Special obligations

My intuition agrees with your conclusion—that there’s good reason to suspect that in loco parentis (in this type of case) entails a special responsibility above and beyond that to one’s own children. However, merely asserting this isn’t enough. I’m not convinced this is normative or abstractly justified. (I also think that “debt” is a particularly bad analogy.)

The question is, when his daughter is riding in a friend’s car, who should have the extra protection? I look forward to his follow-up on that. And the fistfight.
SUV ethics.

I’m with Ophelia — Cohen is not worth reading, unless you get off on mocking his silly “ethical” advice — and his weird set-ups for non-funny punchlines at the end of each column — or on feeling superior to the oddballs who write in with these weird questions.

I think you should do it according to who’s smallest or which kids want to sit together. The moral obligation is equal. I won’t argue with the emotional desire to protect your own kids above all, but we’re not talking about a burning building and there’s something a little ghoulish about doing the cost benefit analysis, and concluding that little Johhny is more expendable than little Timmy, before every car ride.

Steve Martin doesn’t like the ethicist either:
l am going to a country where it is legal and socially acceptable to eat people. I would like to eat my brother-in-law, who will be on the trip with me and is Canadian. l am from Iowa. Would this be ethical?

I am sure cannibalism is illegal in Iowa, but I’m not sure about Canada. I would suggest you stop in Canada first, take your brother-in-law to a police station and eat his foot, and see if anyone objects. If not, you can feel assured that the complete ingestion of your brother-in-law in a permissive country is perfectly ethical.

Link:
http://www.compleatsteve.com/essays/ethicist.htm

I love Randy Cohen’s column, because the questions are so real and the answers are so random. Cohen’s baffling and contradictory responses provide real insights into the chaotic way many of us deal with ethical dilemmas. The fact that he is published as an “expert” by the “paper of record” makes it all the more fun.

The best newspaper advisor of all was the late Dear Abby, who, given the barest outline of one side of a hotly dipusted issue, would pronounce unshakeable judgments like some terrible deity. Was she way off base on any particular judgment? Who cared? She had spoken. That was enough. Compared to her, Cohen comes off as a man of trivial and random personal opinions.

The NYT wanted a fresh voice and had a contest for a new ethics advisor. Anyway, Cohen won the contest. Before that, he was a freelance writer and a comedy writer for David Letterman. (I am not making that up.)

I did, too. But after being amazed one too many times by his answers, I googled him and learned that his prior job was a comedy writer. Isn’t that perfect?

“Isn’t that perfect?“—John

Yeah. It’s really quite amazing given that the last decade has seen such enormous growth of ethics as a professional, practical, discipline. Inexcusable, really.

How’d that happen? DeLong’s bug has infected CT?

This MT Hack will solve this problem (duplicate comments).

Yeah, isn’t it pathetic? What’s on the menu next, I wonder – the Times wants a ‘fresh voice’ to write a medical advice column so hires someone whose last job was being a circus acrobat?

“A man who sits idly by while a strange child drowns within easy reach is not criminally liable. If the child is his son, he is at least guilty of manslaughter for not trying to save him.“—rv agnos

I’d deeply appreciate a cite of an example of such a law.

Certainly.

Check out this law review article. The rules are standard throughout America, with only the rare municipality invoking a Good Samaritan law extending duties beyond family (see, e.g., the last episode of Seinfeld).

http://www.agulnicklaw.com/articles/duty.html

Relevant quotes — citations in article.

“Contrary to French law, the American rule on omissions is as follows: there is no legal duty to rescue another in danger, even though a moral obligation might exist. [FN10] This is true even “when that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to” the potential rescuer. [FN11]”
. . .

” The parent-child relationship is most illustrative of this type of personal relationship. The common law has long recognized that parents who fail to aid or protect their children are criminally liable. [FN27] Today, it is not just the common law that imposes a duty on parents. In fact, every state has enacted statutes to specifically punish parents who fail to maintain their children’s health. These statutes require parents to provide food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention for their children. [FN28] The reason for imposing such a duty on parents is, according to the court in Commonwealth v. Konz, [FN29] “[t]he inherent dependency of a child upon his parent to obtain medical aid, i.e., the incapacity of a child to evaluate his condition and summon aid by himself, supports imposition of such a duty upon the parent.” [FN30]”

Certainly, but the two are somewhat related. The law is not this uniform among states for no reason. The common law emerges out of judges’ sense of our shared sense of morality.

And there is a consensus in America that a greater duty is owed to your own children than to the children of others.

Now, perhaps that consensus is wrong or immoral, but it should at least be viewed as a starting point. If you want to convince someone that he owes as much to a non-relative as he does to a relative, you have to make the case, not simply assert.

rv.agnos, but the point isn’t that you generally don’t have a greater moral obligation to your own children. It’s that when you’re transporting someone else’s child, you have taken on the moral obligations of parenthood, for at least that period of time. I think it’s rather despicable to actually sit down and think about something like this – seat them according to whatever other factors are involved. And like Kieran, I wonder whether there’s any evidence to support the contention that the middle seat is less safe.

“And beyond that, duties of justice quite generally don’t permit us to favour those close to us over strangers (there isn’t a stronger duty to repay a debt to a close relation than to a distant one or to an non-relative).”

I was responding specifically to Chris’s comment quoted above. I do not know whether any posters here have children. I do know that no one with children would have to think twice about whether the duty to a child is ever subjugated to a duty to a non-child.

The fact that the driver is “in loco parentis” may potentially raise the obligation to equality, but certainly not above equality. In terms of “general” duties of justice, however, Chris is simply wrong.

I see you point, Ophelia, but when an American suburbanite looks to David Letterman’s gag writer for ethics advice, isn’t an American viewpoint implied?

More seriously, on the merits, I think I don’t have enough information to answer the original question, regardless of our framework. Do we know about the relative safety of the middle seat? Do we know the size and weight of all three children? Doesn’t that affect the safety analysis?

Apparently En Banc trackback is a bit screwy. I provide legal citations to non-liability for omissions in American criminal law, and offer some other thoughts here.

I have to agree with rv. agnos here. When it comes to familial relations, it is not at all the case that “duties of justice quite generally don’t permit us to favour those close to us over strangers.”

I have duties (legal and moral) toward my son that I simply do not have toward any other child, or any other person. My husband and I are legally (not to mention morally) obliged to maintain and support him: at the very least, we must see that he is adequately fed, clothed and housed, and are also legally required to see to his education. Are these not duties of justice? It seems a curious blind spot to ignore such a large area of moral-ethical life. Unless the familial is seen as simply “natural” and thus beneath or above or beyond the realm of justice?

“In short, sometimes what’s legal and what isn’t can seem a tad beside the real point.”—Ophelia

Well, it’s not beside the point in the sense that r.v. and others have been trying to use the law as an indicator of the prevailing opinion about the ethics of the matter. It’s quite relevant.

I’m not a philsopher, or an academic of any kind, so I don’t even have a high horse to get on. And I said Miss Manners is a far better ethicist than Cohen! So Abby me no Abby. But the word has some meaning, for one thing, and for another thing, Cohen is just shallow and silly.

Oh what the hell. Here’s what I think. Parents should all evict their own children and house someone else’s. I think that’s their ethical duty.

[falls about laughing]

Sorry! I did say I’m not a philosopher. I’m just a child – please can I have a ride and a swim in the pool and all your food and clothes and your child’s room? Thanks.

I read that quote and flinched. Of course one is obliged to honor one’s young guest with the highest consideration, it’s truly shocking to argue otherwise, under no circs will my children ever set foot in this damned Cohen’s damned house, etc., etc.

It’s kinda odd I feel so vehement about this, I don’t know why I do.

Checking in again, quite a bit later. A few things:

nolo’s statement about “recklessness” above is, in layman’s terms, idiotic. We’re talking about the middle seat, which, under certain circumstances, may be marginally less safe than the other two, but remains safer than any seat in any motorized, wheeled conveyance for public sale up until about 10 years ago. For god’s sake, when we were all young, it was commonly accepted that children, whether your own or another’s, would be moving all about the car, one equipped with metal dashboards and rigid frames that transmitted impact forces to occupants with great efficacy. Any parent who would consider another parent to be offering inadequate safety to any child provided with a seatbelt in the back probably gives the child a safety helmet for dog walks.

Furthermore, you (plural) are correct in your suspicions that the middle seat isn’t necessarily the dangerous one – side impacts are more common and more deadly, and a lap belt will certainly prevent windshield ejection. Babies in car seats should absolutely be in the center, but for older (and multiple) children, window seats usually win out on practicality (chris’s original inclination about child arrangement being, I think, the sensible one). We’re really talking about tiny margins of safety, and the calculus surely varies with every trip – Hmm, 90% divided highway, with no chance of head-on collision, plus 18 turn-ins from the left and 15 from the right…driver’s side wins!

Finally, on the general topic, I stick with my original statement, with appreciation for rv. agnos. I can’t fathom what problem keith has with agnos’s evidence – it seems pretty clear-cut that US Common Law generally, and the states in particular, believe that parents have quite high responsibilities towards their own children, and relatively little towards others’ (such as the starvation example – not feeding your own is a crime, but failing to feed others’ is certainly not; maybe if the child crawls to your door with its last strength, and you slam the door on her w/o calling 911, you’ve got some negligence, but not the manslaughter [or worse] faced by her parents).

Getting back to the burning building, even those who seem to disagree with Cohen can’t seem to bring themselves to argue that you have to get the other kid out first. Try to get the other kid – yes. Absolutely. But the only way that Cohen’s car advice can be wrong is if you’re also obliged to get the other kid first – you’re in loco parentis both ways, and either you favor your flesh and blood (in seatbelt theory or fiery practice) or you favor the guest.

“What you will find is lots of courts convicting for manslaughter in one case and not convicting in the other.”—R.V. Agnos

Okay, then cite a case.

Again, your argument is somewhat persuasive. But I don’t think things are as clear cut as you claim. In the drowning example, I have a hard time believing that in a situation where there is a parent and a non-parent, both equally proximate and able, in theory, to save the child, a court would find the parent specifically guilty of manslaughter while the non-parent is innocent. But I very well could be wrong. I’d just like to pin it down.

I really do think there’s something interesting going on here. In the case of car scenario, as phrased, I think it clearly strikes some people that there’s a special responsibility in loco parentis above and beyond the responsibilty one has to one’s own children. In that particular case. As a general matter, obviously this isn’t true, few people would claim otherwise and Ophelia rightly ridicules the idea.

So there’s something specific to that scenario that implies, at least to some people, a special responsibility that doesn’t exist in many other comparable situations. It’s worth figuring out what that is.

Just in case piraisoli’s comments were directed at me, I made it clear (and want to reiterate) that I adjudged Cohen’s comments to be bafflingly random *before* I knew his credentials. Also, I always found Ann Landers to be amazing despite her lack of formal credentials. So, I judge these experts on their merits, not on their credentials.

But there’s another point. Why does the NYT call him the “Ethicist” if he has no systematic approach, no training, no professional project, no schooling, etc? Why “Ethicist”? Isn’t he just a guy offering advice? Maybe everybody offering advice is an “ethicist” and I didn’t know that. Or is it that the NYT couldn’t bear to have an “advice column”? Or is Cohen really an “ethicist” for some reason I don’t understand?

I’m not backing into a credentialist account, by the way. Socrates may not have had formal credentials, but he counts as an ethicist. I just don’t see any basis for Cohen to be labeled as such. His takes on these issues are, to my eyes, largely random and mostly say-so.

Ellis: “there are things that philosophers do that you can’t do because they have both training and experience you lack, just as is the case with medicine. You’re not only being respectful of the philosophers which host this forum, but you’re also being willfully ignorant. If you think that philosophy is just sitting around bullshitting, then, true, you’re not alone in thinking so, but you’re flat wrong.”

I don’t know where to start. Let me try. (i) I said that philosophers are very good in identifying dimensions of analysis, but that a person’s value preferences don’t score high just because he is a professional philosopher. I know exactly what philosophers do, and I have tremendous respect for them. I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt and ask you where you think I said or implied that philosophers sit around bullshitting. (ii) Anyone who thinks that expressing disagreement with opinions here is being disrespectful, not to speak of being “willfully ignorant,” is not giving arguments, but pulling rank and being ad hominem. I made a very specific argument — making practical ethical choices is not just a matter of having your facts right, but making value preferences. Philosophers, qua philosophers, have no greater standing on this than anyone else. Ultimately, an individual has to make those choices, and collectively, a society has to make them through democratic means.

While I am not a professional philosopher, I am quite knowledgeable about the subject and I am fond of the subject and its practitioners. I was just appalled at the uncritical equating of ethical judgments with judgements in physics or factual judgments in medicine, that’s all. So, now, will you engage my arguments, rather than call me names (“willfully ignorant,” unlike you, “ignorant without realizing it”?), or accuse me of saying or implying things I never did. If it would help, carefully reread what I posted.

Piraisoli

R.V.: Thanks! That’s very interesting and goes a long way toward demonstrating, even in extremis, the principle you’re asserting.

Certainly, I should admit that I am a little surprised by this because it doesn’t seem right to me. But I accept the correctness of your point.

Sorry if this duplicates any prior comment (I haven’t carefully read all of them), but I can assert with at least 95% confidence that in American states that have no Good Samaritan laws, the presumption is strongly against any civil or criminal duty to help another (even a child) who is in despair. Typical exceptions are those I mentioned in my post at En Banc. There may or may not be a case out there overturning a conviction for failure to save an unrelated drowning child, but there are very similar cases. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, found that the defendant, who had ample means to provide food and medical care to a 10 month old baby who lived (with its mother) in the defendant’s house, was not criminally liable for his failure to prevent the baby’s death because evidence was insufficient to show a care-taking contract, or other exception to the no duty rule. You can also check out the horrifying Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, where the defendant was not liable for child abuse even though the child’s mother, in the presence of the defendant “savagely beat and ripped and tore at the infant, doing it violent and serious injury. During this prolonged period Mrs. Pope did nothing to try to protect the child, to call the authorities, or to seek medical assistance…. She went to church [!] with [the mother] and later brought her back to her home. At some point in the evening, the infant died from the beating.”

This is one of the relatively few unambiguous principles of American law. Failure to save a drowning child–whether or not sanctioned by the courts–is frequenty cited by scholars as a basic example of just how serious the American criminal system is about not punishing inaction.

I guess the conversation is splintering at this point, but I wanted to re-visit the issue of what makes someone an “Ethicist” rather than someone offering their opinions on things.

I guess my view is that the notion of “Ethicist” implies some systematic ethic and implies a sustained project of addressing those issues. I suppose that Cohen may meet the latter criterion but for my money never has met the former. Note below that he says he will use the categorical imperative on an as needed basis — but I think that whether or not one agrees with the categorical imperative an ethicist has to realize that it is something that isn’t for “as needed,” or take-it-or-leave-it uses. It’s a categorical imperative. (Note, for example, how his answer about the seatbelts never tries to wrestle with the issue of whether Cohen himself is willing to let others make that choice about his kids.)

Anyway, for what it’s worth, here’s an interesting Q and A with Cohen himself. He offers us the “is his advice satisfactory?” test, and as I’ve noted I believe he flunks that test — but I will let him have the last word.

Q: In your new book, you refer to yourself as an “accidental ethicist.” Is it just me, or do you seem almost proud that you have no official credentials as an ethics expert?
A: [Horrified shriek.] I’m not proud! Nothing could be further from the truth. I’m seriously and truly mortified by the great mass of ignorance in which I swim every day. It’s like blurting out the most shameful thing about yourself in a pre-emptive strike — being on a horrible blind date, and saying, “I killed a guy.”

Q: Have you ever taken an ethics or philosophy class?
A: Never.

Q: So there’s no school of ethics that you subscribe to?
A: There is none.

Q: Are you familiar with the schools of ethics?
A: More than I was three years ago. There are many ethical precepts that I find useful and am not bound by. Like the categorical imperative — there are times when I will invoke it, but other times, it doesn’t seem to be a helpful tool for the situation.

Q: On that note, are you always trying to read and learn more?
A: Are you saying I could learn more?! I wish I were a better-educated person. I wish I had a Ph.D. in philosophy. That would undoubtedly be a good thing. But I’ll put it to you this way: One of the functions of credentials is to help you anticipate how well someone will do a job. The reader can see now whether or not they find my performance satisfactory. There are 150 examples. And if I’m not writing something engaging, they should by all means stop reading it. As I understand our laws, it’s still optional — not mandatory — to read me. But I’m spending some time in Albany to see what we can do about that.

Katherine, I agree that in cases where a nonparent agrees, explicitly or not, to look after the child, that nonparent assumes a duty (thank goodness). In the car hypothetical, though, such a duty is probably not breached (the standard would be reasonable care). One reason I offer legal authority is to answer earlier calls for specific cases; the other is to support an earlier claim in comments that there is indeed–to some extent–a political consensus in the law that duties to care for others are explicitly determined by the nature of one’s relationship to others. I won’t duplicate my post on the matter (link somewhere above–available at enbanc.org), but my basic contention is that the most reasonable way to decide how and to what extent relationships affect duties to aid others is through the concept of notice, or the likely expectations people have about social behavior, or the faith they invest in agreeements to take certain actions.

“quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt?”

“of what avail empty laws without good morals?”

–Horace’s 3rd Ode

Perhaps the opposite question is equally appropriate.

Pirasoli: My objection from the beginning was to the idea that only professional ethicists should be hired for jobs like the one Cohen has. I thought that was very credentialist, which might be defended when hiring a bridge designer or a surgeon, but not hiring a political columnist or a newspaper ethics advice giver.

I’m not a philosopher in any meaningful way — I work in mathematical logic — but I’ve been following this discussion with a fair amount of interest. I think your point that the professional/amateur distinction is radically different in medicine than in ethics is a good one, pirasoli, but I’m a bit confused about the general nature of your contention here. Why exactly are you objecting to the notion that only professional ethicists should be hired for such jobs?

To put it another way: You’re using the word “credentialist” as a pejorative in this context and I’m not at all convinced that that’s accurate. One might just as accurately describe Keith or Ophelia’s attitude as “expertist” (or whatever the appropriate “ism” is): the belief that those who have professionally trained to pursue an endeavour are the best-suited to accomplish it. [This of course begs the question as to whether being “credentialed” is the same as being an “expert”; perhaps that is the source of your objection?] As with any such generalization there are bound to be exceptions — maybe Randy Cohen is Socrates reborn, for example — but it seems to be a perfectly reasonable hiring policy to suggest. Could you illuminate your problems with it?

Here’s my solution to the ethical dilemna: all the children should be as safely strappen in as the adult in charge can manage. And the lobbiests from Detroit who contoured legislation such that making cars safe for kids is the parents’ problem should be tied to the back bumper and the luggage rack.