Orin Kerr writes: “The Engligh language needs a word for when advocates on both sides of an ongoing debate switch rhetorical positions, and yet they insist on decrying the inconsistency of their opponents while overlooking their own inconsistency.” If prof. Kerr will settle for a phrase, let me suggest ‘poetic justice as fairness’. I know it will never catch on among the non-Rawls joke getting set, but it’s the best I can do. (Actually what I am talking about is a slightly more generic version of what Kerr is talking about.) ‘Poetic justice as fairness’ denotes a vendetta-based, rather than abstract reason-based approach to argument. Dialectic as feud; Hatfields and the McCoys do thesis and antithesis, with stupidity as synthesis. The rule is: if you think your opponent commited a fallacy in the recent past, you are allowed to commit a fallacy. And no one can remember when it started, but the other side started it. It is difficult to break the tragic cycle of intellectual violence once it starts.
Timothy Burke has a post up at Cliopatra about why he doesn’t like Michael Moore, which is in this general vein:
What I find equally grating is the defense of Moore’s work as “fighting dirty” because the other side is doing so. I agree that many of the critics of Fahrenheit are astonishing hypocrites, applying standards that they systematically exempt their own favored pundits and politicians from, but the proposition that one has to play by those degraded rules to win the game repels me. If it’s true, then God help us all.
UPDATE: From comments received, it is clear my post appears even more naive than, in fact, it may be. I appear to be marvelling that these beings you call ‘humans’ sometimes employ rhetoric. Actually, I’m just giving a name to a peculiar slip. 1) You preceive that the enemy has employed a fallacy or other illicit rhetorical technique. 2) You denounce this as such. 3) You employ the very same trick against the enemy when the wheel turns and the opportunity arises. 4) You do so with a sense not just that it is fair to fight fire with fire but that somehow the bad argument has become mysteriously good, due to the fact that there is poetic justice in deploying it. (Admittedly, this isn’t what Burke is talking about, so my rather narrow point about argumentative psychology was muddled more than helped by the inclusion of the quote.)
2nd UPDATE: It occurs to me that the Rawls connection was probably not clear either. So I’ll just tuck a few further meditations discretely under the fold.