My comprehensive plan for US policy on the Middle East

I see that “Middle East” became “Israel” even more quickly than in the original comment thread.

Well, Obama’s attempt at a nuclear deal and rapprochement with Iran seems a whole lot better than nothing I’d say.

>2. Cut off all military aid to countries in the Middle East

Will make israel more paranoid and aggressive, will put iraq at serious risk of total collapse.

>3. Cut off diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia

will result in them immediately acquiring nuclear weapons from pakistan.

>4. End all CIA or other covert support for groups in the region

Will result in the collapse of the opposition to assad.

>5. Put sanctions on any state in the region that funds terrorist groups

Frankly, that’s pretty much everyone who exports oil. Since the rest of the world isn’t going to embargo the oil exporters, those sanctions will accomplish nothing.

>6. Abolish the CIA, or at least covert CIA political interventions (this would help to address a lot of other problems outside the region too)

When, exactly do you think the CIA last had a political intervention in the middle east? 1953?

>9. Provide development aid (non-military) to the region
>10. Put diplomatic pressure on repressive regimes in the region

How would you do that when you’ve cut off relations, military support, aid, and trade with all of them? You plan is literally to throw away all levels of power then say “now change!” Rarely have I seen such magical thinking.

The United States has only one option left in the Middle East. That is to build a time machine, go back to 1911, and prevent Winston Churchill and Jacky Fisher from converting the British Navy from coal to oil. Admittedly, serious obstacles stand in the way of implementing this approach, but there is no alternative.

cassander: Well I’m glad you at least liked 1, 7 and 8. Some of your points are reasonable, but I think you’re exaggerating a bit in your treatment of 9 and 10. There would be no need to cut off relations, aid, or trade. Yes, you’d have some sanctions, but there would still be trade. (Perhaps 2 was a bit over-the-top and unnecessary. But certainly Saudi Arabia should lose its status as a US ally.) With regard to 6, by ‘political interventions’ I meant any kind of covert payments to anybody. If the CIA is not doing that now, that’s great, if it is, it should stop.

Quiggin’s plan is reactionary, antisemitic, imperialist, warmongering Western propaganda.

… Well, surely I wasn’t expected to read it first.

Peter T @ 11
Do you have any evidence on who got killed by the “tactical airpower” – in light of my comments above that in contemporary warfare it’s mainly civilians who get killed? Genuine question.

@Matt, the overwhelming majority of civilian deaths are down to the regime. ISIS may get the headlines, but their capacity for killing people is far less impressive than Assad’s (or, more likely, they have less opportunity).

Peter T @ 15
Thanks, I tried to reply but my comment disappeared (two links but I don’t know if that’s why). Anyway, I guess it varies, there certainly seems to be a lot of contestation over figures for civilian deaths. I heard the overall 85% civilian deaths in contemporary warfare figure from someone who has been directly involved in forensic investigations, so I took it as a general guide.

I realise, as Chris Bertram says, that ‘do nothing’ may be politically impossible, but really what is the alternative? Actually I just realised I saw something about alternatives on one of the websites I looked at, but can’t remember which. Maybe will try again later.

JQ – really “doing nothing`’ must include stopping arms exports and military aid to the ME – unfortunately it doesn’t look like that is ever going to happen, so your “doing nothing” isn’t really what it is meant to be …

the overwhelming majority of civilian deaths are down to the regime. ISIS may get the headlines, but their capacity for killing people is far less impressive than Assad’s

As much as one might resent this fact, the collapse of the opposition threatening Assad means less bloodshed rather than more, the cardinal sin resulting in the bloodshed was the US trying to destabilize the regime by propping up the opposition and refusing tom engage diplomatically – same old, same old.

@Ze K … there are quite a number of reports that support the claim, but here’s one:

http://newirin.irinnews.org/dataviz/2015/8/17/syria-government-threat-bombing-douma

Will someone please ask Donald Trump whether he will send more US troops into the Middle East?

@30: that’s an utterly false characterization that pretends there is no such things as foreign aid and no such thing as refugees admitted to the US – there are millions from Vietnam, for example, and large Somali and Hmong populations. I know that hating everything about the United States is deeply fashionable for some, but that doesn’t make it productive or true. No European nation has *anything* to say to the United States about welcoming immigrants.

Watson, according to Wikipedia the U.S. gives a lot of aid in absolute terms, yes, but is well down the list as a proportion of GDP https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_governments_by_development_aid#Official_development_assistance_by_country_as_a_percentage_of_Gross_National_Income_in_2013

Val, those statistics exclude charitable giving, which is a major, major part of the US contribution to foreign aid.

I think that the Assad government has killed more civilians than the opposition groups. I believe this is a matter more of military capabilities than intent. Increasing the military capability of groups fighting to take territory from the central government is not doing the vast majority of Syrians a favor. It doesn’t even seem to serve US “interests” unless we’re all going to admit that “the opposite of whatever Iran/Russia want” is definitionally the US national interest. If they drink fresh water, we must all drink salt, because spite.

Here is a link to the PLOS study on Iraq–

http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001533

35 percent of the violent deaths attributed to coalition forces.

JQ@9: the supposed need to control ME oil was always nonsense, but it’s nonsense on stilts now

http://www.dreamscape.com/morgana/enforce.htm:

“Documents recently obtained from Cheney’s Energy Task Force as the result of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the public-interest group Judicial Watch indicate that Cheney and his colleagues had their sites on the black gold under the Iraqi desert well before Sept. 11.

“Last July, the Commerce Department finally turned over records that included “a map of Iraqi oilfields, pipelines, refineries and terminals, as well as two charts detailing Iraqi oil and gas projects and ‘Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts’,” according to Judicial Watch’s subsequent press release. There were also similar maps and charts for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The documents were dated March 2001.”

See also: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4458.htm.

If only Bush and Cheney had listened to people who knew something about the oil industry and believed in the free market …

The UN apparently thinks the Syrian government has caused the greatest civilian death toll with its indiscriminate bombing and shelling. I would link to the latest report, which I skimmed recently, but there is some technical glitch for the English language version. The following link is to a press conference.

http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16379&LangID=E

I think it’s wishful thinking to imagine that simple negation of all Middle East policy will rectify all the problems with actually existing Middle East policy. To cite just one example, cutting off aid to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel would cause a huge international crisis.

“To cite just one example, cutting off aid to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel would cause a huge international crisis.”

I’m afraid it’s not at all clear that the resulting crisis would be ‘huger’ than the ones we get for the aid. U.S. aid to Israel (for example) is almost entirely military aid. We’re sponsoring Israel’s efforts to colonize the West Bank and to periodically destabilize Lebanon. These are international crises, and we’re funding them.

@Donald Johnson @adam.smith

“One thing I noticed with Iraq is that the latest study published in PLOS in 2013 found a lower violent death toll than the 2006 Johns Hopkins study, but roughly agreed with them about the percentage killed by coalition forces ( over one third). The media based count of IBC found a lower percentage of civilian dead attributed to the coalition, which I suspect shows that the press just passed on the official storyline most of the time, where anyone our side killed was automatically a terrorist unless proven innocent beyond a reasonable doubt.”

You should take a look at this, which compares these studies:
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/qa/plos-ibc-others/

That link does not specifically address the coalition percentage, but there’s little difference between them on that. One important issue is that none of these household surveys give a “percentage of civilian dead attributed to the coalition”. They don’t give a percentage of civilian anything. They give estimates of total violent deaths in which there is no distinction between civilians and combatants, and they give percentages of the total violent deaths attributed to the coalition, which as you say is somewhere around a third. And IBC is also somewhere around a third, varying above or below depending on time-frame.

For PLOS, their coalition percentages are 27% (Sibling) and 35% (Household). The IBC percentage for civilians in that period is 13%, but this is irrelevant to the PLOS figures because they aren’t percentages for civilians. The comparable IBC figure (with combatants included) is 27%, exactly the same as the PLOS Sibling, only moderately lower than the Household, and well within the error margins. So PLOS says very little about either IBC’s totals (see link above), or about IBC’s coalition percentages. It would instead suggest IBC is probably not very far off on either question.

For the earlier JH/Burnham one, that said 31% coaltion (again, not a civilian figure). For that period, IBC is 27% (for civilian) and 39% (for civilian+combatant). So the comparable IBC figure here (39%) is actually higher than JH/Burnham and again there’s little difference anyway.

The main large difference is on the total number of deaths (and somewhat on when and where), not on coalition percentage, and only really with one survey, the Burnham one. PLOS is much closer to IBC (and to IFHS, ILCS, Iraq war logs, hospital/morgue stats, etc.) than Burnham on the total number. This other idea that they differ a lot on coalition percentage isn’t true and seems to rest on misinterpretations.

Adam Smith–

I saw that range–not being a statistician I can’t understand why the span was so large. They presumably tried to design their study to answer the question of the true death toll and that’s what they came up with? Most of the discussion seemed to assume the mid- range figure was likely accurate. It was consistent with the IFHS study in 2006.

On the other hand, the IBC method is guaranteed to be an undercount of total deaths and given that much of it comes from official sources, it will likely also undercount civilians killed by the coalition.

There’s a strong temptation, evident in the OP, to just walk away from the mess. Because all sides will have some innocent blood on their hands, all judgements will be more or less uncertain and people will die whatever you do. We saw this with Bosnia too. Until the rapes and murders were too much to bear. But inaction has consequences as much as action. ISIS’ ideology is not a firm basis for lasting rule, but it can, in even a few decades, impose immense costs on the people it rules, those it attacks and those around them. One form of US intervention has limited those costs.

JQ would have no patience with those who, because economic policy is often inept, cruel or stupid, advocated doing nothing at all. But he has no problem doing this in foreign policy.

If I were in fact arguing that “something must be done…” you would be right. Now try, please, to realise that when a group of people has the means and will to kill/enslave/drive away another group, and is in fact doing so, doing nothing does not help the victims. Nor does wishing for a time machine. Or complaining about stuffed-up policies and bad choices in general. Or washing one’s hands and saying that, since it’s all very messy, just looking the other way is best.

I am not endorsing US policy in general, or intervention in general. I am saying that, from the point of view of a Yazidi, Kurd, Christian, Shi’a, Druze or civilized Sunni, survival is at stake, and some forms of US intervention have demonstrably aided in their efforts to preserve themselves, their ways of life and their cultural heritage.

Piquoiseau 10.04.15 at 8:30 pm @ 46 & adam.smith 10.04.15 at 8:36 pm @ 47 —
‘Cold turkey.’ To get a more complete idea, imagine US policy after the Collapse. Because ‘things that can’t go on forever, don’t.’

“That there is a continuum between all and nothing continues to elude many people here.”

‘Some’ has not worked – if anything, it has made things worse. Now what? You say ‘more’, but how much more, to what achievable purpose? Every failure results in a call for more, but when the ‘more’ has happened, another failure is the result.

Me, I’d like to stop being complicit in blowing up wedding parties and hospitals. We’ve been bombing Afghanistan for 14 years. Is it better yet?

Quick! We have to do something to further enrich the armaments manufacturers, banks, and their lobbyists, retired military, and hangers on!!

@66

Because, right now, doing some limited military things is essential to the ability to do anything productive. Your argument is a variation on the “we can’t do anything about this here (and it’s illegitimate to protest about this) until we have atoned for all past sins and moreover fixed Africa”.

I note that, although I point to specific ways in which specific forms of military action have been crucial in preserving people from death, enslavement or flight, the response is always to call for it to end on the basis that some other forms of military action have not worked.

Harold, Layman:
“I am about to be killed. Please help!”
“Certainly. I shall stand here and shout slogans. And deplore your death and blame the US.”

And now of course the Russians have started their own use of air (and ground?) power, claiming to be targeting ISIS but more likely hitting what they take to be the most immediate threats to Assad’s survival, regardless of who poses them.

I do agree that Isis has to be stopped, but more important, we must not create/encourage/support/give arms that somehow ALWAYS end up in the hands of ever expanding future Isises and Talibans. How hard is it to understand? People do not react well to foreign troops/advisers/special forces/exiles/proxies on their soil. They do not welcome them with rose petals.

Tabasco @ 51
I don’t know (as I’ve written on my blog) how anyone can justify war these days.

I don’t know (as I’ve written on my blog) how anyone who thinks like I do can justify war these days.

There you go, Val. I’ve fixed it fir you.

(And I am absolutely not going to get involved in another ‘do chimpanzees make war’ discussion here).

JQ@67: It wasn’t just Bush and Cheney. That control of Middle East oil was vital has been the unbroken consensus among US policymakers since the State Department declared in 1945 that the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia were “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” Hundreds of US policymakers have echoed this view, and I doubt that a single one has ever expressed a contrary view. Can we at least agree that the belief that “US control of [ME] oil is a big deal” has been the virtually unanimous view in every American administration we know of?

And not just US policymakers. The members of Cheney’s Energy Task Force included, along with other high US officials, representatives of the energy industry. Can we also agree that the belief that “US control of [ME] oil is a big deal” has also been the virtually unanimous view of the US energy industry since oil was discovered there?

Presumably at least some of those policymakers and/or oil executives consulted one or more economists at some point during the last hundred years. Did all the economists consulted fail to point out that oil is fungible, and therefore political control of oil is irrelevant?

But even if every US policymaker, oil executive, and energy-industry economist was mistaken in believing that control of Middle East oil is a big deal, the left-wing critique of US foreign policy is still correct. The substance of that critique is that the purpose of US foreign policy is not to secure the “national interest” — a propagandistic fiction — but rather to secure the perceived interests of the society’s most powerful economic actors (and in case of incompatible interests among those actors, the interests of those most vitally affected by the policy in question, as measured by their willingness and ability to expend resources to secure their favored policy); and that to this extent, America is not a democracy.

The point of the left-wing critique is not that US Mideast policy is not very successful in achieving its goal of doing the best for the energy industry — i.e., is “stupid” in its choice of means — but rather that this is a morally corrupt goal, undemocratically arrived at.

@5566hh

> There would be no need to cut off relations, aid, or trade.

except you explicitly called for that in 2 and 3.

>Yes, you’d have some sanctions, but there would still be trade.

the definition of sanctions is cutting people off from trade.

More broadly though, you completely ignore the way that the US presence restrains the behaviors of many of the actors in the neighborhood. Without everyone in the region capable of doing so, the israelis, saudis, and iranians in particular, would likely become more bellicose, not less, because the stakes would be much higher.

@layman

>If those very real people were starving, the U.S. would not feed them. If they were homeless refugees, the U.S. would not take them in. If they were poor, the U.S. would not employ them. If they were sick, we would not cure them. To help them, it seems we are only willing to bomb them. In light of that, are you really sure you understand the motivation for what we’re doing?

Except, of course, for the people the US does feed, the refugees it does take in, and the people it does employ….

https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/agriculture-and-food-security/food-assistance
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_trade_of_the_United_States

@geo

> but rather to secure the perceived interests of the society’s most powerful economic actors

assuming this to be true, geo, how do you explain the more than a decade the US spent enforcing sanctions against saddam, refusing to allow him to sell more oil, against considerable diplomatic pressure to allow him to do so? Or allowing most of the oil contracts in post saddam iraq to go to non american companies? Or do you just ignore those niggling details?

> but rather that this is a morally corrupt goal, undemocratically arrived at.

at exactly what point in the last 20 years do you think american policy was “undemocratic”? Because with the possible exception of the iraqi surge, I’m not aware of any time when the US position didn’t get at least plurality support.

Should have said, any ideas that do not involve a time machine?

btw, US policy may contribute to al quaeda or ISIS, but they do not “create” them. Very violent Islam-inspired radicalism is a thread that runs from the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf) to Nigeria (Boko Haram). The variant in Algeria led to the deaths of over 100,000 people.

@79 btw, Peter T.: “US policy may contribute to al Quaeda or ISIS, but they do not ‘create’ them.
Right. Don’t be disingenuous. It is a well-known fact that the USA and its client state Saudi Arabia spent a great deal of money creating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to “give Russia its Vietnam”. Publishing children’s textbooks full of submachine guns and financing the building of the huge tunnel system that Osama bin Laden took refuge in (but neglecting to keep a map of same). It is true that the Mujadeen were already there but we deliberately blew them up into a world-wide menace.

Harold

Again, read what I wrote. Wahhabism goes back to the C18, and the ghazi tradition well before that (Shia remember the very nasty sack of Karbala in 1802). The CIA and Saudi very foolishly funded the groups that turned into al-quaeda, but they did not create young men imbued with fanatical zeal and looking for a place to “defend Islam”. They did not create the movement, they directed part of it it towards Afghanistan. Again, the taliban came out of religious schools in Pakistan whose roots go back to the Indian Muslim Deobandi school in the C19. Nor did the CIA create the Algerian GIA, or Boko Haram, or Abu Sayyaf. Nor, in these matters, is Saudi a US client: it was fostering this sort of thing from its earliest days.

Nor, again, does this sad and stupid bit of history help in dealing with ISIS.

In the long run the greatest magnitude threat to peace in the Middle East is a nuclear arsenal owned by people with plans to use them. The OP’s program is already in place in regards to that threat. I on the other hand suggest 1)nuclear disarmament for a short term fix, and 2) regime change in the US.

True, but the moral issue does not help in deciding what to do about ISIS.

Around the world there are large numbers of young men with poor social and economic prospects. In many places their prospects are getting poorer. In some places, their grievances are reinforced by weak or corrupt governance, the expectations placed on them by strongly patriarchal cultures, socio-political exclusion, a culture that is affronted by global norms and – in the Sunni tradition – a strand of religious thought that is both puritanical and exalts violence. Add in elite backing for this last and you have all the ingredients for a social explosion.

Ze K

Actually ronan. But – US supported Saddam (against Kurds) in the 80s, declined to support Shia after the First Gulf War, has consistently supported the regime in Egypt in preference to the Muslim Brotherhood and so on. US policy has been all over the place – often on opposing sides or for some imaginary middle.

It’s really not about the US. In a milieu where most political issues are seen through a religiously-tinted lens, any sharp divide will manifest in a religious form. Think Europe in the C16/17.

More Peter T, @80

Should have said, any ideas that do not involve a time machine?

If the last hated military intervention, with its massive collateral damage, created the current crop of extremists; then what can one expect this intervention to do in turn? One shouldn’t need a time machine to learn

btw, US policy may contribute to al quaeda or ISIS, but they do not “create” them. Very violent Islam-inspired radicalism is a thread that runs from the Philippines (Abu Sayyaf) to Nigeria (Boko Haram). The variant in Algeria led to the deaths of over 100,000 people.

Well, it’s not like any of those peoples were subjected to years of violent oppression by Westerners, is it? Pfui!

“And I really think the recent history of places like Central Africa show that places can fall apart and cause huge human suffering without significant input from the United States and it’s “clients” ”

I don’t think that is entirely accurate given global interconnectedness. Global and regional inequality definitely has an effect on the national and regional politics of poorer countries. I think that decreasing global inequality is necessary, I am sure if the U.S. And the EU and China and other smaller countries began negotiating to achieve an end to the conflict by offering to assist with decreasing inequality and assisting poorer countries in the Middle East to meet the Sustainable Development Goals in 15 years that way there would be a lot of support, and they should negotiate with Assad to transition Syria to more democratic governance which I am sure he would probably agree to as his country is getting ruined and then he could have a better legacy as introducing democracy.

Ze K @92
The baathist government wasn’t sectarian.

Saddam oppressed Shia and Kurds (under some obvious and non-controversial definitions of “oppressed”). It was not a “US narrative,” but something that happened. (Which is not to justify the ’03 invasion, which was not justifiable.)

Seriously, discussing these matters without mentioning the blooming arms trade of the five UN security council members (and a couple of others) fueling the conflicts of the ME is completely naive at best and disingenuous at worst:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/apr/23/middle-east-arms-trade-saudi-arabia-iran

And this game has gone on for decades …

Val @81:
Excuse a maybe dumb question but can … anyone explain to me how the UN peacekeeping process relates to the situation in Syria? or why it doesn’t?

Peter already gave a brief answer to this. Bit of elaboration: without getting too much into the technicalities of the UN Charter etc., there are basically two situations for deployment of UN-authorized military operations w ‘blue helmet’ forces (i.e. multinational contingents under UN auspices).

1) Peacekeeping forces can be sent in to help ensure that a ceasefire deal that has been reached actually sticks and is observed. Such forces in some cases go beyond monitoring ceasefire violations; they disarm and demobilize the groups that have been fighting, and in some cases help restore and run govt institutions, etc.

2) ‘Peace enforcement’ ops, often under Ch.7 of the UN Charter, can be and increasingly have been sent in before a ceasefire or settlement is reached and while the parties are still fighting (though I think these are not typically full-scale civil wars w/ the intensity of the Syrian conflict). An analysis of these kinds of UN deployments to civil wars in Africa from 1992 to 2011 showed that increasing the number of armed soldiers in these missions (as opposed to police or observers) reduced the number of battle deaths (Hultman et al, “Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting,” Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., November 2014).

3) The kind of ‘peace enforcement’ mission referenced in (2) cannot be deployed in Syria (even if the Sec. Council agreed to authorize it, which it wdn’t for political reasons, vetoes etc.) because the level of violence in Syria is such that the mission likely would be unable to operate w any effectiveness, unless it was *exceptionally* large, well-equipped, and supported by air power. Anyway, the political circumstances are such that the Sec. Council is not going to authorize this.

Matt@103: Wow, that was powerful. I’m going to repeat it — probably in your own words — as often as I get a chance. (You won’t mind my plagiarizing you, will you?)

The pope is “handwaving”, dontcha know?

Matt @103
the “we must help” argument for supporting military action is ridiculous

Who is making a generalized “we must help” argument? That preventable, poverty-related disease kills many more people (and esp. more children) than ISIS (or other violent non-state groups) do is certainly true, and while much more remains to be done to tackle the former problem, it’s also the case that some progress has been made (child mortality worldwide was roughly cut in half from 1990 to now, from c.12 million under-5 deaths a year to c.6 million [a significant percentage of these occurring in the first month after birth]).

The argument for combating ISIS is not “children are dying; we must help.” The argument, rather, is that ISIS is a fanatical, merciless group that wants to institute by violent means its vision of a resuscitated caliphate –a perverted caliphate, btw, since, as has been pointed out (e.g. here), the historical caliphates were largely respectful of other religions (which ISIS isn’t) — impose its version of fundamentalist Islam on all inhabitants under its control, and enslave or kill anyone who offers any resistance. Moreover and importantly, its program necessarily entails territorial conquest and the fomenting of civil war. Is there any indication that it would be willing to stop w Syria and northwestern Iraq? As already said, there is much to criticize in US policy in the ME over the years and in many cases it has served narrow elite interests, but the use of some force vs. ISIS seems justified in light of its actions.

Yes, precisely. I’m sure pretty much everyone here would support commiting the same sort of resources to measles eradication as is commited to war, but of course (1) that really isnt the choice (money spent on the military wont be funneled into global health), and (2) it isnt the topic of the thread. I like Matt’s comments generally, but I found that quite disingenous.
The comparison also isnt between ISIS and measles eradication, if anything it’s between the breakdown of order in Syria and the region and measles eradication. The collapse of the Levant into decades of disorder would be a considerably worse humanitarian catastrophe (and would also probably lead to a resurgence of deaths by treatable diseases.)
Now note what I didnt do. I didnt call for military action. Personally Im ambivalent on the question, but debates on the topic go nowhere so I think it’s better just to not bring it up.
JQs post was that US policy should be ‘nothing.’ There’s a whole lot of ground between nothing and war that could be debated, and various solutions (meaningful or not) that could be discussed. Novakant’s comment on the global arms trade, for example. What are the diplomatic possibilities for a solution. How do you deal with the refugee crisis. What are comparisons to peace building in other contexts. What does it mean for US/European security (not just the actual, rational threat, but the potential for political and public backlash to the refugee situation/a hypothetical attack)
All of this would mean though (imo) accepting that the usual hobby horses (US FP, Israel/Palestine, the Islamification of Crewe etc) are no longer the point.

I understand that our feelings and our values are closely connected, and I’m not interested in trying to swim against the tide of all human feeling. So I’m not going to try to convince other people that their mother’s life is worth exactly the same as a stranger’s life, even though I think that’s probably true. I can’t even feel that equivalence myself, and to the extent that I succeeded at persuading I fear that I would be convincing people to value family members less rather than valuing strangers more.

I harbor some hopes that people can do better by the numbers when it comes to people who are all remote strangers. Most Americans will never encounter a Vietnamese victim of measles or a Yazidi victim of ISIS in the flesh. Without the overwhelming influence of social ties, without being swamped by emotion, it should be possible to do better by following the numbers instead of reactive, instinctive horror. I do recognize a sort of technocratic dry rot potential living in this proposal: it’s possible that people will finally internalize “measles kills more than ISIS,” stop caring so much about ISIS, but not actually follow through and do more about measles. I don’t want to anesthetize people to spectacular suffering in the course of trying to get them to prioritize more common kinds of suffering. I hate it when whatabouterry is used to justify a comprehensive program of inaction, and I’d doubly hate it if I were driving that sort of apathy myself.

I understand the reflexive aversion to war (in fact I share it), and I also share the view that the US (and others) spend far too much on the military, sell too many weapons abroad, and meddle far too much in the Middle East and elsewhere. But there is, right now, a major threat to peace in Iraq and Syria, a threat that can only be countered by military action. The Iraqi Kurds have mobilised 150,000 against ISIS, Shia militia have left homes and jobs in the south to defend Baghdad, Syrian Christian, Yezidi and Kurdish communities have mobilised pretty much all their young men and women. In the last three days alone, ISIS suicide bombs have killed over 100 civilians in markets in Iraq, reportedly killed 300 Yazidi prisoners and another 300 from opposing Sunni tribes. This sort of carnage goes on week after week.

One can agree with pretty much everything said here about the evil and stupidity of past US actions, and still see that some forms of US military support for groups fighting ISIS is essential if these people are to win at acceptable cost (and that cost is not just to the groups opposing ISIS, but also to the populations under its rule – prolonged war costs all sides). Tactical air support under the current rules is actually making a difference.

Peter T, its not clear to me that you’re wrong that the US should be involved in fighting ISIS. But as far as I can tell, you haven’t addressed the central point that John Quiggin is making, about opportunity costs. You keep arguing that US involvement can help prevent a worse outcome in Syria. Well, maybe. But that’s not quite the right question: the right question is more along the following lines: suppose that the US disengaged from Syria and spent the money on global poverty alleviation instead. Isn’t it very probable that many fewer people would die as a result? In fact, if I understand John Quiggin’s point, he is claiming that spending a small proportion of the money currently expended on war in the direction of poverty alleviation would save many more lives.

Layman

As I hope I have laid out in the case of Iraq and Syria, my general position is that military means must be used sparingly, never as a first resort and always carefully tailored to local conditions. But that, within these bounds, it can be a useful instrument (outside them, it’s usually a disaster). Afghanistan is a very different case to Iraq/Syria. The short answer is that “making the Taliban no more” or “replacing them with reasonable people” is, in the Afghan context, not achievable. So it should not be attempted. If the aim is the traditional form of Afghan governance (weak oversight from Kabul, Pashtun tribal violence confined to the hills, others mostly left alone), then modest military support MAY have a place – anything more is likely counter-productive.

ISIS is very different – everyone else is its enemy (even al-quaeda affiliated groups) and much of the population under its rule is not happy. “Winning” here means removing it from control of territory and the ability to muster significant forces, and the experience to date is that this is do-able.

Val @119: you’re welcome, I’m glad I was able to clarify the peacekeeping thing somewhat.

Layman, Taliban control of most of Afghanistan ended very quickly in 2001. The US was capable of taking one of the strongest armies in the Arab world and annihilating it within a week. The Russians were capable of establishing a regime that could sustain itself, so long as it received external funding. So yes, violence can keep the Taliban from power.

Sure, global health improvements matter. But political improvements can enable poor countries to spend on health initiatives themselves, as well as reduce the level of poverty in a region. We’ve run into this wall with some childhood vaccinations where the remaining unvaccinated areas are too rural to access efficiently. This is despite roadbuilding being within the capability of anyone with a hammer and some rocks: the states are too disorganised to provide that service.

The coalition has removed the Taliban (an imprecise term btw) from control of Kabul, the provincial capitals and central and northern Afghanistan. The issue now is how to divide power between Kabul and the Pushtun regions. Government efforts to impose control unite the religious and ethnic Pushtun opposition, but there is probably space for a negotiated solution.

On the military side what we should do is what “we” are doing – use local forward air controllers to deliver precise targeting information (in conjunction with other sources) to then strike ISIS forces in support of local ground forces. Also, continue to attack ISIS movement where its military character can be firmly established. The sort of thing that has recovered Kobane Canton, saved Cizire Canton, pushed ISIS back from Yazidi and Kurd areas, helped recover Tikrit, reduced ISIS supplies of oil to a trickle…Beyond that, very little – maybe provide more help with mine clearance and IED detection and disposal, as these are a major source of civilian casualties.

A large part of the attraction of ISIS is the coupling of holy ferocity with an assurance of victory. Military defeat undermines it ideologically as well as practically.

Watson Ladd,

The global economy has structural inequalities, so like in national economies you use taxing and transfers to make things more equitable, countries need to do this internationally to less inequality between nations – tied to spending measures targeted to lessen inequality within these nations – to implement the sustainable development goals by 2030.

Current U.S. Middle East policy is the same as your gun policy – give people access to dangerous weapons so everyone can defend themselves with ultimately the ones with the most power able to intervene with bombing or capital punishment – instead of regulating and limiting access to weapons and looking for other non-violent solutions.

“Best people” — perhaps an allusion to”The Best and Brightest”, David Halberstam’s ironic designation for the “whiz kids” of academia and industry whom John F. Kennedy brought into his cabinet to preside over our disastrous Vietnam adventure with policies and methods that contradicted the advice of the State Department and other sane people.

The slogan of the medical profession — “first do no harm” is worth recalling here.

http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/People/EthnicityLanguages.htm

Peter T @ 126, I think you’re quibbling about the Taliban. It looks to me as if they still control territory, that they’re still a force to be reckoned with, that the Afghan forces can’t reckon with them absent extensive US military support; and that such support must be extended indefinitely else a resurgent Taliban recover much of what they’ve lost. Since an open-ended commitment to kill Afghans (and foreign doctors) for their own good is insane, presumably that support will end. What then will 14 years of killing have accomplished, if the result is a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and a collection of warlords?

I also think you’re begging the question: You say ISIS is a different kind of problem than the Taliban, and that they can be destroyed by military action. Why?

Layman
Layman @134

What the media call “the Taliban” is a loose alliance of Pushtun tribes and Islamists. The Pushtuns object to non-Pushtun dominance in Kabul, the Islamists to the character of the government. Talks have been going on for some time between government and various Taliban alliance groups on a settlement and, given that Afghanistan has no tradition of strong central government, some accommodation can probably be reached with key groups. That will not end the violence, but violence is an Afghan way of life (I went through there in 78, before the war – it was one large open-air gun shop). It will diminish it.

ISIS is much more ideological, less ethnic, more united. Their base is angry young men. They have no allies, nor want any (they do have backers). They make no deals. If the coalition against them can wrest back control of the cities, they will become a roving band of guerilla die-hards, gradually fading away (see, eg GIA in Algeria).

Should the U.S. maintain an open-ended commitment of ground forces in Afghanistan so long as the Taliban remain a threat?
No.

Layman

Short answer: Iraq is different to Afghanistan, and the US is (sensibly) pursuing a very different strategy. Key difference is that Pashtuns are near 50 % of the Afghan population, organised in large blocks, while Sunnis are 30% of Iraq at most and ISIS only part of the Sunnis (significant numbers side with the Baghdad government). So ISIS loses wherever it comes up against comparably motivated forces (Shia, Kurds). US air support is a tactical multiplier that makes the fight shorter.

Layman

Whose “we” here? Kurds, Shia, non-ISIS Sunni and even other Islamists have no choice but to fight, because ISIS has and will continue to attack them. Negotiation or containment are not options. For outside forces, the choice is whether and how to intervene. So far the US sensibly has kept its intervention light (air support under stringent conditions plus training). This has made a significant difference on the ground, in allowing anti-ISIS forces to retain or recover territory (Kobane, Cizire, Tikrit, Baiji, Mosul Dam, Shengal). So it makes sense to continue this modest assistance until either ISIS changes (unlikely), collapses internally (also unlikely) or is driven away from major population centres.