Teaching Political Philosophy Right

by Harry on February 26, 2004

I hate to admit it, but Ed Felser may have a point about something, at least. In attacking the teaching practices in Philosophy departments he says:

If, for example, a course in political philosophy is offered in which the readings comprise selections from the likes of the liberal philosopher John Rawls, the libertarian Robert Nozick, and various feminist and left-of-center communitarian critics of Rawls, with no conservative writers assigned at all and with Nozick treated as an easily-refuted eccentric whose views are not shared by any other contemporary philosopher worth reading, then students will—obviously—get the impression that the left-of-center views are the only realistic options. And this sort of thing is, I submit, extremely common in the contemporary university.

I observed this pretty much as soon as I taught my first upper-division political philosophy course. You start with Rawls, because you feel obliged to treat them to a proper, fully articulated, theory of justice, and also to give them a reasonably good sense of the field. You move onto Nozick, who is very clever but full of incomplete arguments, and intuitions that he passes off as arguments, along with apparently willful misreadings of his colleague. You use Dworkin, maybe Raz, and some commentators on Rawls, including perhaps Jerry Cohen. You might introduce some feminist work (easier to do now than 13 years ago). And you complete it with Sandel and a bit of MacIntyre (or MacIntyre and a bit of Sandel), which involves many of the same misreadings of Rawls.

Now, a course like that succeeds in the two main missions I feel obliged to carry out: giving a true sense of the nature of the field, and structuring the students’ learning so that they learn how to reason sharply and do political philosophy analytically.

It succeeds particularly well at the latter because Rawls himself is so at odds with the intuitive politics almost all students, left or right, bring in with them; so they have resources to scrutinize the theory with. But it completely fails to give a balanced picture of the conceptual space, or of the political ideas that predominate in public discourse – conservative political perspectives are almost completely absent from such a course (though I would say that Raz, MacIntyre, and Sandel all deploy some conservative ideas)

Do we have an obligation to cover conceptual space and/or the space of public discourse in a course in a philosophy department? Teachers of metaphysics and epistemology are bound by neither obligation, and a good thing too. It’s a fair complaint that we teach Nozick. I stopped doing it when I found my impatience with him getting the better of me. ASU has always struck me as a bit slapdash—and the best philosophy in it has little to do with his defence of his political philosophy. Fortunately, there are much more powerful and philosophically thorough defenses of libertarianism than Nozick’s, and my own preference has been to use them (Loren Lomasky’s far superior and unjustly neglected Persons Rights and the Moral Community, for example). I also like to use Milton Friedman’s brilliant little book Capitalism and Freedom, a defense of classical liberalism which occasionally invokes more conservative ideas than most libertarians countenance. Though it, too, makes numerous philosophical errors it is easier to be patient because it has so much else of value in it and because Friedman, who was not the most brilliant philosopher of his generation, does not seem so culpable for philosophical carelessness.

But complaining that we don’t, in a course on contemporary political philosophy, teach conservative thought, smacks a little of blaming the victim. I’m an analytical philosopher, and I teach analytical philosophy, and part of the point of conservative political thought is that it eschews the need for systematic and rigorous intellectual justification of conservatism. The burden of proof is on the rest of us. So, there are (or were when I started) no appropriate books defending conservatism for inclusion in such a course. Since then John Kekes has written an excellent analytic book Against Liberalism, which is eminently usable, and a much less impressive book The Case for Conservatism, which I found to be too schematic to be useful in class.

I should say that I have tried to include conservative perspectives in my courses (since the first time, 13 years ago). This is not so as to map the conceptual or current political space, but because I think that on some issues conservatives have interesting things to say, and arguments worth considering, as well as because these perspectives are challenging to students. So I look hard for high quality analytical conservative literature to include in my courses – harder than I do for left or liberal literature, because on the whole I won’t find it in the top journals in the field (which I read routinely). I regret, enormously, Stephen Macedo’s gradual turn away from the right, as it has deprived me of one interesting right wing thinker (he’s becoming an interesting left wing thinker, unfortunately). But the best way to include conservative thought is by breaking the course down a bit so that it is not primarily about theories, and systematic philosophies, but about particular issues, on which conservatives might have written papers responding to left and liberal attempts to meet the burden of proof. Gay Marriage, family values, issues about healthcare and education, issues about global redistribution, and the morality of a system of states, all enable me to construct a course which reflects the state of the field but also elicits a variety of perspectives. Sometimes philosophers who are not systematically conservative present conservative arguments on particular issues (Galston is a good example of this). But some of the best of this work is not by philosophers, but by economists, political scientists and legal scholars (the new natural lawyers, for example), and even journalists (Commentary is a reasonably good source if you, as a teacher, are willing to do a great deal of work elucidating the structure of an argument and finding its rational kernel). To be honest, my neo-con father-in-law and Promise-Keeper, Fundamentalist uncle-in-law are more help to me in finding good sources than my professional colleagues. Good suggestions are always welcome.

Maybe Felser could resist the temptations of public notoriety and do us all a service by writing a systematic, analytical, defense of conservative thought. There’s a gap in the market.



dsquared 02.26.04 at 3:27 pm

Any reason why Hayek couldn’t be in there?


Jimmy Doyle 02.26.04 at 4:16 pm

Loren’s currently a colleague; he’s a very smart guy, and I’m glad you like his book. You’re right about there being something paradoxical in the idea of analytical conservative political philosophy, given that conservatism is suspicious of the applicability to politics of complex abstract argument. But then maybe it’s not so paradoxical: what’s the conservative’s excuse for eschewing second-order abstract argument, to justify their scepticism about the applicability of first-order argument? Two twentieth-century books you don’t mention which rise to this challenge in an intellectually impressive way are Oakeshott’s Rationalism in Politics and Scruton’s The Meaning of Conservatism. There’s also the matter of the *tradition* of conservative thought — particularly important for conservatives, I’d have thought. Why not have students read some of Aristotle’s Politics, Hume’s more Tory essays, Burke?


Russell Arben Fox 02.26.04 at 4:20 pm

Kind of following up on Jimmy’s comments…overall I prefer to teach political philosophy historically, so that over a course of a semester or two I can lay out the arguments for the modern liberal order, and both the socialist and the conservative arguments against it, by way of Locke, Mill, Marx, Burke, and so forth. When I do teach political ideas in a more normative or analytical way, I–like you Harry–begin with Rawls, because you kind of just have to, and besides, as you note, his arguments are extremely good ones to set students to working through right from the start. When I do usually bring in Hayek and Nozick from the libertarian side, but I also try to make room for Oakeshott, through whom one can, to a degree, put Burke’s ideas into a modern, liberal context. Another conservative text I’ve found helpful in such classes is (don’t laugh) George F. Will’s “Statecraft as Soulcraft,” a collection of essays based on lectures he gave at Harvard back around 1981. In that book Will makes a strong, consistent, Tory-type conservative argument, one that I’m sorry to say he almost certainly couldn’t or wouldn’t make today–he’s become too much of a Republican party hack over the years.


digamma 02.26.04 at 4:21 pm

Although Harry doesn’t mention it until halfway through (“in a course on contemporary political philosophy”) Hayek might be a little too dusty for the subject of this post. Certainly, if you’re teaching a survey of political philosophy, you’ve got to start with Plato, and you’ll be lucky if you hit the 20th century at all.

Great post, Harry. I’d love to see more discussion of pedagogy on CT.


Chris Bertram 02.26.04 at 4:37 pm

Some disconnected thoughts …

(1) The centrality of distributive justice as a topic rather than authority tends to push out traditions for whom that topic is less important.

(2) Historically Hobbes, Hume and Hegel all have claims to be considered conservative and they get widely taught.

(3) The problem may be more apparent than real, caused by a failure of the divisions within political philosophy to map onto the division within real-world politics. Some of this comes out in your discussion of the so-called “communitiarians” who share themes but are, politically-speaking, all over the place. Or notice the way in which a books like Scott’s Seeing Like a State, or Nussbaum’s Fragility of Goodness draw on ideas that they share with Hayek or Oakeshott (tacit knowledge etc.).

(4) Our cousin discipline, philosophy of law has at least one prominent conservative in John Finnis.

(5) Agreed with Jimmy re Oakeshott (but less re Scruton). I tried to assign Oakeshott to accompany Kant’s “What is Englightenment?” which it might have been written as a rejoinder to. Hard to get students to tune into Oakeshott, though.

(6) If all the best arguments are on the left (as they are), should we really be seeking “balance”?

(7) I should say that (6) was intended as a joke.


Matt 02.26.04 at 4:43 pm

At Penn, in the Political Philosophy class Sam Freeman taught that I took, we read a fair amount of Hayek. I found it to be quite interesting and worth thinking about, despite the fact that I’m pretty far to the left. What was really interesting to see is that Hayek’s not at all a libertarian, and to see the differences between “classical” liberalism and some sorts of conservativism, and libertarianims. They are really quite sharp, and nicely brought out by Hayek if you read anything beyond “road to serfdom”.


dsquared 02.26.04 at 4:44 pm

The trouble with Oakeshott and Scruton is that deprived of context, it’s hard to convince oneself that they’re not trying to be ironic. (I’m reminded of Peter Cook’s crack that Hitler’s speeches take on a whole new light when you realise that he’s being sarcastic).

C’mon, Hayek’s “Why I am not a conservative” would be ace on any reading list.


Sebastian Holsclaw 02.26.04 at 5:00 pm

“To be honest, my neo-con father-in-law and Promise-Keeper, Fundamentalist uncle-in-law are more help to me in finding good sources than my professional colleagues. Good suggestions are always welcome.”

I think much of the problem is the hyper-narrow definition of philosophy. Thomas Sowell is an economist, but his “Vison of the Annointed” is quite clearly a philosophical critique (though one not likely to be well received by the left). His “A Conflict of Visions” is in much the same vein. He does an excellent job of explaining why conservatives respect tradition more than liberals. His suggestion that civilizational knowledge is far more powerful than individual analysis and how that might work itself out is quite interesting, and so far as I can tell almost never dealt with by philosophers on the left. Of course his “Basic Economics” ought to be read by anyone who wants to bother talking about economics and government, but I’ll admit that isn’t really a philosophy text. But I suspect the fact that he is a black, conservative who was trained as an economist means that he will almost never be taught in a philosophy course.


jdsm 02.26.04 at 5:05 pm

I think Chris’ point number 3 is exactly right. The core texts in my undergraduate ‘Contemporary Political Philosophy’ course were Rawls’ TOK and MacIntyre’s ‘After Virtue’. The latter is very hard to categorise on a left/right spectrum but certainly has very conservative implications.


Michael Cholbi 02.26.04 at 5:16 pm

I second dlgamma’s recommendation of Plato. Both intro level students and the more advanced can still learn from the Republic. And it has many of the themes characteristic of later conservative traditions: suspicion of the popular will, an emphasis on order, prioritizing the good over liberty, the necessity of virtuous leadership, an elitist class structure. I always find it shocking how seductive Plato’s arguments are, even to liberal students. And it shares with other conservatisms no comprehensive theory of the substance of legal or economic justice. Rather, Plato seemed to believe that the Philosopher Kings will know what the right content of the laws ought to be. I’ve also had fun pairing up the Republic with Mill’s On Liberty.


Russell Arben Fox 02.26.04 at 5:19 pm

Regarding Chris’s point number 3 and communitarianism–the latest edition of Kymlicka’s “Contemporary Political Philosophy” provides a very useful (if ultimately unsympathetic) breakdown of the “left” and “right” aspects of the communitarian critique, showing the links to Marxism, as well as distinguishing between straightforward communitarianism and its “civic republican” variations (in his chapter on citizenship). I use his schematic regularly now.


digamma 02.26.04 at 7:42 pm

And it has many of the themes characteristic of later conservative traditions: suspicion of the popular will, an emphasis on order, prioritizing the good over liberty, the necessity of virtuous leadership, an elitist class structure. I always find it shocking how seductive Plato’s arguments are, even to liberal students.

On the other hand, I was once arguing with a (self-proclaimed) socialist education professor who supported a ban on all private education, and I was intrigued at how his arguments echoed those of Plato.


baa 02.26.04 at 8:25 pm

Twenty years ago, people thought you could do ethical philosophy just with 20th century texts, and without tangling deeply with Aristotle and Kant. Such a view would now, I belive, be widely contested: You need to engage with these huge, difficult, totalizing philosophical systems to do ethics well.

Political philosophy seems to be behind the curve here. Rawls’ achievement is almost unfortuate in this regard. He’s much better than most 20th century political theory, and he provides a context to start all from. That makes it easier for political philosophers to conceal from themselves the need to imbed their work in a large philosophical structure. Rawls provides a template for this, but it’s only one template — Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Hobbes have different ones. As someone above noted a great many of the “core concerns” of analytic political philosophy (the “Equality of What” debate, e.g.) just look weird unless you start from Rawls. I hope that in the next twenty years we see a more aggresive attempt to bring the tradition back into use in “analytic-accessible form.” I don’t know if anyone’s bringing virtue ethics and Aristotle into political philosophy, but that seems like a good one to start with.


enthymeme 02.26.04 at 8:31 pm

On the other hand, I was once arguing with a (self-proclaimed) socialist education professor who supported a ban on all private education, and I was intrigued at how his arguments echoed those of Plato.

I for one am not surprised. Read The Open Society and Its Enemies, and The Poverty of Historicism, for the antidote.

Are these even assigned?


Angry Bear 02.26.04 at 8:31 pm

I doubt this would make Felser any happier, but Amartya Sen would seem to fit nicely in a course like that.



enthymeme 02.26.04 at 9:00 pm

Uh, it’s Ed Feser.


Chirag Kasbekar 02.26.04 at 9:06 pm

I agree with all those recommending Hayek. As someone to the left of Hayek (but pretty much on the wishy-washy centre of the general spectrum), I don’t agree with a lot of his conclusions and blinkered thinking (a bit like Marx, I guess). But I think he was ahead of his time in many ways — esp. in his insistence on attention to cultural evolution, complexity, ecology, connectionism, spontaneous order, social knowledge, etc. (Despite not quite being a libertarian or Panglossian.)

BUT I don’t think he’d quite qualify as an _analytical_ philosopher.

I think Daniel is right in suggesting the “Why am I not a Conservative” essay.

Other than that, of course his more famous essays on “Economics and Knowledge”, “The Use of Knowledge” and “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”, etc. are I think important for all students of political issues.

I would also recommend chunks of his Law, Legislation and Liberty series.

David Miller’s reader on Liberty also has a chapter from The Constitution of Liberty.


Chirag Kasbekar 02.26.04 at 9:11 pm

Sorry — “Why I am not a conservative”…


bza 02.26.04 at 10:05 pm

sebastian holdsclaw: But I suspect the fact that he is a black, conservative who was trained as an economist means that he will almost never be taught in a philosophy course.

Are you kidding? I cut him from my last political philosophy syllabus because he wasn’t black enough.


john c. halasz 02.26.04 at 11:00 pm

I’m not at all an academic, but I’ve thought that, if “normative political philosophy” has to do with the elaboration of theories of rights or right, when it comes to any actual application of such concepts, they prove to be rather under-determined- “epistemic illusion” is how I term this-, not just because real politics is a down-and-dirty business, but because of the complexity of matters, with the intrusion of economic and legalistic considerations as well as other institutional, organizational and contextual matters. And as a commenter already noted, conservatives tend to concern themselves less with rights as a starting point in political matters, taking their bearings variously from the likes of “authority”, “tradition”, or functional considerations in defending and upholding the status quo or status quo ante. And in political arguments, not only do people routinely argue past one another, the the crucial “burden of proof” criterion becomes a volleyball.

Furthermore, if the proper task of philosophy is the generalized elucidation of matters, shouldn’t “political philosophy” concern itself with elucidating the scope and nature or constitution of the political realm and of political speech and action? In that case, it would not be a matter of a commitment to a particular position, although extra-philosophically or existentially such commitments are perfectly allowable, but of situating various positions within the political realm, in relation to each other, but also in terms of how various positions themselves construe the political realm and its stakes and thus the implications of this latter for the political realm. And any full consideration of politics would have to concern itself not just with “rights” and “legitimate authority”, but also crucially with the virtually unfathomable question of the nature and operations of power, which may or may not have much to do with any thematic question of “legitimacy”.

As for recommendations, what of the work of Hannah Arendt? She wrote copiously in English, no? And she does not map readily onto any conventional spectrum of conservative, liberal or leftist, nor, for that matter, of individualist or communitarian. How about “The Human Condition” and her essay on the Pentagon Papers, “On Political Lying”? This latter is still topical, eh?


harry 02.27.04 at 2:02 pm

If anyone looks at this again (so much has happened, and I was busy from the moment after I made the original post yesterday), thanks. I do use Hayek, and should have mentioned that — and agree with whoever said that he feels ahead of his time — more contemporary in some ways that Friedman or 1971 Rawls. He’s not an analytic philosopher, nor is Sowell, but that’s one of my points really — that I have learened the need to look beyond my narrow discipline to get this stuff. I’ve also used Sowell, in a contemporary moral issues course, on affirmative action — but dropped the issue because I found both the pro and anti AA literature so unsatsifactory (as opposed to the pro- and anti- abortion literature, both of which have terrific instances).

baa’s point is very interesting. I teach a contemporary political philosophy course as part of a division of labour — when AL teaches the coourse it’s historical, and when I teach it it’s contemporary, which works out well. IF we had a better structured major (one in which there was an incentive to take more than one couorse in political philosophy, or in metaphysics, or whatever), we’d sequence them.

Jimmy, not to embarrass your colleague, but he has quite a fan club here in Madison — 4 of us each harboured an independently-arrived-at admiration for that book, and we only found out by accident. He might not want it revealed since among the 4 one is a Marxist, two are extreme left liberals, and one is a left liberal…

Oh, and I agree with all CB’s points (including the joke). I suppose the insight about distributive justice versus the problem of obligation explains part of what I do — I get away from issues of distributive justice when introducing conservative ideas.

The left-right communitarian issue is interesting. It is also the case that lots of left or liberal thinkers have particular conservative ideas — I think that’s true of Raz, eg, and Kymlicka — so its not as if in teaching them we neglect conservtive ideas, its just that we neglect conservatives.


DJW 02.27.04 at 4:37 pm

What a wonderful discussion. I, like Russell Arben Fox, tend to do more historical teaching than contemporary, so it’s easy to just use Burke. And this as a compliment that students really seem to enjoy:


Teaching conservative thought against the backdrop of the French Revolution is both a good and bad. Good, because a quick glance at history suggests the conservatives were really on to something. Bad, though, because it seems a bit dated, and some of the less sharp students get the idea in their heads that all reforms are fine with conservatives as long as they’re done gradually and peacefully.

The one contemporary political theory course I’ve done was even more contemporary than Harry’s Rawls-Nozick-Dworkin-feminist approach. I began with IM Young’s Justice and the Politics of Difference and from there we read commentaries that extended or critiqued various arguments/issues from that book (Fraser, Taylor, Okin and respondents, Tully, Kymlicka, Jacob Levy). I didn’t have a proper conservative in the course, but it became clear that with respect to multiculturalism, there was a tentative alliance between a conservative and a certain kind of ‘left’ position that cultures have some kind of value in themselves, beyond providing resources for individuals, and a strongly individualist liberal position (Okin). But I’d love to add a proper conservative to the reading list if I ever do it again.

On John Kekes–has anyone used him in the classroom? Is he any good?


Nate Oman 02.27.04 at 5:42 pm

I actually think that this is one reason why legal theory can be — in some ways — a better place for thinking and learning about political theory than political philosophy courses. The theoretical and disciplinary anarchy of the legal academy since the collapse of pure doctrinal scholarship has led to a proliferation of badly done and half baked attempts by legal academics to do philosophy, economics, or the like. On the other hand, top notch legal theorists are, I think, more likely to be aware of developments in cognate disciplines than are philosophers. Disciplinary focus has the advantage of providing methodological sophistication, but it can also breed insularity. For example, I was recently having a discussion with a very smart philosophy professor who stopped to ask what Pareto optimality was. I was a bit shocked. Even those who subscribe to the law-and-economics-is-a-vast-right-wing-boon-doggle wing of the legal academy cannot afford to be ignorant of basic concepts in welfare economics. You can’t make sense of most of the upper level discussions in the legal literature without having at least a simple working knowledge of political philosophy and economics. This means that legal scholars are much less inhibited about transgressing disciplinary boundaries to find a broad spectrum of ideological perspectives. The draw back, of course, is that pedgogically most law students are uninterested in looking at the theoretical or normative foundations of the law, which is where the kind of discussion bearing a resemblence to political philosophy is likely to occur. On the other hand, at top law schools, I think that the students are interested in such discussions and they benefit from the permeability and anarchy of their chosen discipline.


Aeon J. Skoble 02.27.04 at 7:15 pm

Baa says: “I don’t know if anyone’s bringing virtue ethics and Aristotle into political philosophy, but that seems like a good one to start with.” Um, yes. There is a whole cadre arguing that an Aristotelian moral framework can coherently ground (classical) liberal politics. Doug Rasmussen and Doug Den Uyl have co-authored several comprehensive books arguing this in rigorous detail. Liberty and Nature is sort-of out-of-print, though when I ordered it for my class this semester I discovered that it’s available-on-demand, and their new book, Norms of Liberty should be out next season. Others working in the same general direction include F. Miller, T. Machan, R. Long, T. Smith, my humble self, and others I’m too sleep-deprived to think of but ought to.


Aeon J. Skoble 02.27.04 at 7:20 pm

Also, Harry, using Friedman is nice, but a bit on the straw-mannish side as far as showing the students an actual coherent _philosophical_ case for libertarianism. Besides the neo-Aristotelians I mentioned above, your students would find much richer an analysis, this time from a contractarian perspective, from Jan Narveson’s book _The Libertarian Idea_. That’s in print too.


Will Wilkinson 02.27.04 at 9:45 pm

I’d be remiss if I didn’t suggest the two political philosophers on the faculty of the seminar I run for Grad students each summer at UVA: I recommend Arizona’s David Schmidtz… The Limits of Government and his point/counterpoint with Robert Goodin, Individual Resposibility and Social Welfare. His forthcoming Elements of Justice should be very good. Or at least I’m very much looking forward to it.

And John Tomasi’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.

Of course, neither is conservative, but I think with Lomasky they are the most sophisticated libertarians out there.


Jeremy Pierce 02.28.04 at 3:20 am

I suspect the fact that he is a black, conservative who was trained as an economist means that he will almost never be taught in a philosophy course.

I taught Sowell’s response to The Bell Curve just this morning, though I didn’t assign any reading by him. On race issues in general, at least in an introductory course, there’s not a lot by analytical philosophers that I see focusing on the main issues important to me.


harry 02.28.04 at 3:04 pm

You mean Liberalism Beyond Justice. Yes, that’s great, and I like a lot of Tomasi’s stuff. And so Schmidtz’s first book on public goods justifications of authority — which I used a couple of times, but then went out of print too quickly. I didn’t know he had another in the works, so I’ll look forward to that.

bq. using Friedman is nice, but a bit on the straw-mannish side as far as showing the students an actual coherent philosophical case for libertarianism

Well, there are straw men and straw men, no? I tend to use Lomasky too, so I feel I am covered, but the think Friedman does is interesting because he shares with egalitarians a view about why it matters that people have freedom over their own decision-making, but then departs on his conception of freedom. I guess I probably do a lot of the philosophical work in presenting him to make the view as plausible as possible, but I don’t feel (when I do so) that I am misrepresenting the text — just adding to it. And the reason I like it so much is that those first couple of chapters are followed by real institutional discussions, some of which have had real impact (negative income tax, school vouchers, etc).


PrestoPundit 02.29.04 at 6:42 am

Why no Hayek? Let me take a stab at that onr. No Hayek because Hayek doesn’t fit into the simple (minded) boxes of contemporary analytic philosophy. No Hayek because nearly universally philosophers are Democrats and/or folks on the left, and they have little personal interest in things non-left — and no competitive incentive to acquire such knowledge. No Hayek because Hayek requires multi-disciplinary understanding and scholarship, which is not rewarded in academia, and therefore widely lacking. No Hayek because Hayek opposed and argued against almost all of the great fallacies adopted by philosophers in the last 50 years — e.g. positivism, logicism, justificationism, socialism, behaviorism, scientism, naive rationalism and naive empiricism, and on an on. No Hayek because work on Hayek won’t advance your career, there is no “Hayek fashion” to drive Hayek research — and work which is taught is usually work which helps with generating publications.

Well, that’s a start.

Find more on Hayek here.


PrestoPundit 02.29.04 at 6:44 am

Let me try again. Find more on hayek here:



PrestoPundit 02.29.04 at 6:47 am

Or, for more on Hayek, click here.


Stephen Fetchit 03.03.04 at 3:24 am

“Are you kidding? I cut him from my last political philosophy syllabus because he wasn’t black enough.”

Sho nuf, Boss, We done gonna get you some real black folks, ya sir, some real ones, with rythim.

Comments on this entry are closed.