The university after what, now?

by Michael Bérubé on April 20, 2009

Last Thursday I took part in a plenary session of the <a href=”http://www.csaus.pitt.edu/frame_home.htm”>US Cultural Studies Association</a>.  The session was called “the university after cultural studies,”  and the participants were (besides myself) Marc Bousquet, Michele Janette, Cary Nelson, Sangeeta Ray, and Jeff Williams.  We were each given eight minutes to speak, and we were admirably (I might say anomalously) disciplined, coming in at 50 minutes altogether.  For those who might be interested, I’ll post my remarks below, with this brief explanation/ introduction:  my talk assumes that everybody in the ballroom, at a cultural studies conference, can speak to the impact of cultural studies on their own research and/or teaching and/or program and/or department, so that <i>somebody</i> has to get up and say that whole entire huge sectors of the university are not “after” cultural studies at all: they didn’t have any cultural studies to begin with, so they’re not “after” cultural studies in a temporal sense, and they’re not interested in doing any now, so they’re not “after” cultural studies in that sense either.

And without further ado:

One useful way to ask about the university after cultural studies is to ask what impact cultural studies has had on the American university as an institution over the past twenty or twenty-five years.  Has cultural studies transformed the disciplines of the human sciences?  Has cultural studies changed the means of transmission of knowledge?  Has cultural studies made the American university a more egalitarian or progressive institution?  And one useful way of answering these questions is to say, sadly, no.  It hasn’t had much of an impact at all.

I’m putting this baldly and polemically for a reason.  I know there are worthy programs in cultural studies at some North American universities, like Kansas State, where there were once no programs at all; I know that there is more interdisciplinary work out there than there was 25 years ago; it seems that there is even an entire Cultural Studies Association of some kind.  But I want to accentuate the negative in order to point out that over the past 25 years there has been a great deal of cultural-studies triumphalism that now seems unwarranted or embarrassing.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, we heard (and I believed) that cultural studies would fan out across the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, inducing them to become at once more self-interrogating and more open to public engagement.  Some people even suggested, either in hope or in fear, that cultural studies would become the name for the humanities and social sciences in toto.  And lest this sound grandiose, I want to insist that there was, at the time, good reason to think this way.  The period of theoretical ferment that began in the late 1960s and gained traction in the 1970s seemed to have reached the boiling point:  when Illinois held its “Cultural Studies Now and in the Future” conference in 1990, the program included historians, media theorists, sociologists, anthropologists, and AIDS activists; and the theoretical terrain, over which cultural studies had held its earlier skirmishes with deconstruction, with psychoanalysis, with feminism, and of course with the epochal struggle of Althusserians and neo-Gramscians, had lately been enriched by the arrival of Foucauldian historicism and queer theory.  It really did seem plausible that cultural studies could be the start of something big, something that would have a profound intellectual and institutional impact on the American university.

I’m not saying that it has had <i>no</i> impact. I’m sitting here next to three people [these would be Bousquet, Nelson, and Williams] whose indispensable accounts of the academic labor force in the US have been inspired, in part, by some of the best work in the cultural studies tradition.  And I remember well coming to Kansas State in 1995 and attending a terrific conference whose breakout sessions offered memorable work on everything from <i>Pulp Fiction</i> to pedagogy.  But if you compare the institutional achievements of cultural studies to its initial hopes, I don’t see how you can’t be disappointed by the last twenty years.  In most universities cultural studies has no home at all, which means (among other things) that graduate students doing work in cultural studies have to hope they’ll be hired in some congenial department that has a cultural studies component of some kind.  The good news on that front is that you can now find cultural studies scholars working in anthropology, in critical geography, even in kinesiology.  The bad news is that the place where cultural studies has arguably had the greatest impact is in English departments.  And though people in English departments tend to forget this, English departments are just a tiny part of the university.  Cultural studies may have congenial relations with some wings of some departments of modern languages, in communications, in education, in history or anthropology.  But sociology won’t even open our mail or return our calls, and in that respect the contrast between the situation in the US and the situation in the UK — where cultural studies engaged critically (and often caustically) with sociology from the outset, witness the careers of Stuart Hall, Paul Willis, and Paul Gilroy — could not be more stark.  I recently gave a paper in which I argued that the rise of the political blogosphere was a vindication of one of cultural studies’ central beliefs and a rebuke to the McChesney-Chomsky-Herman model of mass media (all three of those influential theorists, by the bye, said at the outset of this decade that the Internet could not work as a progressive political force because it was commercial). [And then, while I was in KC, I rehearsed that argument <a href=”https://crookedtimber.org/2009/04/14/the-answer-to-the-rhetorical-question-is-perhaps-yes-but-only-if-you-dont-invite-michael-walzer/#comment-272769″>in a recent thread on this very blog</a> as well.]  That is to say: cultural studies has taught us — or has tried to teach us — that you don’t know the meaning of a mass-cultural artifact until you find out what those masses of people actually <i>do</i> with it.  After my talk, someone asked me, “but isn’t that really more a question for sociology?”  To which I replied, well, the questions of sociology shouldn’t be considered alien territory for cultural studies.

At the same time, I know you can’t measure the impact of cultural studies simply in institutional terms; it’s not a matter of whether there will ever be as many Cultural Studies programs as there are Women’s Studies programs, and for that matter it’s not clear that the proliferation of Women’s Studies programs has been unambiguously beneficial to the intellectual projects of feminism. [I was thinking of, among other things, <a href=”https://crookedtimber.org/2009/03/18/its-an-outrage/#comment-269564″>Maurice Meilleur’s comment</a> from a recent thread.]  So let me proceed to throw some cold water on the intellectual history of cultural studies in the US.  First and foremost, it has been understood, that is to say misunderstood, as coextensive with the study of popular culture. This is very much our fault: this is what we get for saying that cultural studies has no specific methodology or subject matter, so that it gets elided with “cultural criticism” in general.  At this point in history, anybody writing on <i>The Bachelor</i> or <i>American Idol</i> is generally understood to be “doing” cultural studies — especially by his or her colleagues elsewhere in the university.

This aspect of US cultural studies has often been lamented, and rightly so.  The usual refrain is that once upon a time cultural studies was part of a political project, and now it’s just a matter of watching TV.  But I think that in the US, even the political project of cultural studies has been widely misunderstood.  I argue this point in some detail in my forthcoming book, <i>The Left At War</i>, so I’ll keep this very brief for now.  But much of the American academic left, from education to communications, continues to subscribe to the “manufacturing consent” model in which people are led to misidentify their real interests by the machinations of the corporate mass media.  The point to be made here is not that corporate mass media don’t dupe people; on the contrary, they do it every day.  The point is that Stuart Hall’s work on Thatcherism sought to complicate this picture by recourse to a theory of hegemony that was one part Laclau, one part Poulantzas, one part Gramsci, and one part homegrown Hall.  To this day, Hall’s work is routinely and reverently cited, even as his work on Thatcherism — and the challenge it posed to the intellectual left — is quite thoroughly ignored.  (<i>The Hard Road to Renewal</i>, by the way, is out of print and has been for some time, and most major cultural studies anthologies, including the one organized around Hall’s work, do not include any of the essays from <i>Hard Road.</i>)  The first thing to ask about any ideology, Hall insisted, is not what is false about it, but what is true — what about it actively <i>makes sense</i> to people whose beliefs you do not share.  Does anybody on the left actually operate this way?  Even in the 1980s, there were those who were quite foolishly willing to accuse Hall of betraying the left by proposing that the left could learn from how Thatcherism constituted a hegemonic project. [Addendum: indeed, there was someone at the conference who was willing to repeat that charge today!  I gotta love the fact that someone came to a cultural studies conference to say that.]  And if there was one thing that Hall inveighed against above all others in his debates with his fellow leftists, it was economism, the favorite monocausal explanation of the left intellectual.  As he put it in 1983:

<blockquote>I think of marxism not as a framework for scientific analysis only but also as a way of helping you sleep well at night; it offers the guarantee that, although things don’t look simple at the moment, they really are simple in the end.  You can’t see how the economy determines, but just have faith, it does determine in the last instance!  The first clause wakes you up and the second puts you to sleep. </blockquote>

I read that passage today and I think, how often do we find ourselves ascribing disparate political events and cultural phenomena solely to neoliberalism?  Again, not to say that neoliberalism is immaterial; it has dominated the political and economic landscape for thirty years, and its effects on higher education are palpable, baleful, and undeniable — from the corporatization of administration and research to the withdrawal of state funding for public universities. (In fact, recent analyses of academic neoliberalism by Henry Giroux, Susan Searles Giroux, and Sophia McLennen — in the special issue of <i>Works and Days</i> devoted to academic freedom — have apparently induced Stanley Fish to admit, in so many words, <a href=”http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/neoliberalism-and-higher-education/”>yes indeed, I are an neoliberal</a>, and oh, by the way, <a href=”http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/to-boycott-or-not-to-boycott-that-is-the-question/”>people who disagree with me support an academic boycott of Israel</a>.  Kudos to Henry, Susan, and Sophia!)  Indeed, Hall was writing on Thatcherism — and recognizing it correctly for the radical break it represented — just as neoliberal ideology was beginning to discover its powers, and we are meeting just as it has gone off the rails altogether, hopefully to rest in that <a href=”http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/10/financial-crisis-capitalism-socialism-alternatives”>ash heap of history</a>.  But I raise the question at this conference for obvious reasons — it’s literally on the agenda, in the form of conference seminars on neoliberalism.  And I want to ask, in a general way, whether we’re starting from neoliberalism and then proceeding to the analysis, or whether the analysis simply concludes, <i>it’s the neoliberalism, stupid.</i>  There seems to me all the difference in the world between those two approaches; the latter seems to me to enshrine neoliberalism as the monocausal explanation we had long derided but secretly desired.

Thirteen years ago, in a scathing, freewheeling, and woefully underinformed critique of the field, Bob McChesney asked, is there any hope for cultural studies?  He said no, because cultural studies had gotten distracted by postmodernism and identity politics and had lost sight of the simple truth that the free market is a sham and that people are misled by the mass media.  Enough cultural studies already — we have to get back to good old political economy.  I’m sorry to say that McChesney’s arguments have carried the day in all too many precincts of the university, and I’m even sorrier to say that McChesney’s claim that cultural studies “signifies half-assed research, self-congratulation, farcical pretension” has been gleefully seconded by much of the mass media and underwritten by some work in cultural studies.  But despite what I’ve said here today, I still have hope that the history of cultural studies might matter to the university — and to the world beyond it.  My hopes aren’t quite as ambitious as they were twenty years ago; I no longer expect cultural studies to transform the disciplines.  But I do think it can do a better job of complicating the political economy model in media theory, a better job of complicating our accounts of neoliberalism, and a better job of convincing people inside and outside the university that its understanding of hegemony is a form of understanding with great explanatory power, that is to say, a form of understanding that actually works.

<a href=”http://www.michaelberube.com/index.php/weblog/the_university_after_what/”>x-posted</a>.

{ 16 comments }

1

Sherman Dorn 04.20.09 at 3:20 pm

I have no memory of the delicious line that Marxism is “a way of helping you sleep well,” but it’s a wonderful irony (Althusserianism as the opiate of the professoriate). There was obviously a conspiracy to prevent me from reading Hall in college and in grad school. Let’s blame the corporate media!

2

Michael Bérubé 04.20.09 at 3:29 pm

The full context is even better. It comes in the Q/A after his paper, “The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists,” from Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (U of Illinois P, 1988). Hall is asked whether he remains a Marxist, and he replies:

I choose to keep the notion of classes; I choose to keep the notion of the capital/labor contradiction; I choose to keep the notion of social relations of production, etc.– I just don’t want to think them reductively. . . . My critique of marxism attempts to dethrone marxism from its guarantees, because I think that, as an ideological system, it has tried to construct its own guarantees. And I use the word “ideological” very deliberately. I think of marxism not as a framework for scientific analysis only but also as a way of helping you sleep well at night; it offers the guarantee that, although things don’t look simple at the moment, they really are simple in the end. You can’t see how the economy determines, but just have faith, it does determine in the last instance! The first clause wakes you up and the second puts you to sleep. It’s okay. I can nod off tonight, because in the last instance, though not just yesterday or today or tomorrow or as far as I can see forward in history, but in the last instance, just before the last trumpet, as St. Peter comes to the door, he’ll say, “the economy works.” I think those are very ideological guarantees. And as soon as you abandon that teleological structure under marxism, the whole classical edifice begins to rock. (“Toad” 72-73)

For more in this vein, see also “The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees.”

3

Ben Alpers 04.20.09 at 4:32 pm

My field, history, is always late to the academic party, grabbing on to ideas just as they have begun to become out of style in more cutting-edge fields. But in this case that might not be such a bad thing.

I’m happy to say that at the recent Organization of American Historians meeting in Seattle, I attended a “state of the field” panel no the history of U.S. conservatism that suggested that we’re learning precisely the cultural studies lessons that Michael is worrying that the academy has forgotten (or perhaps never learned in the first place). One of the main themes in the papers and the discussion on that panel was a rejection of the economistic, What’s the Matter with Kansas false-consciousness explanation of the emergence of the Christian right in favor of a more nuanced view that tried to understand why, e.g., so many people living in a neoliberal economy might be particularly attracted to arguments in vigorous defense of “traditional” marriage. Such arguments complicate the picture both of neoliberalism (as it works at the local level) and of Christian conservatism, understanding each in the context of the other, rejecting reductive monism, and restoring agency to the people being studied. And that seems very much in the spirit of Stuart Hall.

4

Ben Alpers 04.20.09 at 4:36 pm

erp…that’s a “state of the field” panel on the history of U.S. conservatism.

Preview is your friend!

5

Kieran Healy 04.20.09 at 5:00 pm

But much of the American academic left, from education to communications, continues to subscribe to the “manufacturing consent” model in which people are led to misidentify their real interests by the machinations of the corporate mass media.

Although we might not be returning your calls, this certainly isn’t true of sociology.

6

JohnM 04.20.09 at 6:15 pm

re: 5

It’s certainly not ubiquitously true in communications either. As a communications doctoral student in rhetoric at a major institution, I haven’t really found this model to be bought into as much as the Sloterdijk/Zizek enlightened false consciousness model – people don’t misidentify their interests, in many cases they know very well that they are oppressed and can identify many of the mechanisms of that oppression, but adopting a cynical distance from that awareness is taken as a political stopping point – “because I watch The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, and I can laugh about economic and political indoctrination, I am doing something to resist it.” When the catharsis of irony is taken as resistance, that’s when you’ve got ideological hegemony.

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Michael Bérubé 04.20.09 at 7:07 pm

Ben @ 3 and Kieran @ 5: good to hear! Perhaps sociology simply isn’t returning my calls because I sometimes get things wrong.

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Maurice Meilleur 04.20.09 at 7:25 pm

JohnM ‘s presentation of the ‘Sloterdijk/Zizek enlightened false consciousness model’ shows (unwittingly? ironically?) that it isn’t just economic Marxism that suffers from circularity. Assuming your account of the model is correct, JohnM, what would constitute refutation of the hypothesis that I suffer from false consciousness? Clearly laughing at those who benefit from it won’t do the trick for Sloterdijk and Zizek. Do I have to actually kill someone to demonstrate my emancipation from their hegemonic ideology? Or would violence just further reinforce the privilege of physical force and masculinity as a source of epistemological authority?

Too many who criticize ‘cultural studies’ and anything involving fields of study that had no institutional homes in the 1950s simply because they are uncomfortable confronting certain realities about the world (racism, sexism, class privilege, and so on) or the way those realities influence the way they think. Others use methodological critique (the common charge of ‘insufficient rigor’ comes to mind) as a cover for the same kind of discomfort. But sometimes the methods and arguments associated with cultural studies really are questionable. Maybe not, strictly speaking, a cultural studies example, but Luce Irigary’s argument in ‘The sex that is not one’ that women’s thought processes are legitimately ambiguous and self-contradictory because of the form of their genitalia is another striking case in point.

By the way, this doesn’t let ‘traditional’ methodologists off the hook; they can be and frequently are equally goofy–they just have more numbers to hide behind. (The punchline to my favorite economics joke is, ‘Assume a can opener.’)

One of the consequences of institutional sequestration in the academy is that having substantive conversations across the lines of departments and programs about what ‘getting it right’ means, and about the practical obligations of the disinterested pursuit of truth, has become very difficult.

But I don’t mean to derail the thread–especially since Michael name-checked me! That made my day.

9

JohnM 04.20.09 at 7:45 pm

I think you may have misunderstood my intent, or maybe I misunderstand yours — I definitely wasn’t trying to critique cultural studies, nor dismiss other humanistic research methods/frameworks. I was responding to the idea that communication studies, as a discipline, has more or less “bought into” the manufactured consent model without taking other perspectives into account.

And to be a bit snarky (since you were with me), if you’re looking for refutation of the hypothesis that you suffer from false consciousness, chances are you suffer from false consciousness.

Zizek has a pretty favorable attitude toward violence, one which I don’t share because I’m not the revolutionary sort (there will be no big-bang of a revolution with guns and guillotines, but it will sneak up unannounced in more subtle ways), but no, I don’t think killing someone has anything to do with demonstrating that you’re not a victim of false consciousness.

I sense that you don’t have much taste for cultural studies in general, so maybe your critique has less to do with my post and more to do with your own idea of “methodological rigor.” If you’re looking for that in a one paragraph response to a blog post on the internet, then I’m afraid you’re doing it wrong.

10

Michael Bérubé 04.20.09 at 7:48 pm

Luce Irigary’s argument in ‘The sex that is not one’ that women’s thought processes are legitimately ambiguous and self-contradictory because of the form of their genitalia

As you say, though, Maurice, Irigaray’s is not strictly a “cultural studies” argument (at least not in my book). One of them French-poststructuralist-psychoanalytic Lacanian-feminist arguments, yes, but tangential at best to the British tradition. But one of the latter-day troubles of cultural studies is precisely that the field has been dereferentialized beyond recognition. This too was our fault, insofar as back in the day (1980s-early 1990s), people were fond of insisting that cultural studies was not a discipline, and was in fact antidisciplinary — even though it really did constitute, for a couple of decades at least, a pretty coherent intellectual tradition, and even though (as Tony Bennett cheekily pointed out in 1994 or so) all the essays that began “cultural studies is diffuse and multifarious and a many-splendored thing that takes the shape of its container” proceeded to cite the same eight or ten Major Texts in their accounts of cultural studies’ history.

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Maurice Meilleur 04.20.09 at 11:53 pm

Michael, I don’t think the quest for a methodological core, by contrast to the ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’ approach of cultural studies, has brought the social sciences any closer to enlightenment–so I’m not sure that CS’s lacking a set of substantive or methodological texts as reference points is a matter of ‘fault’, though it may be a partial causal explanation for why I would lump Irigary in with Williams and Hall. (But don’t overlook the thesis that I’m just a lazy critic!)

Both approaches are actually–to my way of thinking, anyway–the artifacts of thinking of inquiry as something defined by one’s methodological commitments (or rejections, if you like). The study of politics, to pick my own field as an example, would be a lot healthier (and interesting) if most of those who did it thought of themselves in terms of their subject-matter and the problems and questions that set their research agendas, not their methods or their theories or their data. But method (and theory) are so intertwined with professional boundaries and institutional politics that it’s hard to get anyone to listen to that argument, because any methodological critique gets translated into a professional attack. And, like I said, that same parochialism arguably keeps people–especially those in the institutional margins–from feeling like their research is subject to anything like general rules for intellectual integrity (short of rules against outright fraud or open conflicts of interest), in the sense that anyone in or out of the unit in question can invoke those rules legitimately in criticism of that unit’s research.

JohnH, you have again provided a convenient example: I thought that such a clear account of a model like the ‘Sloterdijk/Zizek enlightened false consciousness model’, the causal logic of which as you depict it is so manifestly circular–I can’t imagine too many conditions short of violence that would disprove it–would on its face prompt any reasonably intelligent person to pause and say: ‘Hey, that’s pretty circular reasoning. Have you thought this through?’ So, I thought that your endorsement was tongue-in-cheek, and, even if your post was without irony, that a bit of snark about its circularity wasn’t out of order in making a point about institutional parochialism in re: the exercise of methodological critique.

But your hypothesis, that the reason its reasoning appears circular to me must be that I ‘don’t have much taste for cultural studies in general’, or for its notions of ‘methodological rigor’–and not that the reasoning is, well, circular–is a great example of how questions of method get elided with questions of professional allegiance in contemporary academia. (It’s another good example of circular reasoning, too.) What difference does it make, what difference should it make, what I think of cultural studies?

12

JohnM 04.21.09 at 2:07 am

If you can explain to me exactly what part sounds like circular reasoning to you, then I will very carefully explain in detail what makes your interpretation mistaken.

And you dismissed me before I dismissed you, so don’t be upset when I tell you that one of the marks of poor scholarship has always been the desire to quickly jump to a conclusion about a widely shared perspective upon hearing a limited description of that position. The idea of an enlightened false consciousness undergirding ideology has worked its way into a lot of scholarship, and while that is absolutely not evidence of any kind of validity on its own, it does mean that when somebody essentially laughs and dismisses it after reading a single paragraph, they’ve not really tried to understand it.

The intellectual generosity that leads to a question like “under what circumstances might this perspective make sense?” or “what elements of this picture do I need to see to understand why many people believe it makes sense?” — rather than concluding that a whole line of research spanning 30 years or so can be explained away by calling it circular reasoning with no explanation of why it is such — is generally the foundation of good scholarship whether the findings end up supporting a perspective or thoroughly dismantling it.

Now, you may have some critical insight that I’m absolutely blind to, but in that case your brilliance so surpasses me that you’re going to need to lay out your claims, grounds, and warrants in a little more detail than you have thus far to make a coherent argument.

Let me now explain a little more into where the enlightened false consciousness model fits into cultural studies (and in particular the study of ideology) so that my shorthand account of it might make more sense.

One of the commonplace theories of ideology that has come under a great deal of criticism is the false consciousness model: ideology is false consciousness. In this model, people support things that are not in their interests because they are deceived into not understanding what their interests are. The two main weaknesses of this model are (1) the assumption that people are so ignorant that they just can’t figure out their heads from their asses and (2) that there is some ideal way of understanding the world that people are missing; the model assumes a singular perspective which is wholly superior to any other perspective. This second problem is a major contributor to all kinds of historical oppressions from colonialism to slavery, and so it’s clearly not something we want to advocate as an implicit element of how we ought to critique and overcome whatever ideological blindspots we have. For a more detailed account of this model and its shortcomings, I recommend reading the first couple chapters of Terry Eagleton’s Ideology.

While there have been a number of alternate perspectives on ideology, one of them being the “manufactured consent” Michael points out as also inadequate (which, I might add, is a watered-down and significantly oversimplified version of the Frankfurt School’s critique of mass culture ), the one I mentioned is the “enlightened false consciousness” model. This perspective doesn’t claim that all ideology is enlightened false consciousness, but that at least it plays a major role in the docility of leftist politics in the post-’68 era (which Zizek would argue was the last moment that mainstream left politics were truly left). This perspective emerges out of Peter Sloterdijk’s book Critique of Cynical Reason. Sloterdijk claims that the teleology of “false consciousness”, which is typically “lies, errors, ideology” as he puts it, should have “cynicism” added as a fourth term. His critique is that many who are able to successfully identify many elements of ideological influence in everyday life are happy to take that awareness, become cynical about politics and the world, and treat their cynical disposition as though it were resistance in and of itself. Thus, exactly the kind of thing that leads people to watch The Daily Show and The Colbert Report and conclude that by laughing at government and the media they are participating in resistance to their hegemonic shenanigans.
The result is that you have a lot of people more or less aware of their situation (thus “enlightened”), fully able to understand what their interests are and how they are unfairly suppressed in a number of ways, yet politically immobilized by the catharsis of feeling ironic and cynical about it (thus, a form of false consciousness again). The advantages of this perspective over the previous one is that it doesn’t assume that people are idiots, it allows for the critique of ideology to come from any number of situated perspectives (the critique is based upon the particulars of disempowerment and disenfranchisement as they are articulated to different groups and situations), and it therefore doesn’t support a “one right perspective” implication either.

Now, many could take this view as a critique of leftism and cultural studies in general and post-structuralism in particular for the relative weight it gives to “theory” as a means of overcoming injustice, but I don’t take it that way. I think a straw-man version of cultural studies and post-structuralism (both; I still know that they are distinct entities) is that both employ theory with no politics to back them up. When handled indelicately, they are sometimes taught that way or are sometimes understood that way by students; the reason all this thinking matters sometimes gets lost amongst all those huge tomes of theoretical musing. In short, I think the enlightened false consciousness model doesn’t critique the theory of the left, but it critiques the mistaken assumption that the theory undergirding the projects of cultural studies and post-structuralism is an end in-and-of itself rather than a middle step toward a different understanding of how we should understand and practice political interventions.

All of that may be a ton of hogwash, but if so it’s a more complicated hogwash than you have thus far proposed that it is.

13

Maurice Meilleur 04.21.09 at 3:37 am

JohnH, I see no point in further derailing Michael’s thread about the influence of cultural studies on the university by rehearsing a demonstration of the circularity of the false consciousness thesis, your exposition of its updated version notwithstanding. Qualifying the thesis to say that awareness of, cynicism about, and laughter at one’s position, and the hegemonic ideas that reinforce it, when unaccompanied by action are themselves a form of false consciousness does nothing to improve it. (You’re right: the new version does have the advantage of not assuming people are idiots. Instead, it assumes they’re delusional.) We may have to agree to disagree about what constitutes analytical purchase and disproving conditions.

In any case, your initial point about not everyone in communications insisting on economic reductionism and the ‘manufacturing consent’ thesis is amply demonstrated.

14

Laura 04.24.09 at 1:47 pm

Thread so monstrously derailed that I have completely lost the sensible and interesting and short comment I was about to make. Or perhaps it is not the derailment but rather the arrangement of my sexual organs that is responsible.

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Kathleen 04.24.09 at 3:11 pm

Laura — sad, right? Could have been interesting if not for the guy who turns up & is like Cultural Studies OMG lady parts hah hah ha ha ha ha! See Michael’s earlier post on Horowitz and its derailment into a group of overage frat boys discussing Women’s Studies OMG lady parts ha ha ha ha ha ha!, except at great great great length.

16

Michael Bérubé 04.24.09 at 7:38 pm

Yeah, it is weird how that happens. Depressing, too. But I’m still around here somewhere, and if you recall that sensible, interesting, and short comment, Laura, I’d be happy to read it.

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