This week all the news services carried a story about the Dutch central bank shipping many, many tons of gold from the Mad King-led United States to the custody of cooler heads (well, cooling, we hope, after that very hot summer) in London.
On the same day, the FT ran a story by Banu Baweja at UBS Investment Bank about how lots of people keep wanting to buy gold. Prices have eased a bit lately, but there is still plenty of demand, which they reckon will keep going. The Mad King and his only-slightly-less-mad Court are part of it, making the American finance products people generally use to try to balance out risk from other activity a bit suss.
But also, when the world cancelled foreign exchange reserves held by that other mad king in Russia, the UBS folk reckon people have started getting a bit suss on all money. “Reserve and asset managers globally were left confronting a simple question: if $630bn held in Treasuries, Bunds, gilts and other bonds coule become inaccessible overnight, what constituted money?”
Apparently gold is the answer.
Katie Martin from my favourite podcast (Unhedged) this week declared herself ‘long’ (things she loves) gold. Well, not long on gold gold, really she said, but on the place of gold in the news cycle. I’m with Katie, except in history: I am definitely not wanting a return to the gold standard or something stoopid like that.
Which is to say, while I am just about to talk about the materiality of money in the Age of Gold, I don’t think anything dumb like ‘gold is money’, ‘the only real money is gold’ or even that the materiality of money is more material when it is gold than when it is stuff you tap from your phone or credit card at the shops. In fact, money’s historical contingency is key not only to the history I am trying to write, but the politics of money for the foreseeable future. I think (your feedback is sought, please).
Offshoring in practice and metaphor
Let’s start with offshore tax havens, which have been around for a while. Historian Vanessa Ogle shows tax havens and adjacent forms of smuggling caves for money grew markedly between 1945 and 1965. Amidst processes of decolonisation and against the logic of the interventionist welfare state, new legal spaces grew. In the process, a different kind of colonialism meant that on the edges of the new American imperialism, havens grew for what some rich people in the richest bits of the world (not just the US) idealised as free market capitalism. Like magic (except it was in fact the plan), in offshore places they could forge a kind of ‘freedom’ that not coincidentally accrued to themselves a very unequal share of the benefits of capitalism.
While money was offshore, the welfare state nevertheless grew (such as it was). But it was severely disrupted in the 1970s when the US dismantled the basis of the global financial system by ending the promise to exchange US dollars for gold if asked.
In his Very Serious Treatise on Banking, Making Money, Terry Pratchett inserts this dialogue between our hero, Moist von Lipwig and the head of the bank/mint, Mr Bent:
“I read somewhere that the coin represents a promise to hand over a dollar’s worth of gold,’ said Moist helpfully.
Mr. Bent steepled his hands in front of his face and turned his eyes upwards, as though praying.
‘In theory, yes,’ he said after a few moments. ‘I would prefer to say that it is a tacit understanding that we will honour our promise to exchange it for a dollar’s worth of gold provided we are not, in point of fact, asked to.”
This was pretty much how it worked. So when Europe began to notice that the increased flow of US dollars into their region (mostly a result of paying military folk for the War in Vietnam), America was exploiting the central place the dollar had been given at the end of the Second World War. This breached the trust the world had in America’s intention to use the dollar would to stabilise the global economy. This relied on the convertibility of the US dollar to gold. What with some Europeans threatening to ship their dollars to America and ask for the gold, thus breaching the implicit understanding that the promise to pay depended on not, in point of fact, asking for it, President Nixon solved the problem by ending the promise to pay.
This changed the relationships of all currencies to one another. Currency-by-currency stopped fixing their exchange rates to one another – the key to mid-century stability – and started allowing currencies to ‘float’ – values determined against other currencies by the market.
We’ve gotten very used to this, but the scale of the shock was significant. Buying components for the widgets you make (for example) was now complicated by changing exchange rates. Enterprises found that they were not only operating in a much larger and less stable world, but that to compete they also needed to be more agile in shifting their purchasing of things they needed to make widgets – components, human labour, energy sources – to wherever it was cheapest.
At first this was about finding the best deal on exchange rates, but it also turned into a global race to the bottom on labour costs (putting downward pressure on wages), warehouse costs (leading to ‘just-in-time’ production, destabilising employment), and corporate taxes, to try to lure the world’s biggest business to your shores (leading to under-taxing capitalism and undermining the capacity of democracies to redistribute wealth in the interests of producing social stability out of an inherently unfair system).
In his book Offshoring, John Urry shows that these logics also encouraged the movement of money away from where it was made. The increased mobility of the type of globalisation that began in the 1970s was then accelerated in the 1980s when networked computers rapidly sped up the ability to trade in finance. Money was more mobile than humans, goods or indeed anything else.
In this environment, Urry argues, the super-rich were empowered to pursue a very successful kind of class warfare based on a combination of ‘movement, relocation and concealment’, pursing institutional changes (especially tax ‘reform’) that made whole ‘offshore worlds’ possible. This intensified the pattern that philosopher Georg Simmel had noted, where a ‘money economy generates new levels of “consciously will concealment” or secrets.
Such offshoring of wealth was literal and metaphorical. Globalisation now made global the stage (or screen) on which life and major events were performed, ‘transforming’, said Urry, ‘the character and temporality of life’. The increased secrecy attached to the hoarding of wealth, he reckoned, was not just applied to finance, but to everything else the rich and powerful did. In Virtue Capitalists I described a logic where ‘success is the only virtue’, undermining the material reality of what had been moral work: Urry’s analysis suggests that this disconnect between success on the global stage and material truth is a reflection of offshoring.
Offshoring, both as practice and metaphor, blurs the boundary between ‘what is materially present and what isn’t.
Bringing money down to earth
‘It is as though a significant segment of the ruling classes…had concluded that the earth no longer had room enough for them and for everyone else’, producing climate denial that is based on a denial of the relationship between ‘human beings and the material condition of their lives’. So when Trump withdrew the US from climate agreements, this suggested a larger rich-guy pattern of belief that America generally and rich people specifically, don’t belong to the same earth, or are bound by the same material constraints, as everyone else.
Latour says that this ‘active state of denial’ about climate change is also an active denial of ‘the material constraints of living on earth’. It is an ‘offshore reality’ that is epitomised, surely, in Muskism broadly but more specifically, Musk’s Mad Mars scheme.
For Latour this means that we need to come ‘down to earth’. We need to see that humans are not the centre of a world in which nature is in the background. That we and the material world are one.
The Age of Gold matters
And so, as a historian, I want to turn to the past to see the contingency of money to remind ourselves that money is not essential, as in it doesn’t have a single ahistorical essence, but is subject to change. That gives us (some) agency (at least if we work together).
The present also demonstrates how subject the very nature of money (as social practice and kinda determinative of social relations) is to class influence. Even though money in the Age of Gold was wildly different to what money is now, we can be pretty sure class interests helped shape it. It matters to know how that worked and what were the consequences. These help produce history’s cautionary tales. Finding the logics of money as an earlier round of global money grew via the gold standard, will help us look beneath what seems natural about money now, all the better to see our way through the current, highly destructive chaos, towards something better.
This is because I reckon thinking about the materiality of money in the Age of Gold will help make money’s materiality newly weird. Since we use money every day, the way ot works seems so natural. In an offshored world governed by very little cash, its materiality – bringing it down to earth – seems inordinately hard to do. Making it weirder will help with the process of identifying money with the material constraints of living ‘terrestrially’, as Latour asks. It is not that money mattered more (or was more material) because it was gold. But by seeing money as matter in the past will help us make it matter, now.
In the 1850s as the Californian and Australian gold rushes were rapidly transforming what global money was and could be, Karl Marx decided to pursue the project was would eventually result in three volumes of Capital. There were three reasons: firstly, London was a great place to see the kind of society and class formation that made money its centre. And secondly, the British Museum, which then housed the library, had a terrific collection of the primary sources he needed.
But why then? Capitalism has just entered what he called a ‘new stage of development’. Why? The ‘discovery of gold in California and Australia’. Gold was why Marx decided to ‘resume his studies’ in what he called the critique of political economy.
And so it is this Age of Gold to which I am turning, to think about the materiality of money.
Your thoughts and feedback especially at this stage of my project are extremely welcome.
{ 16 comments }
Alex SL 09.07.26 at 3:48 am
I am not an expert in the history of money, so there is little detailed feedback I would ever be able to provide, and take this as you see fit.
However, whatever the topic, if I were to think that a single decision that I happen to find of great interest in 1971 is *the* causal event for an enormous diversity of processes as far-reaching as supply chain optimisation, corporations wanting to pay lower wages, increasing inequality, the elite collectively forgetting how bad things got in 1929-1945 and therefore destroying all the safeguards that had been implemented to avoid a repeat, the grandiose delusions of one specific, narcissistic gazillionaire, and the fossil fuel industry funding climate change denial, I hope and assume a little warning light would go on in my head.
MisterMr 09.07.26 at 8:49 am
Two unrelated toughts:
First, according to a post by Paul Krugman on his substack, probably physical gold is not going to move through the atlantic, but european central banks will sell the gold they own in the USA and buy some gold in Europe, so they will have their gold closer without any physical movement of stuff.
Second, and more important, I am not an economist but as far as I understand the change to a floating exchange rate on the opposite is something that kept the wage share higer (and also that goes against job outsourcing).
For example, in the EU all countries use the euro so exchange rates are functionally fixed; this means that it is easier to do business across countries, but also that if a country is uncompetitive the only way to increase competitivity is to lower wages through years of crippling deflation, which means years of very high unemployment until workers accept lower wages (and business lower profits).
This is something that many economist saw as a problem for the euro area, and certainly was a big problem during the euro crisis for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
When the USA reneged on gold convertibility, my understanding is that other countries already mostly abandoned convertibility before, so everyone else was already free floating their currency, it was only the USA that was stuck on gold, and this meant that they couldn’t devalue against the others. Today we are used to the idea that the USA is a net importer and has been a net importer since forever, but in 1970 this wasn’t the case and the USA government just tried to keep international trade balanced by reneging on convertibility.
Tm 09.07.26 at 10:04 am
Some other news involving UBS might be interesting: The lobbyists running the Swiss Parliament will likely shield UBS from stricter banking regulations, knowing that the next Too Big To Fail-Bailout isn’t far away and they don’t want to be responsible for Swiss bankers having to cough up extra capital just to protect those tax-payer billions. What are tax-payers for if not bailing out the financial (and fossil fuel) oligarchy?
https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/swiss-parliamentary-committee-debates-new-capital-rules-ubs-2026-08-11/
D. S. Battistoli 09.07.26 at 4:06 pm
A fascinating topic, and I’m sure that part of your challenge will be deciding where to draw the bounds of your inquiry. From the standpoint of environmental economy, the gold standard had the advantageous externality that gold is a finite terrestrial resource, and therefore the global money supply, that is, the global capacity to cause actions to be taken, was to a certain extent inscribed in the environmental capacity of the world. That is not to say that 19th-c. industrialization was somehow environmentally friendly (it wasn’t), but the entire political economy was a function of the physical one, with only limited capacity for epicycles.
This is why in the early twentieth century, predictors of future American superpower status constantly did things like inventory the United States’ unmined military capacity, while after the World Wars, decolonial thinkers gleefully pointed out how close to exhaustion conflict had brought the mines of the Global North, the United States included.
But once the global money supply was decoupled from the physical stock of global resources, issuers of global reserve currencies could essentially, at the cost of temporary domestic unrest, endlessly inflate their money supply at the expense of resource-rich countries that had to extravert their economies to gain the currency reserves that would enable economic stability.
D. S. Battistoli 09.07.26 at 4:35 pm
I should note, with regard to my previous comment, that differential commodity-price trends in a floating-currency regime are a key feature of the functioning system. OPEC could aggressively renegotiate the price paid for oil, given the 20th c. industrial economic dependence on that input, while, say, bauxite or cotton or copper or coffee producers could not do the same, even when they tried to cartelize. Instead, most producers of such commodities were immiserated.
Indeed, making petroleum, needed everywhere, an honorary “rich world” product would help ensure that global value chains (as the late version of the Cardoso/Faletto/Wallerstein thesis would put it) continued to run for the most part in the same channels, to the benefit of the upper economic classes of the same countries (with just enough value flow diverted to nouveaux riches to ensure that no one capable of overturning the system actually did so).
Hannah Forsyth 09.09.26 at 12:58 am
Thanks so much for this feedback. I am keen to make this an accessible book, which you can see is a real challenge!
@Alex SL: it is more trigger than cause, but I think it is uncontroversial that the Bretton Woods system (which obv I should have explained) was based on broadly fixed exchange rates and dollar-gold convertibility in a dollar-centred system and that Nixon purposely dismantled it, beginning the era of globalisation.
@MisterMr: ah yeah, that makes more sense. Gold has often shipped, which makes me anxious even when it is 175 years ago and made it ok. There are a few ways of suppressing wages that don’t require ‘crippling deflation’, including suppressing unions, which happened most places. But of course there is an awful lot of offshoring of labour. I don’t believe that under Bretton Woods it was possible for ‘most’ countries to have floating exchange rates. Certainly Australia didn’t float until 1983 (after a ‘soft float’ late 1970s).
@D. S. Battistoli thanks so much for your support and input, I appreciate it a lot. I hadn’t connected the dollar reserve to extraverting as you describe, that sheds interesting light on the issue. I am broadly taking Perry Merhling’s ‘money view’, but I can see that because of the nature of gold and its literal terresteriality AND that gold is traded as both currency and commodity that commodity prices will be important. For the gold history the relative price matters a lot in the early 1850s when gold sellers are not yet certain if there is even a market for gold, initiating long-term intrabourgeois conflict between merchants and finance in Oz…it will be interesting to see how those value chains work in the age of gold and who benefits over the era. Though I am not yet sure how I will figure that out. If you have ideas, please feel free to email me: hforsyt4@une.edu.au
MisterMr 09.09.26 at 10:42 am
@Hannah Forsyth 6
Apologies, you are correct that other currencies didn’t float but were pegged to the dollar.
I still think that the unpegging of the dollar from gold and of other currencies from the dollar was an attempt to diminish USA net imports, because the hope was that the dollar would fall relative to other currencies, so the problem of outsourcing started earlier and the breaking of the Bretton Woods system was a response to that.
About the “crippling deflation”, weakening unions certainly is a thing but with begged currencies you need wages (and also prices) to fall in nominal terms (literal deflation), and that is difficult without high levels of unemployment and in general an economic crisis.
equalitus 09.09.26 at 2:25 pm
The current US Government obviously seems to think that money matters much & money flows in & out of the US matters very much, or else what would be the reason for the inefficient tariffs that the US imposed on imports from allied countries? If a country has a trade deficit with another country it is defined by currency flow, not by the flow of goods and/or services between the countries. But even we cant’ eat/drink & produce energy by money alone we can buy almost everything with money. While services & goods must be sold first.
John Q 09.09.26 at 7:47 pm
Meanwhile, moving very much in the opposite direction are proposals for central bank digital currencies, most advanced in the case of the euro. In the most radical version, the effect would be that ordinary people could hold, and transact on, accounts held directly with the central bank, bypassing private financial institutions and, in particular, Visa and Mastercard, now being weaponised by the US government
Alex SL 09.09.26 at 10:48 pm
Hannah Forsyth,
Yes, Bretton Woods was based on that, but it remains unclear to me how companies having an interest to minimise labour costs, oil and coal companies having an interest to sow doubt about global warming, rich people influencing government to lower tax rates on rich people and then having more riches to do even more influencing, hiding money in tax shelters, and Musk being a con artist not depend on floating exchange rates. Unless I seriously misunderstand how the world works, all of these could, and in most cases would logically always, happen even if there was a single world currency, because they aren’t rooted in currency regimes but in class interests and personal selfishness.
equalitus 09.10.26 at 12:09 am
How is Visa and Mastercard being weaponized unless it is a part of financial&economic sanctions e.g. on Russia because of the Ukraine war. I strongly support the European Central Bank letting ordinary people/customers have an account. I also suggested it on twitter years ago. But if a decent sum of academic experts also supports it, this have more influence so bigger chance of it being implemented within not so many years into the future.
While obviously the ECB cannot provide the same manual customer service as ordinary banks, AI chatbots would have to do almost all of it.
Tm 09.10.26 at 9:05 am
*”This week all the news services carried a story about the Dutch central bank shipping many, many tons of gold from the Mad King-led United States”*
The number I find is 86 tons of gold.
Have you noticed what happened to US gold imports recently? A huge spike in December 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IEAMGG/). This is if I understand correctly unrelated to government or central bank action, it’s private importers. Most of this gold, most of the global gold trade, is routed through Switzerland. Swiss refineries (but mostly they aren’t Swiss owned) shipped (yes, physically shipped) 68 tons in December and 195! tons in January to the US. This was said to be related to Trump’s trade war because US banks expected tariffs on gold imports (there weren’t, or only briefly) but the overall import volume far exceeds the volumes in preceding years. I still don’t know what to make of this. Gold imports were a significant part of the US trade deficit (which as you know hasn’t declined under Trump).
Tm 09.10.26 at 9:23 am
(I’m not sure whether the figures I gave are really monthly rather than quarterly – The data is surprisingly difficult to come by. My source was https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/gold-exporte-in-die-usa-kommen-schweiz-teuer-zu-stehen-434655094615)
Ebenezer Scrooge 09.10.26 at 6:03 pm
Given my nom de blog, I know a bit about the history of money. Gold hasn’t been money for a long time. The Gold Rush–or the cyanide process–averted bad deflations, but did not have much to do with the monetary system. Let me try to sloppily periodize things:
Back in the day of the Bible, weighed specie was money. I’m damned if I know how they assayed it, but the Bible talks quite a bit about weighing it.
Coins containing (some) specie have been money for a long time, as has mercantile book money. I’m a bit fuzzy about mercantile money, so I’ll stay with coins.
Their retail monetary value was determined by fear of the king, who declared them legal tender at their nominal value. Their international monetary value was determined by specie, with the wholesale value–complex. Hence Keynes’ rather embarrassing line in his Treatise on Money (p.12): “the Semitic races, whose instincts are keenest for the essential qualities of money, have never paid much attention to the deceptive signatures of Mints, which content the financial amateurs of the North, and have cared only for the touch [assay] and weight of the metal.” This is just Gresham’s law in action.
English law conferred legal tender status for most coins, which led to evasion and hoarding. The Ugandans were more sophisticated, and had a minimum quality standard, which brooked no evasion. Keynes again, at 13: “A District Commissioner in Uganda to-day, where goats are the customary native standard, tells me that it is part of his official duties to decide, in cases of dispute, whether a given goat is or is not too old or scraggy to constitute a standard goat for the purpose of discharging a debt.”
In the eighteenth century, paper became money. The hipsters, such as Sir James Steuart, knew that there was nothing special about specie. “By money, I understand any commodity, which purely in itself is of no material use to man [as a commodity], but which acquires such an estimation from his opinion of it, as to become the universal measure of what is called value, and an adequate equivalent for any thing alienable.” Lord Justice Mansfield concurred: Miller v. Race.
By the mid nineteenth century, bank deposits were the principal form of money. Both deposits and paper could be redeemed in principle for a non-money: specie.
Irredeemable money was well-understood by the beginning of the 20th century. Some relevant hipsters: Knapp and Simmel.
Modern law asserts that bank deposit money must be redeemable in paper money, aping the gold standard. This is impossible for any large financial transaction. It is also unnecessary: setoff is settlement, so redemption is unnecessary, even in principle.
steven t johnson 09.11.26 at 4:16 pm
Re the gold market? Perhaps it should be gold “market?” My relatively uninformed opinion is that gold isn’t as heavily manipulated as diamond but more so than oil. Transnational monopolies or state interventions are unlike legal monopolies. The latter are limited by the costs of enforcing the monopoly. But monopolistic pricing/production levels (substitute “oligopolistic” if it makes you feel better) even in non-juridical monopolies still face competition in the long run, particularly if so-called entry costs are manageable.
At any rate, this seems to be a useful point to remind everyone that the world economy is a so-called free market economy, has never been regulated in the lay person’s sense (or lawyer’s either I suspect.) Wrong state policy, much less so-called regulatory capture, for world economy considered as a whole is not an explanans. World economy as a whole isn’t often deemed to be an explanandum in economics (officially Marxism doesn’t count, right?) But the economists’ habit of equivocating on whether the world is an exogenous or endogenous factor is not helpful in my opinion.
J-D 09.12.26 at 12:42 pm
This may be true in some countries, but not in those where paper banknotes have been entirely replaced by polymer ones; a qualification particularly apropos when commenting on something written by an Australian.
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