Through the Hourglass

by David Warsh on November 12, 2007

From his title on, Dani Rodrik is at pains to identify himself as a neoclassical economist, bred in the bone. He writes, “If I often depart from the consensus that ‘mainstream economists’ have reached in matters of development policy, this has less to do with different modes of analysis than with different readings of the evidence and with different evaluations of the ‘political economy’ of developing nations.” Not to start an argument, if the book were about professional cooking, he might have called it One Chemistry, Many Recipes (and Plenty of Chefs). True, economics is not very much like chemistry, but the reason for Rodrik’s emphasis on the primacy of theory, I think, has less to do with the presence of economics’ many competitors in the development game – political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, business executives, savants of all sorts—than with what happened in mainstream economics itself in the twenty-five years since he began his career.

Rodrik was just finishing graduate school when something called “the new growth economics” took off. To all intents and purposes, it began with a famous lecture in Cambridge, England, by Robert Lucas, of the University of Chicago. Lucas’ reputation was as a monetary theorist, not an expert on growth. He had never traveled abroad before he spoke. Yet “The Mechanics of Economic Development” is the fifteenth most frequently cited of all papers in major economics journals since 1970, according to one careful survey. It was the first salvo in a barrage of papers that brought about a profound reshaping of the concerns of young economists. The new growth literature returned the wealth of nations (and lack thereof) to the center of their theoretical and empirical investigations, relegating to a lesser position the interest in distribution that had been dominant since Ricardo, and overshadowing for more than twenty years developments in traditional macroeconomic problems such as inflation, unemployment and the business cycle.

There are many versions of what the new growth economics was all about, including those of Paul Romer, “The Origins of Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter,1994, and Olivier Blanchard, Chapter 30, “The Story of Economics,” Macroeconomics, 5th edition, Prentice-Hall, 2007. Here’s my interpretation: Lucas’ powerful rhetoric depended on asking a series of questions, not answering them. In Robert Solow’s model of economic growth, dominant for thirty years, nothing much could be done about growth, aside from sound macroeconomic management. In Lucas’ view, which was expressed in the formalisms that were becoming standard in economics in the 1980s, technological improvements (and the institutional arrangements that made them possible) could not be taken for granted. He pointed to immigration flows to pose a puzzle: why did people throng to cities, and to highly developed countries, instead of the other way around? Why didn’t capital move freely to less-developed areas around the world? Lucas was interested in trade and growth. The hypothesis he advanced was that the engine of growth was human capital accumulation; that people went to cities because that was where the valuable skills were (just as money was in the banks).

Of course, practically as Lucas spoke, the pattern was reversing. Highly skilled people and capital were going back to poorer areas – to Ireland, to China, to India. Soviet-style communism was crumbling. Globalization was swinging into high gear. But meanwhile he had opened the door to a different answer, advocated chiefly by his student, Romer: that knowledge, nonrival and often partially excludable, was important, too, and that it possessed quite different economic attributes than goods do. Economists argued about it for a time, before the best among them agreed to stipulate that knowledge had an economics of its own, quite different from the economics of things. They left behind a handful of researchers to work it out, and moved on to the investigation of the institutional apparatus and social framework that created and distributed new ideas around the world.

Some years later, David Kreps described this sort of an evolution in terms of an hourglass, an image he attributed to Romer. Before World War II, Kreps said, economics had consisted of many different fields that had grown up in substantial isolation from one another: trade, development, economic history, labor markets, public finance and so on. These semi-autonomous discussions, with their focus on typologies and institutions, sounded like so many regional dialects, some of them all but incomprehensible to others. But after the war, as the advancing salient of economics – mainly macroeconomics and general equilibrium theory—embraced more formal methods, mathematical models in particular, the new techniques gradually were extended into one area after another (a movement often experienced as “colonization” by those previously working in the field). Gradual standardization of methods was the result. Previously disparate sub disciplines gradually came to sound more like branches of a single common (methodological rather than topical) tongue, wrote Kreps. And when, as was always the case, the new dialect of mathematical modeling lacked the appropriate vocabulary to discuss important topical features of the landscape, “rather than speak in an unfashionable dialect, some things were just not discussed,” at least by those who felt as if they were on their field’s cutting edge. Gradually techniques were developed to bring these familiar topics under the lens of the new mathematical economics and broaden the discourse.

Hence the image of an hourglass. The vertical axis represents time, and the horizontal axis the scope or breadth of economics. As time passes, we first see a narrowing of topical concern as the language is unified and then a widening of concerns as the language develops. Throughout, it is important to note, the discipline of economics did not entirely abandon subjects such as institutional economics. Pockets of resistance to the evolution persisted; in some overseas locations and in some domestic departments, they dominated. The hourglass describes roughly the development of orthodox or mainstream economics, and, (at that), primarily in the United States. (Daedalus, Winter, 1997)

The excitement over the new growth theory has now passed on to “new” institutional economics and, more generally, to the “new” (meaning more formal) political economy. But while it lasted, the excitement had at least two unfortunate side-effects. The first was to greatly overshadow development economics as a discipline. Beginning in the years after World War II, development economics was an important new field, populated by original scholars who were thought of as giants – Albert Hirschman, Alexander Gerschenkron, W.W. Rostow, W. Arthur Lewis, Theodore Schultz, John D. Black, Peter Bauer. But while those scholars attracted plenty of fans, they didn’t train many students of the next generation who could compete as stars with those who identified themselves as (mathematically trained) growth economists; Mancur Olson, Peter Timmer and Anne Krueger were probably the best-known among those who won prominence. Others, like Henry Rosovsky, left the field for other responsibilities.

The other side-effect in the 1980s and ’90s was to add a little momentum to the impulse to send a lot of bright young theorists out into a world that was rapidly opening up. They were to serve as “country doctors.” The content of their black bags consisted mainly of a understanding of the fundamentals of sound macroeconomic management described in 1990 by John Williamson as “the Washington consensus” and ordinarily interpreted as One Size Fits All. Central to the bedside manner of these advisers was their ability to speak fluently of the latest advances on the research frontier; detailed knowledge of the country in question was not required. Jeffrey Sachs, Lawrence Summers and the late Rudiger Dornbusch were among the most prominent. Countless teams were mobilized by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well. And even in a case where advice was being given by a theorist with intimate knowledge of the local economy, Andrei Shleifer, a Harvard University professor who had grown up in the former Soviet Union, the project collapsed amid charges of corruption among its leaders, a disaster for both US foreign policy and for Harvard.

Rodrik’s heart has been in development since he started, at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy more than twenty-five years ago, but he recognized immediately that he couldn’t hang out a shingle except as a full-fledged practicing member of the community of mainstream economics – hence the Princeton PhD. Throughout the years in which the triumphant “Washington consensus” dominated, Rodrik taught, published and worked around the world on development problems, mostly behind the scenes. He retained his Turkish citizenship. In 1996, he moved from Columbia University back to Harvard, where he had been an undergraduate, and quickly built the Kennedy School’s MPA in International Development into a leader in the field.

Rodrik’s task now, as I understand it, and that of the many other economists in his community around the world, is to rebuild development economics on the firmer foundation of the new, more cosmopolitan economics – all the various “new” economics that have emerged since the 1970s, when game theory and decentralized stochastic general equilibrium models became part of the normal graduate student toolkit. He co-chairs Harvard’s Growth Lab with Philipe Aghion, Harvard’s leading growth theorist, and the two teach development together. In Many Recipes, he repeatedly demonstrates his familiarity with the finer points of theory (and they become fine very quickly), taking account, for example, explicitly and implicitly, of a couple of important applied papers in the lit – Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny on the concept of the “big push,” Romer on the significance of an export-processing zone in Mauritius.

He tackles the literature even more directly in “Why We Learn Nothing Regressing Economic Growth on Policies,” a paper too technical to be included in the book but available on his website, even more powerful for its elegant take-down of the economists’ equivalent of digging holes and filling them in. These cross-country regressions were a outgrowth of the new theories of growth (if particular policies could affect the growth rate, why not compare their effects in countries all around the world? Especially since a great compilation of data on production, income and prices in 188 countries, knows as the Penn World Table, had just become available?

Rodrik’s chapter on growth diagnostics, with Ricardo Hausmann and Andrés Velasco, is the heart of the book. There may be other ways to write the decision tree they have devised to identify the constraint on growth of a given country and identify the most binding one – it seems to me that human capital formation is under-stressed – but as a means of disciplining conversation about the experiences of disparate countries, I suspect it cannot be surpassed. It is, in embryo, a contribution equivalent in many ways to the Penn World Table, which also was devised by a handful of economists working at a distance from Washington, in that case at the University of Pennsylvania. Growth diagnostics deserves to be taken up and systematically elaborated by the World Bank, the United Nations or some other agency concerned with global development, s a means of getting beyond the platitudes of “the Washington consensus.”

I especially like the concept of national “self-discovery” that Rodrik identifies as being the nub of the problem in, say, El Salvador. Clearly innovation is what is required if low levels of entrepreneurship and private investment are to be reversed – new markets for new goods, especially since the successful products can be scaled up for sale in the world market (which is the essence of new growth theory). But new ideas are easy to imitate, hard to protect. What it that El Salvador can uniquely trade in the world economy? Not just coffee, surely; that grows just as well in a dozen other countries around the world. Rodrik is particularly good at drawing out the implications in chapter four, “Industrial Policy for the Twenty First Century.” Most significant instances of product diversification are the result of collaboration between governments and the private sector, he says, in East Asia and in Latin America. (He might have added that the same is true of the United States and Europe, too.) What’s needed is to understand much better the differences between success and failure.

And this brings me back to Robert Lucas. What was so startling in 1985 about “The Mechanics of Economic Development” was the frank and surprising admission by the leading theorist of the University of Chicago that building new skills was at the heart of the problem. Sure, Lucas imagined an austere world, in which there were only two goods, potatoes and computers. And yes, the two models he brought to bear were highly mathematical. But both led ineluctably to a possible role for government in fostering growth. In the first model, a subsidy to schooling would enhance development, he noted. In the second, an industrial policy focused on “picking winners” might improve matters. Picking winners was easy in the model he had written down, Lucas wrote: “If only it were so in reality!”

In those days, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and the business school across the river had a joint seminar discussing industrial policy that produced, among others, Robert Reich and Ira Magaziner. But Lucas’ talk changed all of economics. On my reading, Rodrik understands that – it is part of what he means when he writes that “social phenomena can best be understood by considering them to be an aggregation of purposeful behavior by individuals – in their roles as consumer, producer, investor, politician and so on – interacting with each other and acting under the constraints that their environment imposes.” Precisely because that he understands that mainstream economics, Chicago and Cambridge, now presupposes that industrial policy is as much a part of sound macroeconomic management as monetary or industrial policy, he is a regular rock star among development economists, quite able to stand toe-to-toe and slug it out on practical matters with any theorist.



Aaron Swartz 11.12.07 at 5:52 pm

This piece appears to be cut off. (Less severely, it’s also in a funny font for much of it and has weird spacing issues.)


Henry 11.12.07 at 8:29 pm

Thanks Aaron – WordPress’s automatic formatting munged it something horrible, so I have gone back and reformatted manually – it should work now.


John Emerson 11.13.07 at 2:26 am

Y’all aren’t getting the comments. haven’t read the book, but based on what I’ve read here, I’ll troll a question.

Why is it so deathly important for every even mildly-dissident economist to assure people, as Rodrik does, that they’re orthodox neo-classical economists and in no way heterodox? Is it because all heterodox economists are always wrong about everything, or is it that the economics profession is controlled by an efficient and unforgiving Mafia.

Also, why is it that none of the people trying to make room in neo-classical economics for alternative views ever criticizes an important neoclassical economist by name, even mildly? Mafia?

Also, why is it that Krugman gets shit from the profession for being too political, but Pinochet libertarians like Hayek and Friedman never did?


John Quiggin 11.13.07 at 5:56 am

“Economists argued about it for a time, before the best among them agreed to stipulate that knowledge had an economics of its own, quite different from the economics of things. They left behind a handful of researchers to work it out, and moved on to the investigation of the institutional apparatus and social framework that created and distributed new ideas around the world.”

This is correct, but, I suspect unfortunate. I think there’s the potential for some really substantial progress in the economics of information, that would illuminate, among other things, the role of institutions.


Tracy W 11.13.07 at 9:52 am

Why is it so deathly important for every even mildly-dissident economist to assure people, as Rodrik does, that they’re orthodox neo-classical economists and in no way heterodox?

Huh? Have you ever encountered an Austrian economist?

Also, why is it that none of the people trying to make room in neo-classical economics for alternative views ever criticizes an important neoclassical economist by name, even mildly?
Not true. See for example Peter J Boettke’s review of Stiglitz’s book “Whither Socialism?”. For example “Stiglitz’s problem is not limited to a weak reading of Hayek. He unfortunately cannot resist the temptation to characterise his opponent’s position in the most simplistic manner possible”.

I suspect there are thousands of other examples.

Also, why is it that Krugman gets shit from the profession for being too political,

Krugman’s now boring because he’s too political.


dsquared 11.13.07 at 9:54 am

Why is it so deathly important for every even mildly-dissident economist to assure people, as Rodrik does, that they’re orthodox neo-classical economists and in no way heterodox?

watch this space tomorrow for some jokes in this vein.


credit the ancestors 11.13.07 at 12:39 pm

Nice essay by Warsh, but I think he’s being a bit blind in suggesting it all started with Lucas lecture (key article published 1988). What is at the heart of new-growth economics are models with externalities and spillovers that end up breaking the key assumption of more standard neo-classical (i.e. Solow-type) models that there are diministhing returns to capital (or any accumulated factor) which lies at the heart of all the convergence results. Lucas pointed to spillovers and complementarities in human capital as one such avenue.
But Ken Arrow had pointed to essentially the same idea in 1962, although it had to wait until Lucas, Romer, Helpman/Grossman/Krugman and others to work it out more fully in the mathematical rigor of general equilibrium models. What is more, well before Arrow there was a era of ‘high-development’ theorists (to borrow Paul Krugman’s phrase), writing in the 40s and 50s who spoke of essentially the same types of spillovers, externalities and coordination problems we find in this modern literature. People like Rodenstein-Rodan, Scitovsky, Hirschman and others. They were the theorists behind the economic arguments for the possibilities of an industrial policy.
The mainstream economics profession through the 1980s managed to belittle and ridicule these earlier authors, and declare them largely vanquished in the battlefields of the pages of economic journals, for their inability to formalize ideas more precisely.
What Lucas deserves credit for is for doing a ‘Nixon goes to China’ move and allowing future generations of mainstream economists to feel safe in stepping again on grounds that these earlier theorists had developed but that Lucas’ intellectual army-mates had earlier spent so much time turning into a minefield.
You and Dani Rodrik are right in pointing out that economics is a much more interesting place today, and that people like Lucas deserve credit for expanding its scope. Lucas deserves credit for ending the cold war, and Dani Rodrik for rescuing debating points from the 40s and 50s and dressing them up in modern language, so that they are once again in policy debates.


dsquared 11.13.07 at 6:25 pm

in my essay I characterise this as “the main usefulness of neoclassical economics is that it can be used as a means of persuading neoclassical economists of the truth of valid propositions discovered by other means”.


Walt 11.13.07 at 9:59 pm

credit the ancestors makes several good point. The fact that in some accounts it’s all attributed to Lucas disturbs me greatly. Krugman points out a rather eloquent description of spillovers in Marshall, for example.


John Emerson 11.13.07 at 10:24 pm

Geoffrey Hodgson says that economic theory “works principally through its auxiliary assumptions”.

Austrians aren’t economists — they’ve been expelled. Neither are Marxists. Sorry, guys.

I was talking only about “mildly dissident economists” within the profession, who aren’t devout neo-classicals but want to introduce some changes. They’re pretty timid. I didn’t express myself clearly.


notsneaky 11.13.07 at 11:07 pm

While it’s true that it didn’t start with Lucas and many of these ideas go way way way back, I think that “The mainstream economics profession through the 1980s managed to belittle and ridicule these earlier authors” is plain false.

Can you give an example where a prominent “mainstream economist” belittled and ridiculed Rosenstein-Rodan, Hirschman, Scitovsky or any others? The general feeling – before IO got really underway in early 80′s – was “it may be true but it’s hard to model”. Which means that perhaps it was ignored, but it doesn’t mean it was ridiculed.


John Quiggin 11.14.07 at 12:35 am

JE, I had my go at Pinochet here (search my site for more examples).


credit the ancestors 11.14.07 at 1:09 am

notsqueaky: I agree it is too strong to say it was belittled and ridiculed. But do still think there was a ‘Nixon goes to China’ quality to the Lucas’ paper. U Chicago is really not the kind of place from where to expect a paper on externalities and market failures or the possibility of industrial policy. Chicago — home of Coase, Stigler, Harberger, Friedman, Becker — was the place to find good arguments deeply suspicious of the idea of industrial policy.

Hence it was somewhat of a setting of a bold new direction for Lucas to have built a theory of growth build on market failure and external returns to scale. Chicago’s Kevin Murphy shortly after joined Shleifer and Vishny to formalize Rodenstein-Rodan. So no doubt the ideas of high-development theorists were making a comeback.

I’m not interested in re-hashing a version of the debate over whether ‘heterodox’ economists are tolerated or not (smart heterodox economists who can formalize ideas in models have always been tolerated and often celebrated — even though I’m quite certain Chicago was not the place they went to camp out).
My point was mainly that Lucas’ contribution to this field was not so much one of seminal ideas (as suggested by this essay), as much as those of formalizing, popularizing and hence making the topic interesting and hot for a new PhD to work in (e.g. Paul Romer was a Chicago PhD).


notsneaky 11.14.07 at 3:36 am

“I agree it is too strong to say it was belittled and ridiculed.”

Ok, don’t do it again.

And Chicago was never as monolithic ideologically or methodologically as people made/make it out to be. I guess I see Lucas’ “departure” as less of a departure. It was good economics and that’s what mattered.

Also, if you read the original Lucas speech – the whole “the implications of growth are staggering” bit – you see him pay ample homage to the predecessors. Even the model associated with him is known as the Uzawa-Lucas model. Uzawa published in 1965 and good part of the reason his name is in there is because Lucas has always been very good about acknowledging the predecessors (same applies with Muth and Rational Expectations).


dsquared 11.14.07 at 9:24 am

Can you give an example where a prominent “mainstream economist” belittled and ridiculed Rosenstein-Rodan, Hirschman, Scitovsky or any others?

It’s easy to be nice to the big names of the previous age; the trick is to venerate them as wise but essentially (and sadly) irrelevant predecessors while slagging off the modern-day inheritors of their tradition as kooks, dead-enders and unable to cope with the rigor of “real” economics (the Austrians can of course tell you all about this; the combination of venerating Hayek and vilifying Hayekians is pretty much par for the course, Krugman in the 90s being a particularly egregious case).

It’s also hard to square this nicey-nicey version of history with the facts about the institutional survival rate of development economics departments and programs. Somebody was certainly going around saying that development economics wasn’t real economics and that its grant money ought to be switched to something else, and the “follow the money” rule certainly points toward rational expectations theorists.


Tracy W 11.14.07 at 11:05 am

I was talking only about “mildly dissident economists” within the profession, who aren’t devout neo-classicals but want to introduce some changes. They’re pretty timid.

Ah well, there’s your problem. If you’re only looking at mild dissidents, it’s hardly surprising that they are pretty timid. :)

There is a polarising tendency in debate. To maintain a naunced position I find takes serious energy and attention to detail. For example I once set about arguing in a debate on a Jane Austen-dedicated board, that Willoughby did really care for Marianne, he wasn’t just faking it. I had to devote massive amounts of space and time to specifying that I was *not* arguing that Willoughby loved Marianne, and that I was not arguing that his feelings were worthy of being called love in any philosophical sense. People, in arguments, have a tendency to fill in the other person’s side based on some caricature, I know I tend to do it myself if I’m not extremely careful. To resist this and to insist on being read as having a more nuanced view than the most wild-eyed lunatic your debating opponent has ever encountered means spending a lot of time saying that you are not arguing whatever the wild-eyed lunatics argue.


John Emerson 11.14.07 at 11:13 am

I believe that the standard professional procedure for belittling or ridiculing an economist is to say that he’s really just a sociologist. (Or maybe just a historian or just a philosopher). The nice thing about this is that it seems innocuous enough outside the profession, and not only that, the target can only defend himself by insulting sociologists et al.

There’s a specter haunting neoclassical economics. Not the specter of Communism, but the specter of Ptolemy. Stiglitz seems to have begun to realize this. The Ptolemaic theory and (more broadly) scholasticism were solidly institutionalized, and scholasticism hung on well into the sisteenth century — three centuries after it quit producing anything of much interest. (Here’s Wiki’s scholastics 1350–1650: Gregory of Rimini, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, Leonardus Lessius, Cesare Cremonini.)

This is not to say that the late scholastics wrote nothing of any interest or value at all. Suarez was the theoretician of Guy Fawkes’ “Gunpowder Plot”, and performed a great service for future anarchists and assassins.


John Emerson 11.14.07 at 11:17 am

To further clarify my muddle point, neoclassicism seems to be allowing new ideas in drop by drop while demanding that the new people renounce heterodoxy. The Collander — Rosser — Holt book “The Changing Face of Economics” (intro McCloskey) seems to do this. Herbert Gintis seems to be especially venomous in his attacks on those on the other side of the drawbridge.


Alex 11.14.07 at 3:55 pm

As I said to a colleague not so long ago, rational expectations theory is now in the process of achieving something incredible – despite the fact that cognitive neuroscience (which is actually a proper natural science with all experiments an stuff) has pretty conclusively demonstrated that the rational expectations hypothesis is berserkly stupid, they are now arguing that all that accepted, their conclusions are still the same and still just as valid.

It’s as if physicists were to discover that in fact, the speed of light is variable, but continue to maintain that the rest of the standard model is just as good as it ever was.


notsneaky 11.15.07 at 9:30 pm

“(the Austrians can of course tell you all about this”

Yes, but that’s because after Hayek and Von Mises they got… Rothbard. So it’s not like it’s entirely undeserved in this case.


William Newman 11.16.07 at 10:33 pm

In my stunningly bad books collection I keep _How to Live Like a King’s Kid_, a proselytizing tract which I was given after asking someone for a book she thought would be particularly convincing to a thoughtful nonbeliever. (bad call on her part, I think) In one chapter the author tells about how, when visiting scientists at NASA, they told him about how their computer simulation of the solar system “back and forth across the centuries” didn’t fit until some religious fellow on the team pointed out Joshua’s missing day could make things come out right. That was the key insight, although in the event, the computer team also needed to include the forty minutes in Hezekiah’s day to get things quite right. Yowza! At the end of the chapter the author notes “Since the incident came to my attention…I have misplaced names and places” and as far as I know they never turned up after that, so we can never check with the NASA tech people to find the details. Without that, it’s hard for us to fill in the details: I have never been able to imagine such a planetary simulation with a contradiction which’d be solved by accounting for a missing almost-a-day, because I can’t think of any date endpoint thousands of years ago where we’d know even one astronomical planet’s position nearly precisely enough to create such a contradiction.

Similarly, I have great difficulty imagining a feasible set of experiments in cognitive neuroscience (which is actually a proper natural science with all experiments an stuff) which could pretty conclusively demonstrate that the rational expectations hypothesis is berserkly stupid. It’s certainly true that impressive individual irrationalities exist and don’t necessarily average out into something more nearly rational. They can even perversely end up blowing up into big irrationalities like speculative bubbles. And the properties of individual minds, and of the collective behavior of interacting actors, are enormously important, so this sounds like vitally important work, and not just in economics. And if someone has pretty conclusively demonstrated that the perversities must consistently dominate overwhelmingly in real-world economic situations, that seems like incredibly great work, unbelievably far beyond the state of the art of psychological understanding of the individual brain, of understanding of economics in general and the flow of information in particular, and of understanding of the mathematics of stability of systems. So could you elaborate? It’s not reasonable to expect any of us to be such supergeniuses we can fill in the technical details by ourselves, and now that publication lags for amazing stories have become so much shorter, presumably unlike Harold Hill you haven’t forgotten the technical contact details of your high-powered scientific buddies before publication.


Robert 11.17.07 at 8:08 pm

Mr. Newman’s comment seems too long-winded to be merely a “proof” by incredulity. But I can see very little else there.

Presumably alex is referring to work surveyed in such articles as:

Colin F. Camerer (2007). “Neuroeconomics: Using Neuroscience to Make Economic Predictions”, Economic Journal, V. 117 (Mar): C26-C42.

Chris Starmer (1999). “Experimental Economics: Hard Science or Wasteful Tinkering?, Economic Journal, V. 109, N. 453 (Feb): F5-F15

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