liberties get, as automatic consequence, to the best possible societal organization. Rawls doesn”t go in for this. Much like Smith he sets out to find the constraints that need to be put for us to have an environment wherein everybody has a reasinable chance to act morally. He is a neo-Kantian and his thought experiment (see above OP, VoI) is such that people in constructing those constraints have no choice but to accept something very much like a categorical imperative.
The outcome of his argument (which, to be clear, I don’t fully buy) are the principles – and the principles are not just those of the free market and certainly take precedence on the free market. Just as an example: as far as I remember he gives concrete cases of oligopolies (specifically in the media sector) and distribution of stock ownership as the kinds of things that need regulation even if it goes against the free market.
(and as far as ‘pure rational choice’ as part of capitalist ideology: maybe so – although I think that the defense of capitalism is increasingly emotional – but: if A is part of B and A is part of C, it does NOT follow that B equals C, in fact nothing else follows than that B and C share at least one thing, namely A)
Yarrow 01.27.09 at 2:21 am
harry b – thanks for the Krouse/McPherson pointer.
JoB – I’m not saying that Rawls claimed to be advancing an ethos, or intended to be advancing an ethos. I do say (based on a fairly narrow selection of anecdata, but this is a blog comment!) that whatever his intent, he did in fact advance (inspire? provide the intellectual underpinning for?) an ethos — the ethos of folks who believe we need big changes in our current system, whose impulse is then not to wonder how to replace capitalism but how to improve it.
JoB: “…if Cohen understands Rawls’ principles as creating obligations for individual personal & particular decisions, he’s off the mark”
Cohen believes that justice creates obligations for (certain) individual personal decisions; one of his complaints is that Rawls’ principles, as least as Rawls applies them, do not.
JoB 01.27.09 at 2:21 pm
Yarrow,
It was opposite to Rawls’ intent to inspire or advance an ethos, let alone one of saving capital from all too revolutionary changes. You make it sound like he is the Heidegger of capitalism, that’s a bit rash, isn’t it? Certainly if based on anecdota. Maybe you mistake Hayek & Rawls?
But none of that (& none of this) is very interesting beyond the particulars.
What is interesting is the attack on basic liberties you seem to associate with Cohen. People have fought long and hard to get rid of sin and its likes trying to procure their freedom to do as they please within the observable limits set by a proper constitutional democracy. I’d be very afraid (to come back on topic) of Cohen’s project it it is about re-introducing some or other soft Gemeinschaftlichkeit that lays claim on how people ‘should’ think – if they are to be considered as ‘good’ people. That’s indeed the great-grandfather story of ‘everybody brushing the street in front of his own house &, sha-boum, the world will be a better place’.
It’s not the people that need to be changed, it is the law and the institutions that need change & the reason they need change is to ensure that each & every person has a chance to do whatever the hell she or he pleases with his or her time, with as little interference as possible.
The realization of Rawls is that this requires some principles, one of which will de facto have a consequence of limiting the difference in compensation (including the income from capital). I don’t care whether some find this too high a price to pay, I only care that they pay the price as it’s only fair to require them to do so. More justice than that would be injustice.
Chris Bertram 01.27.09 at 2:37 pm
Of course, it would help greatly if you would take the time and trouble to read Cohen before free-associating about what he might or might not be saying. Still, this comment of yours:
bq. It’s not the people that need to be changed, it is the law and the institutions that need change & the reason they need change is to ensure that each & every person has a chance to do whatever the hell she or he pleases with his or her time, with as little interference as possible.
is worth saying something about.
Many of us do not actually think it outrageous, in fact we think it mandatory for justice, that the state do something about racist and sexist attitudes. Yes, of course law and institutions are important instruments in combating racism and sexism, but so is education, advertising, whatever.
[Anticipation of irrelevant comment or reply: those who think that state action against racist and sexist attitudes would be ineffective or counterproductive can butt out – the issue is whether the state would be justified in acting to eradicate such attitudes if it could.]
And of course, Rawls himself believes that the state has a right to “change people” insofar as it is necessary to cultivate their respect for others’ rightt, ensure stability etc. See for ex “Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good”.
So whatever is wrong with Cohen’s view, it can’t be that he violates a _general_ prohibition on “changing people”.
JoB 01.27.09 at 3:28 pm
Chris,
Yes, it would help greatly but I don’t have the time so I limit myself to this thread and to what others report of Cohen, in this case Yarrow. If I do not sufficiently qualify this fact, that I was reacting to second order opinions on Cohen, I apologize. Was Yarrow right on Cohen?
I agree the state needs to do things with respect to sexism, racism and indeed the income gap. So, in this sense of changing people’s behaviour I have no qualms. Also, I’d regard education, advertising and the like as quite proper means so I retract the comment insofar as it seems to be referring to a very strict definition of law and institutions.
But I do think that the objective to ‘change people’ (rather than to put limits on behaviour) is a matter for comprehensive doctrines. I do not think that justice as fairness is to be construed as a comprehensive doctrine regulating what people think or should think, feel or should not feel. To keep the point sharp: I do think there is a general prohibition on changing people – the objective is to allow people to figure out their own thing. The realization of that objective is that we need a conception of justice that puts limits to people’s behaviour (as some of it is quite clearly incompatible with this root-liberal objective, for instance to have failed bankers sell the assets they acquired for 14M$ to their wifes for 100 bucks and get away with it).
(I have no issue he tries to do this. I only have an issue if he’d would succeed in doing this. I feel no compulsion to have an opinion on what he tries to do as I don’t know him – much less care to know him)
Mark Stenekes 01.27.09 at 5:07 pm
Cohen’s recognition that the free market of property and resource ownership restricts the power of some to create equal opportunities for others should be taken into light when arguing:
-The state has a right to “change people†(Rawl’s imposition of inequality generating incentives is just as long as it benefits the less fortunate)
-Cohen’s view that these kinds of inequalities would not be necessary if people were truly committed to the principles of egalitarianism.
– Justice commands the “change of peopleâ€. Cohen’s belief that justice creates obligations to influence personal decisions
Mark Stenekes 01.27.09 at 5:49 pm
John is a Christian who does not like Muslims. The states ability to change John is confined to combating acts of hate and promoting equality. The Muslims are in a minority. The state offers John a tax break if he hires students. John discards all the applicants with Muslim like names. This becomes a trend of other employers in this town, so the state hires them to work in various branches of government. John’s brother who is a police officer is furious.
John is a Christian who does not like Muslims. The states ability to change John is confined to combating acts of hate. The Muslims are in a minority. The state offers John a tax break if he hires students. John discards all the applicants with Muslim like names. This becomes a trend of other employers in this town, so the Muslims end up on welfare. John’s brother, who is a police officer, spends a good part of his career locking up Muslims.
How does justice command the change of people without the states right to promote equality?
Are people’s prejudices towards race much different than their prejudices towards the poor?
Mark Stenekes 01.27.09 at 8:43 pm
In response to my #75, as I talk to myself………….
A citizen’s capacity to act in favour of a just obligation, free of state intervention is highly subjective to the emotional forces of fear and greed (The Global Financial Crises – “OTC Derrivatives†as an ultimate tool of superficial expansion). State intervention at best, acts a logical regulator of this inherent nature, simply relying on a liberty of emotions and logic to act in favour of a just obligation is a recipe of self-destruction under the extreme imbalance of ownership that we face today. (What happened to Easter Island, the Mayans or the Norse who occupied Greenland?)
My theory here is that in order for Cohen’s theory to be more credible, the imbalance of ownership (property, resources and social class) would have to reverse its course so the boundaries of failure and success contract, hence state intervention to diminish in comprehensible proportion.
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