Do States Have the Right to Exclude Immigrants? (published today)

Even if you don’t demand impartiality between citizens, it’s just about impossible to defend the immigration restrictions in place in most countries. The harm done to would-be migrants by exclusion is huge, and the only clear benefit is to appease prejudice. Economic arguments have never been resolved, but the net effect of current rates of migration on existing residents is certainly small).

Moreover, much of the harm is done to citizens. Citizens in many (most?) countries are not free to marry and live with the person of their choice, have non-citizen relatives live with them (especially if those relatives are in need of medical care), have friends visit them freely, and so on. As someone (a restrictionist, I think) has put it, the votes for restrictive policies come from “Stayers” who don’t need any of these freedoms for themselves and are happy to deprive their fellow-citizens of them.

My belief is that we could safely deal with much higher immigration levels in the US if we returned to an assimilation/melting pot focus. But statements like “but the net effect of current rates of migration on existing residents is certainly small” seem misplaced. It makes two errors that we really should have gotten over from the re-evaluation of the 1990s globalization debates. First, the current rates of migration are based on current laws. Easier migration laws will increase migration. Second, economics studies based on average net effects don’t deal with the fact that rich people do better and poor people do worse in most of these net effects. Globalization has been great for the people in the rich cities, and often very bad for everyone else. On net it has been good for GDPs but that hasn’t trickled down to most of us. With that error I corrected on a policy level, it isn’t surprising that people still injured from the last big economics error won’t want to risk listening to the experts again. Especially not when they are using the exact same explanation.

Congratulations, Chris! It’s a lot of work to write a book, particularly when one is as meticulous and fastidious about formulating an argument as you are, when one takes as much care and caution before weighing in, in thinking before speaking, as you do. We could all learn from you, in that regard alone. In any event, congrats!

Congrats! I plan on picking up a copy when it’s published in the US.

Even if you don’t demand impartiality between citizens, it’s just about impossible to defend the immigration restrictions in place in most countries.

Impossible to defend? There are a lot of people who think that these restrictions are not hard enough. You will not need to defend these restrictions against them. They might, and sometimes do, even win elections and get those restrictions tightened more. And they seem to be fine with this huge harm done to would-be migrants by exclusion.

So anyway, each time this comes up here, I really wonder what the framework is. Especially: what is that instance that grants or denies rights to states, deciding against the states in this particular matter? Perhaps even against the will of its inhabitants?

“Moreover, much of the harm is done to citizens”

That’s nonsense, unless “much” means “some.” Non citizens suffer the vast majority of the harm from immigration controls.

It is valid to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary migration. We tend to do that by having categories called voluntary migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The injustice comes from treating the latter two categories too harshly. Voluntary Migrant implies a degree of choice with a voluntary decision to seek a new and perceived better life. Life presumably is tolerable and not subject to persecution or privation in the old country.

Australia, for example, has an unjust immigration policy at present. It could be amended from a human rights perspective and made less costly by re-balancing the equation;

Net migration = Voluntary Immigrants + Refugees + Asylum Seekers – Emigrants.

First, have a population growth and then stabilization policy in relation to environmental policy, limits to growth and sustainable footprint theory. This would enable the nation to set and reset net migration over time with respect to natural increase be that positive, neutral or negative.

Process the Refugees + Asylum Seekers expeditiously in Australia according to International Law, UN Agreement(s) and International Treaties, satisfying all requirements of all of these. Reset voluntary migration levels as required by changes in the other variables. It’s not that hard.

A country with a low carrying capacity for humans, even with the assistance of technology, be that a micro country or a vast but very arid country like Australia, does not have an open ended obligation to take voluntary migrants beyond its likely ecological footprint capabilities long term. That is where, as a matter of realism, I would draw the line.

There also could be cases where, due to regional wars or global ecological crises, the numbers of refugees regionally would exceed Australia’s capacity (as an example) to absorb them. As a matter of realpolitik we have to realize that the shutters will then go up and such a country would be in a state of siege (war siege, refugee siege or ecological siege). This is quite possible given limits to growth, climate change, sea level rise and damage to ecological systems and bio-services. To think these things will never happen is to ignore the grave warnings and indications from the Union of Concerned Scientists, the IPCC and others.

“Immigrants are the ones holding a valid immigrant document
done through the proper lawful way.
…
Yes, the States have the right to exclude them and deport them.
They are breaking the law..Otherwise, what are laws for?”

Compare that reasoning with: “Immigrants [to the US during the era of the Chinese Exclusion Act] are the [white Europeans] holding a valid immigration document. States have a right to exclude [the Chinese and other Asians]– They are breaking the law.”

Also, compare that reasoning with “Black people [in the antebellum US] are free if they have been emancipated. Others who try to leave slavery are breaking the law. States have a right to capture them– otherwise what are laws for?”

Rights are creations of law– by definition states have a “legal right” to enforce their laws, no matter how evil and unjust those laws. That tautologous reasoning does not answer the question of whether those laws are themselves justified.

Congratulations on the book being out, Chris. I enjoyed reading it. It’s certainly provocative. I do want to ask about a point you don’t (to my mind) address as clearly as I’d like in the book, perhaps especially since you mention it here, too. You say,

where states fail to work towards justice they lose their authority over would-be migrants who have, in turn, no obligation to obey their immigration laws.

As far as I could tell, no state comes close to meeting the standards you set in the book, and none are actively moving towards them. (Many, alas, are moving away.) This suggests that, at the current time, no one has any obligation to obey any immigration laws. (In the book, you apply this to current citizens, too, but I want to leave that aside for a minute.) I’m interested how far you want to push this. It’s most plausible in relation to people in pretty bad situations – those fleeing serious danger, or who face low living prospects. But the statement here and in the book doesn’t seem to be limited in this way. Do you want to include all people and all immigration laws (as seems to be suggested by your formulation here)? For example, my visa in Australia has several different requirements on it – that I work only for my current (sponsoring) employer unless I get special permission, that I maintain private (fairly expensive) health insurance, and some others. I knew this before I came. On your account, it would seem that I don’t have any obligation to obey these laws. That would seem surprising to me. Is that a conclusion you’d accept, or do you want to limit the claim to a smaller subset of immigrants and immigration laws? I’m eager to hear what you say!

@12 In my usage “much” means a substantial amount (in absolute terms) not “most” (in relative terms). To rephrase, immigration restrictions do a lot of harm to citizens of the country that imposes them.

Based on reading the brief view on Amazon, as much as I agree with the moral positions in this book, I feel that they are incorrect presented in terms of the real world. Of course, I may be dreadfully wrong because I haven’t read the rest, so please forgive me and correct me if I am guessing incorrectly.

You write “Indeed, states do have the legal right to do that. But this book argues that the legal rights states have need moral justification and cannot be taken for granted.” (p.3)

I heartily agree that states have the legal rights, and that there is a difference between legal and moral rights. It is terrific that you make this clear in your introduction. But it is merely a moral claim that legal rights need moral justification. I think that all they need is coercive power, and while that power might in part come from people convinced of your idea of moral rights, it is hardly necessary.

I would prefer that your title was “Do States Have the MORAL Right to Exclude Immigrants”.

IMHO, moral rights are simply priors, no matter how well argued. Moral rights, because they have no cost of enforcement, can multiply like angels on pinheads and conflict in a battle of all against all. I could just as easily say that there is a moral right to make legal rights without any other justification. Moral rights are just the preferences we argue for, and we can prefer one to another, but not really disprove one or the other preference.

Thus we enter the basic realm of liberalism: how to deal with conflicting values to create practical governments. Some people’s values (moral rights, for example) will be satisfied and some not, no matter what we do. The liberal solution is to convince, weigh, balance, and bargain using systems such as democracy to optimize results.

You then write “But I have no right (legal or moral) to exclude people different from me from my area…” (p. 4) But of course you might have such a legal right, and it might even extend to exclude people who are like you. The whole idea of private property, for example, gives you such legal rights as an individual. And you are bypassing the question of whether a group can have such legal rights whether or not an individual can.

You point out that states are coercive. But you don’t seem to address under what circumstances coercion could ever be justified.

In your conclusion (p.122), you reasonably suggest that unrepresented people outside state boundaries who are affected by state power are prone to being wronged, presumably because there is no feedback through representation. You propose a test for fairness. But how can you decide what fairness is except through representation? And then, once again, we are in the standard liberal situation of trying to reconcile conflicting notions of fairness. Any group and outgrip has the same problems of externalities. For example, the system of property has the same exact problem of unfairness to non-owners. Do you propose solving this with a universal group? Can groups limit their membership in any way?

In short, I don’t see this book as situating itself in the context of the basic philosophical problems that are really unsolved. Instead, I see a rush to complain (justifiably) about many harms of the current system. Without such a basis, you can’t really say you are right and they are wrong, merely that you have these preferences and values. Perhaps that’s the best anybody can do.

G’day, Ikono, it’s quite a while since I read anything of yours.

Now here you say: “First, have a population growth and then stabilization policy in relation to environmental policy, limits to growth and sustainable footprint theory.”

But do you mean that to apply only to states with immigrants, or to the planet and its human occupants as a whole ?

I could see, for instance, that 100 million Chinese and 100 million Indians could emigrate “by choice” to Australia without significantly, or for very long, reducing the human occupancy of their countries of origin (without even beginning to consider Bangladesh, Pakistan etc). Is that what should happen ? Or should we just declare, say, 25 million as the ‘optimal population’ of Australia (since there would still be a significant agricultural surplus which could be exported to help feed the rest of the world) and terminate ‘voluntary’ immigration, and all but a small asylum/refugee intake ?

When the world population is 9.7 billion – an extra 2.4 billion (or roughly the equivalent of the Indian plus Chinese populations now) over today – in 2050, what will “limits to growth and sustainable footprint theory” look like then ? And who will have what “rights” then ?

GrueBleen

I suggest that you consider the possibility that this is a case where an excess of reification is an obstacle to comprehension. If you stop looking for an answer to the question ‘What are rights and where do they come from?’ and instead try asking ‘What do people mean when they talk about rights?’ you may find that you can figure out more of this for yourself than you’d thought.

GrueBleen,

I meant Australia should have a population policy. I was speaking as an Australian citizen and voter so I am only likely to be able to influence Australian policy… a tiny little bit.

Australia should try to set its population limit at about 35 million people. That would put us at about 75% of footprint for carrying capacity. We could even still export a little bit of food. As you point out, Australia’s capacity to take serious levels of overpopulation from the rest of the world as voluntary migrants or otherwise is negligible. The UK and USA are already way over their carrying capacity at current living standards. The world in total is way over its carrying capacity. Sooner or later there are going to be far more climate refugees than the few countries with spare carrying capacity can ever take.

Congratulations

J-D @28

Why thank you for that suggestion, J-D. And if you ever stop to ask yourself what people are really saying, you may find that you too can occasionally participate in a conversation.

But just a quickie – how do I get your comment up the top as a pointer as you did with mine ?

J-D @35

Ok, thanks. I don’t actually see what I have to enter – before, during or after the “””” for instance – and exactly how the URL gets into the thing, but I’ll give it some further deep thought.

Anyway, how to know what people are really saying ? Well I guess it’s a process consisting of asking them, prompting them, expressing puzzlement etc etc. You know, the usual homo sapiens sapiens uninformative merry-go-round.

But in this case, I’ll have a go: I was merely expressing annoyance at people using next to meaningless words such as “rights” as though they conveyed some clear meaning that we’d all understand. Well, maybe some of you – eg Chris Bertram – do understand that meaning, but I don’t.

Do you ? Can you try to explain it to me ? Did you ask yourself ‘What do people mean when they talk about rights?’ and if so, what was your reply ?

Chris Bertram @38.

Thanks for that Chris, the very first words in the Stanford exposition explained everything: “Rights are entitlements …”.

So, you really think I should study that “carefully” ? Or should I just assert my right to comment without having to capitulate to your, or Stanford’s, idiosyncratic thinking ?

GrueBleen

Anyway, how to know what people are really saying ? Well I guess it’s a process consisting of asking them, prompting them, expressing puzzlement etc etc.

I used to think that too, and in other contexts I’d still employ that strategy, but bitter experience has taught me to be wary of employing it in Web discussions because of the hostility it frequently provokes.

J-D

Muchos grazias, J-D Ok, I hope I’ve got it right and this works.

GrueBleen, the 2016 census has about 1.2 million people of Chinese descent living in Australia, about 500,000 of whom are from Mainland China. We don’t know what proportion are new migrants, but let’s be generous and assume half. So 600,000. To be living in a “province of china” you would need the half of mainland China residents who are migrants – so perhaps 300,000 people – to include to larger than the population of Australia, currently about 24 million. This would mean that the total population of Australia was something near 48 million. THEN you might be in a province of China. Even if we add 300,000 people a year this is going to take 80 years, by which time the non-Chinese population will have increased by about 1% per year, or about 240,000 people … meaning that the Chinese will remain a minority. I’m sorry but your fever dream will never come true.

Why oh why do critics of Chris’s proposition always start from this fevered nightmare of billions of people trying to invade the shire, instead of from a reasonable supposition about the state of international migration? The answer of course is because they consider any number of non-white migrants, no matter how small, to be an emergency. A great way to write an article for the Daily Mail, but not a great way to discuss population policy.

I can discern no conflict between holding, on the one hand, that it would be wrong for Tibetans to prohibit or restrict the migration of people to Tibetan territory solely on the grounds of their ethnic background and, on the other hand, that it would be wrong for the Chinese government to promote the migration of Han Chinese to Tibetan territory in order to change its demographic character.

Sebastian H

There are lots of reason why people move from one place to another. I expect often it’s a combination of reasons. Sometimes people want to move away from places where they are being persecuted; sometimes they want to move away from places where there is famine, or other hardships. Sometimes they want to move to places where they think there are better opportunities: they hear about a gold strike and they fancy their chances mining; they hear about mercenaries being recruited for a war and that takes their fancy. Sometimes they want to move near to sites which they consider have religious or spiritual or cultural significance; sometimes they get the idea they want to move to the place they heard their grandparents or great-grandparents or remoter ancestors came from. Sometimes they fall in love and want to move be with the people they love. Sometimes they want to move somewhere they prefer the climate, or where they think their health will be better.

All of these, and more, are examples of people moving to follow their own desires or purposes or preferences. They could easily be desires or purposes or preferences which they share with other people who might be moving along with them; they might work together to make the move easier. Also, of course, people’s desires and purposes and preferences are shaped by the circumstances in which they find themselves, including the effects on them of the actions of other people.

But all of that is different from a government deliberately setting out to get people to move from one place to another in order to serve the purposes of the government, whether the government works by direct compulsion or by more indirect means.

If Han Chinese people want to move to Tibet because they think it will make their own lives better, they may well be mistaken; but in general people should have the chance to try to make their own lives better so long as they’re not doing it by making other people’s lives worse. But if the Chinese government decides to stimulate a large-scale Han Chinese migration to Tibet in order to change the demographic character of Tibet, they’re not doing it to make people’s lives better: they would have no good purpose, and I’m opposed to governments acting with no good purpose.

If individual Han Chinese people, in whatever numbers, decide they want to move to Tibet, what harm would they be doing to anybody? If the Chinese government decides to try to turn Tibet into a Han Chinese territory, what good would they be doing to anybody?

The example of Tibet is a pretty weird one to bring up in this context, given that (regardless of whether it ought to be or not) AIUI it has been in no sense de facto or de jure an independent state since its incorporation into the PRC as an autonomous region (and arguably not since the invasion in 1949/150). The relevent issue in this case is not one of open or closed borders, it’s of the rights of national and linguistic minorities within a nationalistic state that seeks to assimilate or otherwise marginalise them.

Sebastian, your position is essentially “if communities and polities can’t control their own ethnic demographics, so then if group a wanted to fuck around with demographics in group b, there’s nothing that group b can do, right?”

You have been given the knowledge you should need to see the nature of your error. If you want more understanding you need to look at how you handle information, which is not something we can help you with. (You also need to look at how you think about “intent”, which is as I’ve mentioned a pretty common problem among conservatives)

Sebastian H

So you haven’t thus far provided a good explanation of what morally distinguishes the case …

I’m going to explain some of the general principles I’m working from, because if you disagree with these then they’re we’re not going to get anywhere discussing application of principles to specific cases; if what follows is obvious and the explanation supererogatory and a waste of time, I’m sorry.

Not always, but in general, it’s fairly easy to tell what’s a harm and what’s a benefit. Sometimes people are mistaken about what harms them and what benefits them, but it’s unusual; it’s less unusual, but still unusual, for people to be mistaken about what harms and what benefits others.

In general, it’s wrong to harm people, and good to benefit them; it gets more complicated when actions can cause both harm and benefit, or when different options are likely to result in different harms, or different benefits.

If you disagree sharply with these general principles, I think it would clarify the discussion if you made that disagreement explicit. But if you don’t, then I can explain how I apply them to the kind of case we’re talking about.

Now, in one general kind of scenario, we have people from one group (in the particular case under discussion, Han Chinese people) trying to move to an area inhabited by another group of people (in the case under discussion, Tibetans), and the people who are already there have a choice between two options: try to stop the movement, or don’t try to stop the movement. The people who are trying to move must have some motive: they must perceive some kind of benefit to themselves in making the move. If the current residents try to stop the movement, they will denying access to those supposed benefits. On the other hand, if the movement is not restricted, there’s no obvious general kind of harm that will be caused, and no obvious general benefit to the existing residents. I’m sure it’s possible to construct specific examples in which these general presumptions could be overridden; I expect I could and I expect you could. If we’re discussing the specific example of Han Chinese people moving to Tibet and you can give me an example of how the presence of more Han Chinese people in Tibet makes life worse (for the Tibetans, or for the Han Chinese, or both), then I may concede its relevance and importance. General principles point me to the conclusion that people should, in general, not be prevented from moving where they want to move; I concede easily that these general principles can be overridden by specific considerations, but you need to show me specifically what those considerations are before I’ll concede the overriding.

On the other hand, in a different kind of scenario, we have a government with a choice between two options: deliberately seeking to promote the movement of people from one background (for example, Han Chinese) to a territory inhabited by people from a different background (for example, Tibetan); or, not to do so. In history, governments have sometimes tried to promote such movements by providing generous inducements to people who relocate, and have sometimes more simply compelled people to relocate. Both methods have significant costs, borne respectively by the people who have to finance the inducements or by the people who are compelled to move; their lives are made worse, to some degree, and there’s no obvious general benefit from this kind of government action. Again, I’m sure examples can be constructed where there are specific considerations that override the general principles, but general principles point me to the conclusion that, in general, the government shouldn’t be involving itself in deciding where it’s best for people to live, and you’ll need to point me to the specific considerations before I’ll concede the overriding.

You could say, also, that I’m taking in both cases the view that ‘because they’re different’ is usually not a good enough reason, in this sense: if Tibetans want to stop Han Chinese moving into Tibet, I want to know why, and ‘because they’re different’ is not a good enough reason; if the Chinese government wants to induce (or force) Han Chinese to move to Tibet, I want to know why, and ‘because they’re different’ is not a good enough reason. I am less interested in trying to decide whether Tibetans have a ‘right’ to keep Han Chinese out than I am in knowing why they might want to do that; I am less interested in trying to decide whether the Chinese government has a ‘right’ to move Han Chinese in than I am in knowing why they might want to do that. To me, those are important and relevant facts (because they relate to the general principles about harm and benefit), and in the absence of information about them I am inclined to the general view that it’s better if people let each other make their own decisions, which is how the two conclusions which seem to you contradictory seem to me compatible.

I wonder if it would be fair to reword J-D’s final paragraph as: if a person or group does something I think is wrong, but which they have a right to do, I have an *obligation* to understand (in a strong sense, that is, to essentially agree with their arguments, and not just potentially but right now) their reasons for believing they are right. If not, I’m curious why J-D uses the word “interested,” is this as a historian, a philosopher, a person potentially talking to Tibetans or Han Chinese in a social setting, or what? It has some appeal in a sense but seems to me a little strong. It is off-topic, though.

Ah, sorry faustusnotes — you made largely the same point I was making. The perils of reading very quickly while cooking…

Sebastian H

I want to mention that your approach is a full throated libertarian critique of governmental immigration policies. I say that not to disagree–I’m actually very open to the strength of libertarian critiques.

I wouldn’t shift from the views I’ve expressed because somebody tells me that they’re libertarian; I also wouldn’t shift from the views I’ve expressed because somebody tells me that they’re not libertarian. As far as I’m concerned, neither ‘that’s a libertarian view’ nor ‘that’s not a libertarian views’ is an adequate basis for a negative evaluation. So I don’t understand why you’re bringing up this point at all.

You have a very particular view of ‘harm’ that I don’t really buy into.

I find this comment very confusing. I am not conscious of having expressed any particular view of what constitutes harm. If you could explain why you disagree with my view (or whatever view it is that you take to be mine) , it might be clarifying.

I guess I’m not really interested in getting sucked into a discussion with someone who either doesn’t know enough about Tibet or thinks it might be an open question about whether or not they have been harmed.

If you want to limit yourself to responding to people who can attain your stipulated minimum pass mark in a test of knowledge of Tibet, obviously all I can do about that is accept your choice.

However, for the record, I am in no doubt that the policies of the Chinese government have caused harm to the people of Tibet. What I don’t understand is how it’s supposed to be reasonable for you to ask me now to explain how I think the people of Tibet have been harmed when you appear to be unwilling to explain exactly the same thing.

As ever, I am surprised by how seriously we all take de facto alt-right talking points, as though they are genuine and meaningful contributions to the topic (Novakant is, as usual, an honourable exception).

If self-described ‘Conservatives’ were genuinely concerned about ‘immigrants’ ‘swamping’ the ‘original inhabitants’ of a country, they wouldn’t be blathering on about Tibet (China being a country Washington has had in its sights for some time now), but would instead concentrate on Israel.

e.g. ‘But for those who do see that Palestine has been harmed, I would ask where you see the harm? Is it in the immediate Israeli governmental takeover of governmental institutions? Or is it ALSO in the attempt to weaken resistance to the takeover by dramatically changing the makeup of the nation through very large scale immigration.’

etc. etc.

But of course in that case, Conservatives love wide scale (overwhelmingly European or North American) immigration with the deliberate (and, so far, successful) attempt to ‘swamp’ the native culture. So, the right do not, in fact, have any ‘principles’ about ‘swamping’ ‘native cultures’. They do, on the other hand, have issues with brown, yellow and black people (mainly from the global South) coming to live and work in ‘white people’s countries’ (mainly in the global North).

People, right and alt-right ‘arguments’ against immigration make no sense, and are not being given in good faith. The right really do have real arguments about immigration, but as these would inevitably turn the conversation towards issues about race (where the right are no longer comfortable about stating their real beliefs) these arguments cannot be, so to speak, ‘used’ any more in the public sphere. So instead we have random blah about Tibet.

Hidari it’s important to respond to these ideas because lots of people who aren’t especially racist or otherwise concerned have imbibed this idea that migration is a threat to the dominant culture through years of constant conservative pressure. I don’t think Sebastian is racist but he is using a pretty extreme anti migrant language, as novakant oberves, because that’s how the debate is framed. Sadly the ideas underlying multiculturalism need constant defense against conservative assault.

Bianca Steele, I have seen this concern expressed before because it is part of the Chinese strategy in Tibet – sending lots of Chinese from the east into Tibet to work and live. There were demonstrations a few years back because the han Chinese were getting all the best work, for example. But they’re also there as part of Chinese plans to develop the region, which really needs development. There’s also a lot of resentment against them for past misdeeds (Chinese policy in Tibet has changed a lot since the 1980s), and of course the whole security apparatus is Han Chinese. I think a lot of western critics see it as kind of similar to the way white populations pushed native Americans out of their la d in the 19th century partly just through population movement. The differences are obvious though and I think the population changes are often conflated with the aggressive security policies. They’re not the same though and certainly a poor comparator for peaceful mass migration elsewhere.

fn,

I think you’ve missed my point, or I’ve missed yours (for instance in your earlier comments to Sebastian ). I was referring to the word “swamping,” which is used by white American racists with regard to immigration from Latin America, the use of Spanish in some places as an official or semi-official language, and so on. Sebastian could easily have emphasized the differences between the policies you mention (which I am aware of but which I’d suggest comparing more to colonialism generally) and mass migration that isn’t orchestrated by a government for the purpose of wiping out an ethnic minority, culturally or physically). Or he could have mentioned an argumentative about what policies governments should or can justifiably take to preserve cultures within their borders. Instead he used a word that conflated two different cases with different characteristics and different moral attributes.

If your position is that it’s reasonable for China to colonize Tibet, and reserve positions of responsibility only for some ethnicities, just because ethnic Tibetans aren’t as good at modernization and so on, I think that would require a lot of scrutiny before I’d say “oh yeah that makes sense.” Definitely I’d be inclined to doubt you’re right. If you said Tibetans were a bit silly for wanting to preserve their traditional culture, and of course China is right to discourage them if possible without too terribly much violence, I would think that would require even more scrutiny. If you said the only reason North Americans and Australians are concerned is that our own history with indigenous peoples—which, for unexplained reasons, is much much worse—makes us irrational, I obviously am not going to follow you there.

In the best case, I’d say your argument rests really, really implausibly heavily on my knowledge about China’s Tibet policies being out of date as of any time since my thirteenth birthday. And almost certainly on your discounting religious persecution to an unreasonable extent.

Hidari @ 70,

A general problem that I see here is that everyone’s basically saying that unrestricted migration is good except when it isn’t. If there’s a right to live wherever one wants, that presumably means that Israelis can live wherever they want including Palestine even if the Palestinians don’t want them there.

I’m not a professional historian but my impression is that the Briton natives of modern-day England and Wales weren’t very enthusiastic about the inward migration of the Vikings. The ancient Celtic peoples and tribes probably weren’t happy to see the Gauls or the Romans. Nobody was happy to see the Huns.

Putting to one side all the other issues related to these conflicts, I don’t see how one can have a general principle (the right to live wherever you want) but cave out exceptions here and there. If there’s a right to live wherever you want then, presumably, the Jewish settlers have a much right to take the land of the Palestinians as a Libyan economic migrant has to choose to live in Italy.

Either there’s a principled way to discriminate among people and groups with claims of exclusivity or there isn’t. If there’s no principled way to adjudicate that dispute, there’s an awful lot of people who would want to live in both Israel and Palestine who are unwanted by the current inhabitants of both places. How would you resolve this?

Bianca Steele, I guess we’re misunderstanding each other. I read your comment “I don’t think I’ve ever heard the argument about Tibet, or against genocide generally, presented in terms of “swamping culture.”” as meaning that you hadn’t encountered this argument, and was just commenting to say I had, and I think it is sometimes used to conflate migration and cultural destruction. I think that’s what Sebastian is doing here (and also Mitch Guthman? when he presents the example of Israelis living in Palestine as if their free movement into Palestine occurred peacefully).

I would say if one’s argument against unrestricted migration relies on comparing it with violent dispossession, you’re on shaky ground.

Fn,

As I see it, we disagree on (1)whether Chinese policies in Tibet are reasonable and justifiable, and (2) whether “swamping” has a narrow or a broad definition. I’m happy to leave it there.

Mario

It does not follow from the fact that an action cannot be prevented that it cannot be evaluated; more specifically, it does not follow from the fact that I cannot prevent it that it cannot be evaluated, and it does not follow from the fact that you cannot prevent it that it cannot be evaluated. Nobody can go back in time and alter the actions of William the Conqueror, but it does not follow that nobody can evaluate the actions of William the Conqueror. I evaluate them negatively; I can’t find in your comment any reason why I should not do so. Obviously he was under no obligation or compulsion to justify his actions to anybody, but that doesn’t make it impossible for people now to evaluate whether they were justified and equally it wouldn’t have made it impossible for people at the time to make the same kind of evaluation; equally, the fact that the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is under no obligation or compulsion to justify its actions to anybody doesn’t make it impossible for people to evaluate those actions.

I leave room for the possibility that you genuinely and sincerely do not understand what people mean when they express normative evaluations; it’s not an impossible supposition; but it’s not a probable one. It’s less improbable to suppose that you do understand such statements but, for reasons which are at best only partly clear to me, are trying to deceive yourself into believing that you don’t so that you can then pretend, when others utter them, that they’re meaningless. Normative language is so widely understood that it seems more likely than not that you also understand it, even if you choose, for whatever reasons, to pretend otherwise.