Selfish genes, selfish individuals or selfish nations ?

“If we are machines for replicating our genes, we can’t also be rational maximizers of a utility function”

This is a patently false statement, no, an absurdity. It is perfectly possible to reconcile the two by assuming that the utility function being maximised is that for reproductive successs. The rest of your argument is just as easily dismissed.

Abiola:

Maybe you don’t understand what is meant by “utility function”.

“Maybe you don’t understand what is meant by “utility function”.”

You’re hardly in any position to be condescending to me on that front, if you can’t see what I’m getting at.

Ultimately, whatever contribution our genes may or may not make to our nature, there is not much we can do about them. Unless we are prepared to embark on large-scale genetic re-engineering, our only hope is to focus on those aspects of our condition that are amenable to nurture.

Surely, a complementary approach is to try to structure society such that the negative effects of our genetic inheritances are minimized? And that the positive effects are maximized. For example, encourage competition in some circumstances, encourage cooperation in others?

Abiola and ekr are right here, and John is (with all due respect) wrong. Indeed, I seem to recall just this point being made by a number of prominent members of the evolutionary psychology school — Dennett certainly, and I believe Cosmides and Tooby, and Pinker’s earlier book. It’s an issue of mechanism design, if you like — creating a system of incentives to align the interests of the principal and the agent. It’s not obvious that this is the case, but it’s certainly not incoherent to talk about it. (I won’t comment on the stuff about Pinker’s latest book, not having read it.) Similarly an international relations realist could say that rational utility maximizers who find themselves leading states will pursue (a certain conception of) those states’ interests, due to very general features of states as institutions (i.e., the information available to their leaders and the incentives they face). I’m far more skeptical of this claim than the evolutionary one, but, again, there doesn’t seem to be any logical incompatibility.

There’s also a question of the is-ought gap here which it seems to me John is overlooking. Pinker, Janet Radcliffe Richards and John Gray had a very interesting discussion about this on BBC Radio 4’s ‘In Our Time’ a couple of years ago (it’s archived, I just re-listened to it a few days ago; I recommend it). As JRR kept firmly pointing out, saying what we are like is one thing, saying what we ought to do is quite another. Richard Dawkins is equally firm about the fact that he is a Darwinian descriptively and very much an anti-Darwinian normatively.

I think it’s way too glib to assume that all evolutionary psychologists are ‘realists’ of the ‘selfishness is good’ variety. At any rate, it doesn’t happen to be true.

“All of these realist models are opposed to any form of idealism in which people or groups act out of motives other than self-interest.” This isn’t quite correct.

When this question came up in my micro-economics class, the Prof replied that philanthropy is a status good. Money is given to a cause, in exchange for status, recognition, and acceptance into high society.

Here’s a quick quiz: how many named endowed chairs are there at your alma mater? How many anonymous endowed chairs?

Is endowing a professorship an idealistic act, or a self-interested one?

Similarly, many people are willing to buy collective goods, like support for NPR, only if they’re “on sale”, for example during a matching funds pledge drive. Likewise, the number of people willing to vote for more social spending by raising taxes is higher than the number of people willing to pull out their checkbooks and give money to the disadvantaged directly.

Well, now that I’ve admitted to being lazy, I might as well give the links. Here’s the archive page and here’s the one for Pinker, Radcliffe Richards and Gray.

The problem that John is pointing out is a problem only in the same sense that it’s a problem for him. As others have said. For different purposes, there are more and less appropriate levels of description. An extremely common intellectual vice is to prefer a general level of description (reductionism, say), then expect that to be appropriate for all purposes. Simiarly, critics will point to failures of theory as disconfirming the appropriateness of that level of description for all purposes.

It’s also worth noting that insofar as John’s examples are all “realist”, a parallel claim can be made about “idealist” schools of thought and how they are also (necessarily) inconsistent with each other. The comparison is telling, since I imagine that John would naturally expect the idealists to disagree—they’d have to—but that his point is that the “realists” shouldn’t be disagreeing because, as “realists”, aren’t they describing reality and isn’t there only one of those? Well, no, there isn’t, not in the descriptive/modeling sense relevant here.

The real problem here is ideology and ideologues. They want a Theory of Everything, usually organized around a few core principles they are psychologically predisposed to favor. It’s makes me very tired.

“Evolutionary psychology makes no moral claims whatsoever: it simply says people are – perhaps strongly – inclined to behave in such a way as to ensure the survival and spread of their genes.”

Just so. This is why I think John is being glib in assuming that EP necessarily or automatically has an agenda. It just ain’t true. Sure, no doubt plenty of individual evolutionary psychologists or at least popularizers of the field do, but the discipline as a whole? No.

Shaun—that’s a famous Kant quote (Berlin’s translation) and thus, I think, is consistent with what you’re calling “idealism”.

John,

I stand corrected. Or cower corrected. But then if is-ought is irrelevant – why, for instance, do you say that “EP wants male aggression to be genetically ingrained” [my italics]? Why do you seem to be so convinced that EP always and everywhere simply finds what it is already looking for? Why do you seem to be so convinced that EP has an agenda and that it’s self-evident what that agenda is?

According to Marx, it is individual members of ruling classes who act self-interestedly, not the class. This is why capitalism can have crisis tendencies.

Tom

Whatever happened to the massive discourse of the nineteenth century division of the human and natural sciences? Better question, get on the social debugger and find the exact point at which desertification began in the social sciences, leading to its present imbecility.
For my money, although I respect Marx in many ways, his work shows the approximate debug step, with the traces of Hegel still vestigially present in his economic concoctions.
I must remind myself that if a man as smart as Marx is a specimen here, the tidal motion of this change (Kuhnian dynamics?) was irresitible.
In fact, the generation of the Left Hegelians shows the social science flu getting underway and spreading.
So it would be unfair to blame the whole thing on that incorrigibly stupid Darwin, who claim to fame was a degenerate version of the original idea of evolution gestating in the late Enlightenment, visible in Lamarck, the teleomechanists,Robert Chambers, and others….
Moral: some sciences advance, and some decline, in time.

I don’t see any inconsistency in the various realist schools, unless you take them in a ridiculously strong form. If you say “all human action is in the service of maximizing reproductive fitness”, then yeah, the other theories will contradict that. But nobody sensible takes such a single-minded view.

How about this: self-interest occurs in many different organization levels. Genes are selfish, but genes make minds which end up pursuing their own interests, which often but not always in sync with those of the genes. Similarly, individuals combine to make social groups (nations, classes) which end up having their own interests and even have some mysterious power to make individuals neglect their own interests (and that of their genes) in favor of the group. None of this is contradictory becuase none of the phenonenon are simple, closed, laws-of-physics types of things — they are complex patterns of interaction between different levels of organization.

From Ophelia
why, for instance, do you say that “EP wants male aggression to be genetically ingrained” [my [emphasis]]?

John:
Would it be consonant with your intent to interpret your statement as “the branch of EP which Pinker espouses wants male agression to be genetically ingrained”, or is the stronger statement implied by your original wording more reflective of what you were thinking?

—

While there may be no inherent agenda to a broadly conceived EP, my impression is that the most well known exponents of the field often present their arguments in a fashion that tallies with John’s description. So it’s possible that, regardless of the possibilities of the field, the current culture of EP may reinforce/reward a certain outlook. It could also be true that EP just needs a popularizer/synthesist who represents another part of the spectrum.

The former would lead to two related “realist” points: one, that there is an exploitable niche available for those who want to practice EP from a different perspective; and two, that, for those who might want to follow ideas similar to EP but who are not matched to the culture of the field, that pursuing their studies under a different rubric would enhance their chance at tenure.

(I am trying to sketch a meta-argument here – I can’t claim enough familiarity with the range of positions among practitioners of EP to attach particularities to the framework I’m suggesting.)

—

mark raises the question of flexibility. In that context, it seems that one of the main baselines that EP would need to establish is some way to distinguish the (perhaps diffuse) border between tendencies that are held in place by cultural means (with such reinforcement possibly extending to biological effects – as a simple example, cultural practices may bring about a water supply tainted with lead, which leads to biological effects), and tendencies that are governed by genetic effects.

I am troubled that exponents of EP seem to ignore the criticisms directed at the field by developmental biologists. I recall being particularly annoyed by Dennett on this point. If I recall correctly, Dennett, (at least in _Darwin’s Dangerous Idea_) did not address developmental issues, but did emphasize the viewpoint that for any complexly constructed object (such as an organism), there must have been a process of construction.

Reading bill’s discussion of economic models, I became curious if anyone has ever tried to model economics a probabilistic mechanics. As actors do not always follow their rational interest (as conceived by the model), perhaps some way could be devised to assign a fluctuating percentage of the population who are not acting “rationally” over time. This would force economic models to deal with the spikes in non-rational behavior that would follow from such a model, and which (naively) accord with reality. Or would this route excessively an already unwieldy computational framework?

“perhaps some way could be devised to assign a fluctuating percentage of the population who are not acting “rationally” over time.”

My understanding is that there is no theory of irrational behavior even close to as well-developed as standard economic theory of rational behavior. I am quite open to being corrected on this point.

I’m puzzled by the characterization of certain approaches as “realist”, in contrast to “idealist”, as if any objection to them would amount to a prediliction toward airy realms. A common line of criticism to such “realist” approaches is that, in fact, they are reductionist and lead to highly unrealistic accounts and implications, especially when pushed to the limit and totalized.

I rather liked Neel Krishnaswami’s defense of methodological individualism in economics. Still, one of its drawback is that it perhaps can not deal adequately with the dimension of organization, insofar as it is not reducible to individual interest or utility, including the levels of organization required for individuals to pursue their maximalization of utility or interest.

As for utility-functions themselves, one of the common criticisms is that, of course, they can be drawn to accomodate just about anything. But another line of criticism is that they are not the sole criterion of rationality on the basis of which individuals make decisions.

Just to continue a line of criticism from the previous thread, even if the program of ev psych were to be completely established and fulfilled, it is likely that the explanatory power it would offer with respect to human behaviour and organization would be quite limited and a good deal less than that afforded by other approaches. So it is hardly apparent why such a program should assume the mantle of scientific realism and be regarded as obligatory in its consideration. There are likely specific biological constraints that condition and inflect our existence as human beings, in our behavior and the possibilities available to us, but they are far more likely to be discovered piecemeal in the course of empirical biological research than through the erection- (pun or not)- of a grand theory.

Ev psych stakes its claims on universals, which have a tendency on inspection to be less than meets the eye, thin abstractions that carry little by way of detail and explanatory power, given the range of variation, which even the most rigorous application of statistical methods can not control for, since, not only does statistics establish correlation rather than causality, but its application is dependent on a prior categorical framework, which can not rule out statistics gathered on the basis of different categorical/explanatory frameworks. So the emphasis on universals tends to toward the searching out of streotypes, though the prediliction for stereotypes is no doubt something susceptible to good evolutionary explanation. But aggregated behavioral tendencies often prove less strong than the range of variation amongst individuals so aggregated, especially considering the effects of all the other factors that weigh in the balance. But such steroetypes are precisely what is needed to make good on the claim for the predominantly biological determination of human culture, inspite of the fact that biological potentials have be refunctioned by human culture, repeatedly and variably so, such that their distinct expression is likely to be context-dependent and quite variable in emphasis.

What does ev psych “want”? It wants to be recognized with all the seriousness and honor due to a “disinterested” science, rather than as a rather trivial academic fad, motivated by the standard oversupply of time and the imperatives of academic overproduction- (publish or perish!). This would at least obviate the need for the most basic claims of its hodge-podge to be reflected upon and argued for. (Specifically, it tends to go together with a rather philosophically bizarre account of knowledge as a non-linguistic process that is reducible to biological/functional adaption.) But its elective affinities in its adaption to the currently prevailing socio-cultural environments remain open to ideological analysis and criticism. Specifically, one might argue that it is conducive, not so much to conservatism in general, as to laissez-faire attitudes, as a requirement of adaption to the status quo.

I think John’s point is that a “selfish gene” explanation says you throw yourself on the grenade because that’s behavior that saves your kin, who then go on to propagate genes similar to yours, while a “selfish individual” explanation says you throw yourself on the grenade because you want the glory and status that will accrue to your name aftewards, and a “selfish nation” explanation says you do it because you love your country. The explanations are not mutually exclusive, but it’s logically incompatible to say that all three are the primary motivation. And if one of them takes precedence, then it may lead to instances where the others are inoperative–if the genes are primary, then there are instances where they will lead you to act not in your individual interest. If the individualism is primary, then it will lead to instances where you take actions that don’t further your genes (e.g. Gary Becker’s argument that we don’t have kids when they become expensive). But I suspect the truth is that there is no “hierarchy,” and that we don’t understand yet what motivations are primary in what circumstances, and the fact that no one really tries to clarify that question makes it all a bit unsatisfying.

The underlying tone in some of the discussion is that men are violent and that women are not and have thereby have a diminished role in the choice for aggression.

I think it is evident that on an individual basis men would have a tendency to have a more violent response when threatened or on the hunt. Women have a tendency to desire negotiation. These two responses seem to have been honed in the hunter/gatherer society. The simplistic view of this setting – Men making a plan and then silent execution. Women working together and discussing every aspect of life until the men got back.

In short, Women have been able to study men as a group and are very perceptive in discerning how to manipulate men to achieve their desires. The problem is that women have never, “looked in the mirror”, and analyzed how their desires have influenced the aggressive choices of a nation. I think if women turned their “perceptive?” gaze at themselves they would see that aggressive national responses are initiated, when women approve them.

As another side analysis, look at the blogosphere and inside your own households, women are rarely involved in the discussions, but when it comes time to vote they will name a candidate and quote some headline out of a paper as the rationale for the selection. While all I heard out of their mouths until that time was “what color should we paint the kitchen”, “jimmy is a better soccer player than bobbi” “my husband does not do (blank) right.

Fill in the (blank).

Aggression and violence are strongly linked to testosterone levels. There is a lot of variation in testosterone levels among men AND women, and it, by the way, declines with age.

Testosterone promotes dominance, risk-taking, and sexual activity in both males and females. It’s pretty easy to see how this might get selected for evolutionarily, because more sex, with more desirable partners (because of dominance), means more reproductive success.

But low testosterone ALSO gives a genetic advantage. Simply put, high-testosterone individuals die a lot faster, or tend to wander off, and thus aren’t around to help their offspring become adults. The meek shall inherit the earth.

Violence may not be reproductively beneficial in today’s world, but dominance pretty clearly still is.

My best source for this is the book Heroes, Rogues, and Lovers by James McBride Dabbs.
I think of Pinker’s work as pre-scientific — it shows where to look — and work like McBrides to be
the science that backs it up.

Kimmitt, your (2) frames the question of needing to explain deviation from morality rather than compliance with it, when one could legitimately ask what explains our compliance with morality in the first place…

“The point I tried to make is that Pinkers account of aggression as individually rational (in terms of obvious individual-level goals like access to food, sex and power) is inconsistent with (or at least renders redundant) a claim that aggression is a genetically-driven behavior induced by sex-specific adaptions to a now-vanished environment.”

John,

Again, I say that you are simply wrong here in stating that there is any sort of inconsistency between the two positions you lay out, and that it ought to be obvious why this is so. The “redundant” part isn’t necessarily true, either.

For an evolved tendency to aggression to be irrational in the context of the modern world, one would have to show that aggression is no longer efficacious in winning struggles for influence, mates and so on, but anyone who’s ever had to work in a competitive, heavily male atmosphere, even in the Western world, will realize straight away that aggressiveness, even physical aggressiveness, does still indeed often pay, often enough that men will go out of their way to cultivate a reputation for aggressiveness out of all proportion to their own real inclinations (“machismo”). Aggressiveness is indeed an evolved trait, and as someone else has already mentioned, we even know a biological precursor for it – testosterone. It is a trait that paid off often enough to be passed on not just in the Paleolithic, but anywhere in the world where young men have had to compete with each other for the “good things” in life – those being usually defined as women and booty.

To address the “redundant” part (which, by, the way, if true, would be inconsistent with your claim of inconsistency), a trait could have evolved in a certain historical context only to have become obsolescent with the passage of time; indeed, this is the very stuff of which evolution is made. Not everything that is the result of evolution is necessarily adaptive in the current context, and if a trait is indeed still adaptive, it needs to be shown to be so. As such, your claim of redundancy is also without merit.

(By the way, John, I don’t want to read too much into it, but why did you choose not to bother capitalizing my name when mentioning it, even though you took care to do so with everyone else? I’m not particularly bothered by it, but it does seem to say to me that my response got to you at a personal level. You dismissed what I had to say as “trivial”, but the fact is that your original statement was blatantly false, and a shocking lapse in reasoning from someone from whom I expected better.)

Kimmitt, your (2) frames the question of needing to explain deviation from morality rather than compliance with it, when one could legitimately ask what explains our compliance with morality in the first place…

Well, I want to be moral. I feel happy when I’m being a moral person. Why would I wish to do anything to interfere with that?