War and its consequences

Unfortunately, sometimes making peace on the basis of the status quo ante isn’t among the available options. Because, of course, it takes two to make peace.

And getting a reputation as somebody who won’t fight back, when you’re surrounded by enemies, can be VERY costly.

Second both the post and comment one. The complete futilty of this entire conflict is the only lesson worth learning. The lack of any appetite on the part of any of the players of either side to even make a vague attempt at coming up with a new approach is both marked and depressing. Good old fashioned “let’s just kill them, all of them” is the best they can manage. It’s pathetic and tragic.

you idea, idea you. Obviously.

‘And getting a reputation as somebody who won’t fight back, when you’re surrounded by enemies, can be VERY costly.’

As usual you have to pinch yourself in order to remind yourself that this is really how some people see the world.

A brief reality check.

Israel has invaded Lebanon, twice in recent years. The current invasion is ongoing. Remind me of how many times Lebanon has invaded Israel again?

It is of course, Lebanon (a secular Arab democracy) which is ‘surrounded by enemies’. Israel has peace treaties with many of the Arab countries on its borders, and has, in any case, demonstrated on numerous occasions that it can defeat them militarily, if it comes to that. Israel is ALSO surrounded in a more general sense (not coincidentally) by American client states/’states friendly to the US’ (or whatever other euphemism you might want to choose) such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Egypt and so forth, which will never never never never never choose to offend their owner by attacking Israel (criticising it is a different matter, but they only do that out of fear of what the populace might do if they don’t).

In a similar way, Lebanon, which is, to repeat, a secular Arabic democracy, is the one that is surrounded by enemies because the theocracies that surround it hate and fear its example and are terrified that it may succeed and that their own legitimacy will therefore be destroyed.

To repeat, therefore, it is the secular democracy Lebanon which is surrounded by enemies, which is threatened on all sides, and which is currently being invaded.

You should also be aware (and if you aren’t you really ought to be) that there are powerful voices on the Israeli right which argue that South Lebanon should be annexed (or at least controlled) by Israel permanently (or at least ‘until the threat of terrorism has been dealt with’ i.e. permanently).

‘until the threat of terrorism has been dealt with’ i.e. permanently

The problem here is that, among all those tit for tat causes for war is the big provocation that Israel simply can’t cease: It’s very existance.

The logic of this thinking depends on the acceptance that your enemy is implacable and cannot be negotiated with – that no compromise exists. As such, permanent peace can only be achieved via the complete extinction of the enemy. Brett, based on this line of thought, am I missing a possible permanent resolution?

I would add that in general, the use of phrases like “we must finish the job”, “until we achieve victory”, “we cannot cut and run”, “we will stay the course” etc, is a very good indicator that the belligerent party had no idea whatever of what benefit they hoped to achieve by starting the war.

From #4: Good old fashioned “let’s just kill them, all of them” is the best they can manage. It’s pathetic and tragic.

The only reason why *any* war is not advisable. Should there be even a slightest chance that 100% anihilation is possible, I say, go for it. Much the better for the victors.

It is because none of the actors in any theatre of war (post WWII) have had the guts to accept that on one’s conscience, and none of the actors in any theatre of war (WWII and before) have had the wherewithal to succeed, that it is stupid, – not wrong, not bad, not illegal, not immoral; acres of forests can be, and have been, chopped and pulped to take a stand either way – plain stupid to fight. You can’t win. Or, rather you won’t.

Speaking of things that inflame hatreds and accomplish nothing, by this evening this thread will have almost certainly run to over 100 comments with zero effects on people’s opinions or the events in the Levant.

Richard Cownie got it right. Israel and Lebanon can only lose from this madness, but Olmert and Nasrallah come out political winners. (Just as Bush gained politically from Iraq until very recently, while the national interest of the US took a big hit.) Without understanding this, it’s impossible to understand why the madness continues.

As near as I can tell Hassam Nasrallah looks a Hell of a lot better for the West than al Qaeda. That is to say, both don’t like Israel, but at least Hassam has the marbles to see that the solution is to mess with Israel. Leave the rest of us out of it. If this thing is handled well – not to say that I think it *will* be handled well – then it looks like a good opportunity to cut support from Al Qaeda.

Most people believe that there is something worth fighting for no mater what the cost. Mabye that ‘something’ is trivial to the commentors. It is foolish to assume that it does not exist for the people fighting.

james: As pointed out, for Olmert this “something” is probably the opportunity to be seen as more than a wimp. And as for the Hizbullah terrorists — maybe 70 wives in Heaven? The fact that some bellicose folks are fighting for some nebulous “something” doesn’t mean that innocent people must sacrifice their lives to satisfy the wants of these bellicose folks.

lurker: “What was the status quo ante, as Mr. Quiggin put it? It was war. What’s happening is status quo ante.”

In a certain, very non-reality sense: 1 person killed is war; 1 billion people killed is war; therefore, they’re the same. Not.

brendan: “‘And getting a reputation as somebody who won’t fight back, when you’re surrounded by enemies, can be VERY costly.’

As usual you have to pinch yourself in order to remind yourself that this is really how some people see the world.”

Well, in fairness, it’s a sound line of reasoning if you find yourself in prison, or as a student in more than a few urban schoolyards. The interesting question is whether it’s a generalizable strategy for interpersonal relations or foreign policy. I’d say “no” and “probably not” respectively, and in Israel’s case, as John points out, it really hasn’t worked terribly well.

To judge the war by its consequences is correct. Some of Israel defenders justify the consequences only in terms of loss of life. I think one obvious consequence is what Fred is guessing a couple posts above. This, like the Iraq war for the US, has been a terrible strategic disaster for Israel. It has emboldened its enemies, it has destroyed the little left of Israel’s image in the world and, in general, it has left Israel much weaker than before it started (‘it cannot defeat Hizbollah’ is the message to many). As many point out: how long will Israel keep ‘double betting’? This war has not gone the way Israel wanted, so now some israelis and american supporters claim Israel has to go ‘all the way’ so not to allow the enemy to claim victory. The problem, as in Iraq, is that losing the redoubled bet could have terrible consequences. What if really, Israel cannot military defeat Hezbollah? How long will Israel be seduced by its military might? How long will it keep ignoring the best bet it can make to secure its future: retreat to the pre-1967 borders, after all, the only logical solution Israel has not tried. Make a big gesture that shifts the burden of containing its neighbors’ hostility to the international community. Today, Israel is in complete isolation, except for the US military help. That help could not, and will not last forever. Israel’s support is obviously a big security risk for the US. Like or not, what Israel does is seen as what the US wants/allows it to do, and arab/muslim hate for the US is an obvious security problem. I think it is a matter of time american public opinion will demand partial disengagement from Israel. And what will happen to Israel if by then Israel has not gained ‘security’ by force?

After reading the post and all comments, I offer these (biased) thoughts:

1. Many (most) Israelis will go to extreme lengths to get even a couple of decades of peace

a) We will withdraw from Gazza (done)
b) We will withdraw from Yehuda and Shomron (Was in the process of doing so when this started)
c) We will split jerusalem (yes – you heard right)
d) We will not grant the right of return (this is unfair I know, but it will destroy Israel as a jewish state)

If these terms are acceptable by any Arab leader, he can even get elected here in Israel.

But seriously…If you are a leader of an arab state and these terms seem acceptable, please email me.

And another thing

Israel is not expecting to destroy Hizballa, It merely wishes to damage its military infrastructure as much as possible. Israel only does this since Lebnon will not.

Yoav,
An Israeli citizen

Yoav at 30, has the option of reclaiming land from the Mediterranean Sea been considered to address the issue of ‘right of return’?

Yoav,

In response I would like to point out that too little, too late, is pretty much the summary of what happened before both the French and Russian revolutions. Israel COULD announce a package of all these things tomorrow, and, like South Africa, probably achieve its goals. Or it could dribble them out, each concession achieved with vast amounts of blood and anger, and the end result will be that it will arrive at the same place, but with the entire Arab world just as angry at them as they are today. There is psychology here, and concessions won in blood are not considered evidence of good faith on the part of Israel. A large part of the anger here is simply that Israel continues to refuse to admit that it ever did anything wrong, and an Israel that concedes rights begrudgingly is not an Israel that has admitted its errors and is trying to make amends.

So will Israel follow the Russo-French example, or the South African example? My bet is on Russo-French.

It is strange to observe the cognitive distortions at the start of a war. At least there seemed to be a lot of this in the U.S. prior to the Iraq war and perhaps among the Israeli leadership. There’s this idea that the war will be *the* solution to some thorny problem–not only will it will quickly and efficiently do away with whatever threats to security exist or are imagined to exist but there will be some kind of future bonus of stability and control. Not only is the horror of the death of hundreds or thousands of people obscure in their minds but they don’t even seem to see the obstacles to success, or the significant risks they run even for their own goal of security and control.

In the U.S., the promise the Iraq war was thought to hold was not only stability in the middle east–the glorious spread of democracy far and wide–but also everlasting U.S. hegemony. I think behind the war was the idea that–having no global rivals–the U.S. could use this opportunity to make the world to its liking. A safer, better world awaited. And all it took was a little death and destruction.

Something similar seemed to tempt the Israeli leadership–I think they thought this was their big chance to do long lasting (maybe permanent) damage to their enemies, thus insuring greater security.

For some reason, the loss of reason when political leaders contemplate war reminds me of the stupidity lust can bring on but maybe it’s just a characteristic of any kind of desire–you desperately inflate the benefits of achieving the desired object and completely overlook the costs.

Like lust, it later becomes difficult to admit what a fool you’ve been. The Bush administration *still* insists the Iraq War was a great idea. Do they think this in their private moments? It’s almost a kind of insanity.

“OK. The land issue at its heart. Ethnic cleansing has never worked”

I’m no professional historian, but anybody who didn’t sleep through American history would find that proposition dubious. Ethnic cleansing may be many things, but it IS frequently successful.

Lots of things that are immoral work, it should be remembered.

Barry, you didn’t even begin to show that my initial remarks were lies. How can you point to Lebanon as proof Israel isn’t surrounded by enemies, when Lebanon harbors Hezbollah?

Question: Does anybody here seriously believe that if Israel’s neighbors simply left Israel the hell alone, Israel would be invading anybody?

Israel can’t bring peace to the middle east, by anything short of suicide. Only Israel’s neighbors can accomplish that, by accepting Israel’s right to exist. Until that happens, Israel doesn’t have the option of a good outcome, they only get to pick among bad ones. It’s a prisoner’s dillema where the other prisoner hates your guts.

Brett, nice trick. But no go. The Israel you mention. Draw a mutually agreed map of it.

You can’t. So, ‘neighbours’ is a useless term in this context. You’ve not yet built your home. And before you pounce on me do note that I’ve not said you cannot build a home.

Regarding your comment on ethnic cleansing, the U. S. of A. still has a sizeable ethnicity of Native Americans (Funny. Only *they* are native). But no violence, because? Suffcient land to go around.

Brett: “Question: Does anybody here seriously believe that if Israel’s neighbors simply left Israel the hell alone, Israel would be invading anybody?”

Yes. One sign was after the Oslo accords, where terrorism in the West Bank/Gaza Strip declined, but the rate of settlement building increased.

Lurker,

What do you mean by ethnic cleansing “working”? The Turks ethnically cleansed 1.5 million Greeks and the Greeks ethnically cleansed 800,000 Turks (or so I’ve heard). There are few Greeks living in Turkey today, so in a certain sense the ethnic cleansing, at least on the part of Turkey, worked.

This is, of course, not to say that the Israelis would be justified in ethnically cleansing Lebanon. Of course, it wouldn’t be.

You know, one would think that in a present-day blog discussion among supposedly thoughtful, erudite people–led by a distinguished economist, at that!–about how making war is almost always a huge mistake because negotiation and compromise would produce a far better outcome, someone might have mentioned the words, “prisoners’ dilemma”, before comment 40…

Sheesh.

To 44. Lurker
‘What do you mean by ethnic cleansing “working”?’

What he means is that the Europeans (majority Anglos) who were in the Americas early, wiped out the native population, and then went on to found the wildly successful United States.
A classic example of ethnic cleansing working – no? This “ethnocleaner” view unfortunately seems to persist in the mindset of modern Americans (white mostly?) as well, although they would never acknowledge that even to themselves, such polite and civilized folk that they are!

Lurker: media coverage of recent Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Gaza certainly emphasizes retribution for kidnappings and rockets, but it seems weird to suggest that land issues haven’t been at the top of the agenda for Israelis and Palestinians since, oh, 1948. Dan, not sure this is a prisoner’s dilemma; seems more like chicken.

Israel may have accomplished (or aim at accomplishing) a couple of things not noted above. First, it probably has demonstrated military superiority with respect to surrounding states. I would not have thought that in genuine doubt, but it is possible. That could be seen as an aid in future negotiations with Syria or Egypt (although I can’t see why either would be interested in a military confrontation). The war on Lebanon has certainly taken attention away from Gaza and West Bank. (The cost seem too high for that to be motivation.) The war has elicited a very high degree of support for the government from the domestic audience. That has a variety of positive effects internally for policy development. (What that might be used for I do not know.) I suspect the war has also been somewhat reassuring on the dmoestic front in that in confirms a military strength and community coherence that can be satisfying.
For Hizbollah, the war looks like success as well – it appears the pscyhological and propaganda victor (accomplishing what the states could not); it has enticed IDF into attacks which make public engagement with Israel more difficult; it may also have changed the domestic Lebanese political situation in ways quite favorable to its domestic policy goals.
The situation is not really a prisoner’s dilemma for several reasons. It is not one-off and does not look like it reduces to a one-off interaction. That is crucial for prisoner’s dilemma.

T. Gracchus:

One other thing the war has done is save, not just Olmert, but the entire Israeli government. Or am I mistaken? Would the electorate have been satisfied to leave in power a government that didn’t respond when its soldiers are murdered and kidnapped on Israeli soil?

Just to clarify, there are 1.8 million Native Americans in the US. That is .6% of the population.

But to make the point clearer, when the genocide started there were over 10 million Native Americans in North America. When the genocide ended, there were only a few hundred thousand Native Americans in all of North America.

What else should Israel do, that is substantially different from what it’s doing now? Surrender? Negotiate with an enemy whose fundamental demand is Israel’s total destruction? What?

Are you sure none of Israel’s enemies will settle for less than Israel’s total destruction? I don’t have any inside knowledge, but my impression is that the Syrian regime, for one, just wants some disputed territory. Israeli diplomats do formulate plans (which I only get to know about thanks to the Head Heeb). Somebody must think they could work.

I don’t have military experience either, but I’ve a strong impression the Israel has a lot of stuff which might be useful if Saudi Arabia transformed itself into a great power, but which isn’t much good for Lebanese-style fighting. Time to reallocate resources?

Are you sure none of Israel’s enemies will settle for less than Israel’s total destruction?

That’s what the Oslo accords, the Lebanon withdrawal and the Gaza withdrawal were all about, Kevin. The Israelis got their answer.

I don’t have any inside knowledge, but my impression is that the Syrian regime, for one, just wants some disputed territory.

Ehud Barak, working from this same assumption, attempted to reach a deal with Syria in 1999, and got nowhere. Syria claimed extra territory that Israel held even before 1967, and demanded an Israeli promise of full withdrawal from all of it before discussions even began on what kind of formal agreement Syria might eventually be willing to enter into with Israel. Barak eventually gave up and decided to try the Palestinian track instead–hence, Camp David.

is the reason Israel is invading Lebanon to ensure abundant water supplies?

Lebanon attempted to muck with northern Israel’s water supply by diverting the Wazzani river in 2002. Israel threatened to treat such a diversion as an act of war–which in fact it is–and intervene militarily, and Lebanon backed off. There has been no trouble on that front since.

But I’m sure if you’re dead-set on ignoring the missiles raining down on Israeli cities, and on making common cause with Hezbollah in treating Israel as the “Little Satan”, then a bit of “water libel” is as good an excuse as any.

dan simon: “Once again, sheesh.”

Sheesh Dan, enough with the sheesh’s: this isn’t a prisoner’s dilemma. The ‘dilemma’ in the PD is that the unique Nash equilibrium isn’t the Pareto solution, because each player would rather defect if the other cooperates, and of course being suckered is the worst outcome, so if the other player cheats, then you should too. But in the current conflict it isn’t at all clear that there’s just one equilibrium point. Again, it looks rather more like a variation on iterated ‘chicken’. Now, back to the substance of this conversation …

Shelby: “I’ve read a great deal in the past few weeks, here and elsewhere, about how Israel should never, ever have gone teh route it did. No one has yet suggested a SINGLE credible alternative, except (possibly) for “do the same thing, but with fewer bombs”.”

That isn’t a trivial thing, and frankly, it seems to be the most common suggestion. Careful retaliatory killings would have the greatest negative effect on Hezbollah, with the least postive effect on Hezbollah, and the least negative effect on Israel. It’s so obvious that I’ve got to assume that the Israeli government was playing a Bush here, or acting out of severe political weakness.

Does that mean Israel should attack [Syria]?

Shelby,

That’s hardly a solution. Granted, Israel could probably get to Damascus and topple statues etc., but as Iraq demonstrates that’s when the real troubles begin. It seems to me that you are assuming that the supply of Arabs who can be bargained with was exhausted after peace was made with Egypt and Jordan. The evidence for that claim is weak. On my reading of the story, negotiations between Israel and Syria have come close to fruition several times. Granted the asking price for peace was always high, but that’s apt to be the case for something which is in short supply. Peace with Egypt didn’t come cheap either.

Of course it sucks to pay over the odds, but so does the alternative.

But I’m sure if you’re dead-set on ignoring the missiles raining down on Israeli cities, and on making common cause with Hezbollah in treating Israel as the “Little Satan”,

Dan, this is about your third warning. If you are going to accuse other people of being anti-Semites or allies of terrorists, do so openly and specifically, not through nasty little insinuations like this. I am not the only CT editor who is getting profoundly sick of this behaviour, and pretending to know a lot about game theory but just saying “sheesh” all the time is not really adding enough value to compensate for the irritation.

Brett,

If they bargained with Lebanon, what do you make of the story I linked to at #60 above, about Israeli officials preparing plans (which were never pursued) for a negotiated settlement?

Is it true that for all people (S,T) is preferred to (P,P)? Because if it isn’t, the model has a problem.

What if you have beliefs that indicate you or your people will survive the (P,P) catastrophe either by the intervention of a god or by some myth of toughness?

What if you believe the destruction of your enemy is worth the price your immediate group has to pay so that other similar groups can prosper?

Such beliefs are not exactly unknown in the history of the world.

Kevin:

If you’ll reread my prior post, you’ll see I am NOT persuaded Israel should attack Syria or anyone else. However, politically it had to respond in some fashion to Hezbollah’s provocations. Possibly some sort of diplomatic response would have worked better — though I find that hard to believe, Hez being what it is.

Regarding the Israeli diplomatic corps working on plans for negotiation, well, that’s what bureaucracies do in large part — work up, revise, try out, shelve, and dust off contingency plans. If Israel’s diplomats really had no plan for negotiating with Hezbollah, then someone(s) needs to be fired por encourageur les autres.

And can one of the principals on this blog create a separate Game Theory thread to siphon off all those comments?

“One other thing the war has done is save, not just Olmert, but the entire Israeli government.”
Shelby’s conclusions at 56 are a bit premature. Yogi Berra’s axiom “it ain’t over…” applies here. The fortunes of leaders on both sides really depend on the outcomes and they won’t be known for a while yet. (If Israel’s security doesn’t see vast improvement, Olmert is toast). And it may be months or more before we know who the real winners are (they may not have been participants at all) and whether the exercise, as played, was worth it.

On the subject of the original post, I’m not so sure that no good will come of this war for Israel, at least when “good” is measured against the sorts of tactical and strategic goals Israel sets for itself.

It is my sense that Israel doesn’t really think in terms of permanent long-term solutions to its security problems. It perceives itself to exist in a neighborhood, and indeed a whole world, populated by enemies – people who are enemies now, and will be enemies ten years from now, and a hundred years from now. It has no idealistic dreams of turning its enemies into friends, and is resigned to a national security policy based on staying stronger than those enemies militarily, in perpetuity, and beating those enemies on the battlefield whenever necessary to maintain that preponderance of military power and defend itself against attacks.

This may involve beating those enemies again and again and again. Israel doesn’t care. Whether its worldview is simply based on deluded paranoia or an accurate command of reality, Israel believes it is in an enduring “fight or die” situation. That has been it’s condition since its founding, and Israel expects that it will always be in that condition. It plans to keep fighting, to stave off death for as long as possible. Maybe that will be 10 years, or 100, or a 1000. But like Victor Laszlo, it believes that the reason one fights is simply that “if we stop fighting our enemies, we die.”

Israel is not as sensitive as some other countries to international condemnation and the loss of friends, because its national strategy is not based on gaining and keeping lots of friends – so it doesn’t weigh the criticism as an important political minus. It’s strategy is based on the accumulation of military strength, and the ruthless exercise of strength. It doesn’t really care if it is reviled because of its military actions, because it believes that reviling Israel is the permanent pastime of much of the world, that the latest condemnation is nothing new, and that it is probably destined to remain the object of condemnation for as long as it exists. Israel’s leaders believe that the Jewish state simply participates in the same fate as the Jewish people in that regard.

After the conflict is over, Hizbollah will have fewer rockets, fewer rocket launchers, and fewer trained cadres. And of the forces left, fewer will be close to the Israeli border. There may also be NATO forces in south Lebanon; or Israel itself may occupy territory in south Lebanon. Hizbollah does have some missiles that reach far into Israel, but not that many. Now of course Hizbollah will attempt to rearm and rebuild over several years, and may even succeed. But what does Israel care? If this war buys Israel two or three years of relative safety and calm on its northern border, that’s two or three years better than they had before. And if Hizbollah rearms, Israel will just do the same thing again later that it is doing now.

Israel also seem bent on sending a message to its passive enemies, and the ambivalent bystanders, that there is a hard price to pay for aiding or tolerating its active enemies. One can’t say for sure this message won’t be received. There may be a lot of popular support for Hizbollah now in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East, but eventually the Lebanese and the international community will probably take steps to strengthen the Lebanese govenment and army, and diminish Hizbollah’s influence in Lebanon. And if Hizbollah is weakened by the war, at least for a time, this will undermine popular Lebanese confidence in Hizbollah’s ability to act as a national resistance movement and defend the Lebanese against the Israelis. Indeed, the very harshness of the Israeli attacks seems designed to send the message “Hizbollah can’t protect you.”

If Iran and Syria attempt to resupply Hizbollah, the Israelis will attempt to intercept those deliveries and destroy them. They may also succeed in raising the profile of Iranian intervention in Lebanon, and bring greater international pressure down on the Iranians.

There may also be a tactical military aim involved in this assault. If a war comes in the very near future between Iran and the US, or Iran and Syria and the US, Iran will temporarily have fewer options for striking at Israel through Hizbollah. So again it is not necessary for the war to deal a crushing defeat on Hizbollah, or destroy it, in order for Israel and the US to succeed in their immediate tactical aims. If the assault on Hizbollah is just an initial battle in a longer war, it is only necessary that Hizbollah be weakened somewhat and rolled back temporarily, to strengthen the US/Israeli military position against Iran.

Whether they have calculated poorly or no remains to be soon, but my guess is that Israel and the United States are executing a coordinated one-two punch here, and that other moves are yet to come.

So, I take it Quiggin’s theory is that most wars are mistakes, rather than being caused by states acting in their perceived interests. Watch out Quiggin! I think they take away economics PhDs for espousing that kind of theory.

Anyway, what’s the evidence that “The great majority of wars, revolutions and insurgencies have done more harm than good”? It seems to me that most U.S. wars have been pretty successful (from the U.S. point of view).

Obviously the Vietnam war and the current Iraq war look a lot like cases that support Quiggin’s argument. But what about the Korean War, the Mexican-American War, the 1988 naval conflict with Iran, our many Indian wars, the invasion of Panama, and so on? Even WWI was a big success from the US point of view (we got to reshape the world more to our liking afterwards at a relatively small cost, as wars go).

Finally, considering the present Israel-Lebanon conflict, I’m just amazed at the willingness of so many people to play armchair general, and offer pronouncements from afar about the war’s advisability and likely outcome. In my view, Israel’s elected leaders and generals are probably capable of making reasonable judgements about their own best interests.

This is really not so complicated. Iran- and Syria-sponsored Hezbollah’s threats to destroy Israel were followed by a deadly border incursion and showers of rockets that forced one third of the country into shelters. Hundreds of daily rocket attacks does indeed constitute a threat to Israel’s survival. A population that is forced to stay in shelters cannot support itself. Olmert said it clearly: “we are fighting for the right to a normal life.”

OK, confining myself to the(necessarily minor) points that have not been raised;
1) The reason ethnic cleansing could succeed in the USA and Australia is that we kept going till we covered the continent, and had continents free of nation-states where we could do that, and had native populations small enough (after plagues) to be incapable of objecting. As none of these things apply in that neighbourhood ethnic cleansing, or even genocide, isn’t much use to Israel, and neither is advancing to the Litani, because in all those cases Israel will still be left with a border with people who hate it (even more). There simply is no situation where Israel will not face the war-threatening situation of having its soldiers standing within snatching distance of an enemy.
2) Once a war has begun, one cabinet or the other has to fall. There do not appear to be, historically speaking, many politicians who can perceive a difference between the existential destruction of their nation and the loss of office by their party.
3) One objective for Hezbollah, one imagines, is a weakened Israel, and that’s what it’s getting. While the rockets’ direct effects are minimal, their effect on the economy are profound, and the greatest long-term effect of the war will be to further discourage immigration to Israel and encourage emigration. Actual dead, fifteen; net population loss over the next decade, 25,000. The times when an attack on Israel spurred overseas Jews to enlist are long gone.
4) “Israel believes it is in an enduring “fight or die” situation. That has been its condition since its founding, and Israel expects that it will always be in that condition. It plans to keep fighting, to stave off death for as long as possible. Maybe that will be 10 years, or 100, or a 1000.”
If this had been made clear in 1946, would anybody have been in favour of establishing the state of Israel? Jews included?

“Israel believes it is in an enduring “fight or die” situation. That has been its condition since its founding, and Israel expects that it will always be in that condition. It plans to keep fighting, to stave off death for as long as possible. Maybe that will be 10 years, or 100, or a 1000.”

If this had been made clear in 1946, would anybody have been in favour of establishing the state of Israel? Jews included?

Yes, of course. In 1946 that was the deal, and Jews in DP camps across Europe risked hunger strikes and British bullets to get it. If the Palmahniks were willing to “stave off death” from a raw kibbutz without running water or electricity, isn’t it plausible that sixty-story skyscrapers and billion-dollar IT and pharma ventures are worth defending with equal tenacity?

The sour joke about “the state of the Jews” being doomed to become “the Jew of the states” is older than 1946; it might be in Herzl or Pinsker. The phrase “eyn brera” (there is no choice) is centuries older yet.

Hat tip to Dan Kervick at #80; the stuff at the end about hypothetical Israeli/US coordination seems to me to anticipate the evidence, but his analysis of Israeli psychology is spot-on.

Chris,1.Israel has soldiers “within snatching distance” of Jordan and Egypt. Those governments control their soldiers and know and choose to avoid the consequences of violating the border with Israel. Lebanon can learn the same lessons.
2.The Israeli people is remarkably united in viewing this war as a war of no alternative. Even if you assume that politicians are guided solely by their desire to hold onto their positions, which is perhaps too cynical, how does loss of office follow doing the people’s will in this case?
3.The rockets’ damage has been minimized by keeping the population inside. The murderous pellets and metal scraps with which they are packed would otherwise have cost huge losses of life and limb, within hundreds of yards of the place of impact. You are correct that this has been hugely expensive. But to call the rockets’ direct effects “minimal” is not correct, unless you think destroying homes, businesses, hospital wards, kindergartens, etc. is minimal damage. New immigrants have continued to arrive, despite the war. The nature of warfare has changed, and the IDF is not at the moment desperate for manpower.
4.Israel has peace, though not yet real friendship, with Jordan and Egypt. That gives hope for other fronts. Israelis want peace, and that is what they teach their children. Israelis also know that freedom isn’t free and that constant vigilance is required. The alternative to establishing the state of Israel would have been the need for Jews to depend on the good nature of other nations to protect them. We know how that worked out in Europe and in Moslem countries, which is part of the reason that Israelis take very seriously the threat of terrorist groups that call for death to the Jews and wiping Israel off the map.

Brendan, the Wikipedia article doesn’t say anything about annexing Lebanon or “huge chunks of the middle east.” It does say that the National Religious Party wants to annex the West Bank.

Brendan, Could you please provide a source for your claim that the NRP wants to annex Lebanon? Also, why do you ignore the rocket attacks that Israel is suffering now? (The north has just been hit minutes ago). It is possible to defeat a militia/political movement without committing genocide. Will you admit you were mistaken when Israel does not seize Lebanese land and/or water?

Linda (#93)”It is possible to defeat a militia/political movement without committing genocide”

In the case of Hezbollah, and taking defeat to mean defeat permanently, how will Israel do so otherwise? I see little on this thread that would not consider a defeat of Hexbollah not obtained at tremendous human cost a good thing. Seriously, imagine if the IDF were able to actually permanently bring about the end of Hezbollah and then withdrew back to Israel? The unlikely nature of this is the central idea of the orignal post.

Dan, Lebanon needs to have an Altalena moment, and remove Hezbollah from power.

NewCenturyProf, the ethnic cleansing of the americas was mostly by inadverdent introduction of diseases, as far as I know. But your point stands that ethnic cleansing and relocation experiments has “worked” in the past, as well as giving us the conflicts of Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Israel, to name a few. And those were just the ones the British were responsible for…

Brendan, you admit that the article on the NRP doesn’t define the “Land of Israel,” but merely links to another Wikipedia article. So it’s not clear how the NRP defines the “Land of Israel.”

As it happens the Wikipedia article on the Land of Israel, also includes another definition, a definition that excludes Lebanon. You neglect to quote this definition, and yet you call *me* a liar!

From Wikipedia:
“Consequently, in 20th century political usage, the term “Land of Israel” usually denotes only those parts of the land which came under the British mandate, i.e. the land currently controlled by the State of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, and sometimes also Transjordan (now the Kingdom of Jordan).”

My point, in response to Ragout was not about the policy of this or that political party, but about whether this invasion is going to lead to a long term occupation of Lebanon. In fact, way back in the day, there were and are forces in Israeli society that want South Lebanon to be controlled (not necessarily occupied: an ‘international force’ would do as well) by Israel. Many Israeli politicans argued that the withdrawal of 2000 was a mistake.

What is true is that very very few Israeli (or any) politicans actually have the nerve to come out and say that they want South Lebanon occupied permanently. But so what? This is the situation in Iraq too. George Bush did not come out and say that he wanted an occupation of Iraq by the US that would last decades (or longer). It’s just barely possible, I suppose that he even believed it. But the mechanics of the operation led to the situation we are now in, in which (given the assumptions and actions of the Bush administration) the Americans ‘cannot leave’.

Equally, to quote this blog: ‘Does anyone remember how U.S. involvement in Vietnam kept increasing incrementally from a few hundred military “advisors” in 1963 to 500,000 troops and 55,000 dead by 1972-3? Does anyone remember the lies Ariel Sharon told Begin and the Israeli people in 1982 about his Lebanon adventure being a limited incursion lasting at most a few weeks and not advancing farther north than the Litani River? Does anyone remember Bush telling us the Iraq war would cost a mere fraction of what it has ended up costing us?

The point is (and I’ve been pounding away mercilessly at it here for weeks) that unless you execute a pinpoint military operation with clear and limited objectives you must perforce make the same mistakes Olmert, Peretz and the IDF are making here. Their biggest problem is that they are improvising the Lebanon war–essentially making it up as they go along. They have a “plan” in the same sense that the U.S. had a “plan” for administering Iraq after it “won” the war against Saddam. It represents mission creep, which is:

the expansion of a project or mission beyond its original goals, often after initial successes. Mission creep is usually considered undesirable due to the dangerous path of each success breeding more ambitious attempts, only stopping when a final, often catastrophic, failure occurs.’

http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2006/07/25/israel-reoccupies-southern-lebanon-1982-redux/

The fact is that the ‘default position’ for an invasion is to keep the area seized occupied for ‘as long as it takes’ or ‘until the job is done’. But somehow the job is never done, and so the force remains in place, and ‘short term’ occupation gradually becomes ‘long term’.

(Incidentally, I know this is ‘another’ reason for the invasion but I never think that these things are ‘monocausal’.)

For the record, I do not think Israel is crazy but I fail to see how their current actions will meet their stated objections. As for my basis for saying this, how about their failure to defeat Hezbollah up to this point? Including previous invasions, current actions etc. etc. etc. etc….why will it work this time? is the question I think for those querying others knowledge of military affairs.

“That’s right—the “chicken” model isn’t great. On the other hand, as Sebastian has effectively pointed out, the “iterated prisoners’ dilemma” model fits perfectly after all. Sheesh.”

I’m not certain my point goes that direction. I think that the chicken model (in terms of consequences) might be fairly descriptive. It is our assumption that there aren’t people who would prefer to have both sides lose rather than be the sucker that I suspect is not correct. This may be especially true when the decision-makers are somewhat insulated from the effect of losing. (Or maybe that takes us into another model).

One of the problems with any of the standard theories (“prisoner’s dilemma” or “chicken” or “dollar auction”) is that the entity paying the price for bad decisions is not the entity making those decisions. This is especially highlighted in the terrorist/guerrilla warfare model. The terrorist/guerrilla warrior often pays much less of a price (and for a much greater ‘reward’) than the civilians he hides behind. In a “chicken” analogy, he gets the reward if the other side is the sucker, but the civilians around him get to pay the price if he neither side blinks.

Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon weakened the PLO substantially, killing lots of fighters, capturing huge amounts of equipment, and driving them out of Lebanon entirely with a few months. The PLO’s response? Within a few years, they moderated their position and endorsed a 2-state solution for the first time. So a military success is perfectly possible.

After that, things didn’t go so well for the Israelis of course. The Syrians, Hezbollah, and international pressure drove Israel back to a strip on the border by 1985. But it’s easy to imagine that things could have gone differently. Most obviously, Israel could have withdrawn within a few months, after they’d achieved their initial objective of driving out the PLO. And it also seems likely that Israel will withdraw more quickly this time. Unlike 1982, the Syrians aren’t occupying Lebanon anymore, the Israelis have no Lebanese allies to support, and they have lots of bitter experience with past wars in Lebanon.

felix

Sorry, that’s what I get for typing too fast. There were 12 injured in that attack

I remarked at 86
1) “There simply is no situation where Israel will not face the war-threatening situation of having its soldiers standing within snatching distance of an enemy.”
Linda says “Israel has soldiers “within snatching distance” of Jordan and Egypt. Those governments control their soldiers…. Lebanon can learn the same lessons.”
Well, yes. My point is simply that moving Israel’s borders cannot be a solution to Israel’s border problems.
2) “Once a war has begun, one cabinet or the other has to fall.”
Linda says “how does loss of office follow from doing the people’s will?”
Politicians know that the people do not forgive anybody doing the people’s will and then losing. And at least one out of Hezbollah and Israel has to lose. Which acts – my point – as a deterrent to peace.
3) “the greatest long-term effect of the war will be to further discourage immigration to Israel and encourage emigration.”
Linda says “New immigrants have continued to arrive, despite the war…. the IDF is not at the moment desperate for manpower”
I was thinking less of the manpower needs of the IDF than the “demographic time bomb” argument – posponing the time when Israel (however boundaried) has a moslem majority. Here the amount of immigration is less important than the (Jewish) immigration/emigration balance, and while this is in Israel apparently a state secret I don’t think it’s irrational to suggest that it’s unlikely to rise in the wake of rocket attacks; that is to say, Hezbollah rockets are in part a successful attempt to cut back the effects of the Law of Return.
4) “If [the future] had been made clear in 1946, would anybody have been in favour of establishing the state of Israel? Jews included?”
Joshua says “Yes, of course. In 1946 that was the deal, and Jews in DP camps across Europe risked hunger strikes and British bullets to get it.”
To which,
– Not really; those in camps weren’t offered a straight choice of taking up residence in, say, america/england/canada/australia or israel; if they’d had that, the direction of emigration may have been different
– still, let’s up the ante; if in 1946 the people in the camps had known both that Israel would be at war much of the time and that there would not only be no more holocausts in America/england/canada/australia but very little overt antisemitism either, which country would they have preferred? It’s a serious historical question, though one obviously now very much overtaken by events; did the Jews of 1946 make the wrong choice (at least if viewed on prudential grounds)?

still, let’s up the ante; if in 1946 the people in the camps had known both that Israel would be at war much of the time and that there would not only be no more holocausts in America/england/canada/australia but very little overt antisemitism either, which country would they have preferred?

Chris’s question presupposes that the existence and military viability of Israel can be causally decoupled from the modern lack of overt antisemitism in the Diaspora. Yet in practice American Jews only get to stay at Conrad Hilton’s hotels, work in Henry Ford’s boardrooms, and run for vice president in Huey Long’s party, in decades when Israel is strong and secure. The causal link thus seems to me at least an open question.

Don’t forget that Jews expelled from Arab countries, mostly from 1948-1967, are a large fraction of Israel’s population (somewhere between 1/3 and 1/2). If the state of Israel hadn’t been established in 1948, what would have happened to them?

My belief is that if Israel hadn’t been created, anti-Semitism in Europe and America would have been slightly worse than it has been…

Why? Seems counterintuitive.

Nearly all African ones, plus Iraq/Mesopotamia and several other Gulf States. You don’t hear many people arguing that the creation of modern Germany and Italy was a mistake but there were plenty of people arguing about it at the time. More or less everybody agrees that the creation of the Soviet Union was a mistake. I never understand why people ask this question rhetorically.

When people say that the creation of Nigeria, Iraq or the Soviet Union was a mistake, what they mean is that the world is better off without the sovereign instantiation of a national identity, because without a state that national identity itself is likely to evaporate, to the benefit of its members and the world. The nation of Israel (am Yisrael, “nation” as the King James Version used it) is, however, demonstrably unlikely to evaporate, and a fond desire that it might evaporate is closely associated with ideologies that are unspeakable in polite company.

The example of (Metternich’s or Bismarck’s) Germany is an apt one; the history of its first century makes clear that the question of whether there is a “German nation” is a consequential one. But the analogous question about the Jewish nation is not (openly) in the dock, in most cases where “Israel’s right to exist” is raised rhetorically. That is, an attempt to end am Yisrael by banning infant circumcision, abolishing the public reading of Hebrew, knocking down gravestones and so on is almost never what is (openly) meant.

Instead, the rhetorical pose is that a return to the pre-Zionist status quo ante is desirable: Israel should continue to exist as a nation, but once again as a stateless one. This is unusual enough to be slightly unbelievable; it was slighly unbelievable during the nineteen centuries it was real. No one wants a stateless Soviet Union, a spiritual union of former Iraqis or a common Nigerian flag to fly in the hearts of independent Yorubas and Ibos alike.

(To forestall the inevitable tedious objection to “am Yisrael’s” connection to the modern state of Israel, on the grounds of a 20% minority of the latter’s citizens with no stake in the former, I agree it’s a thorny problem, though not different in kind from problems other new countries, notably the US, have faced with minority threads in the national narrative. “We didn’t land on Plymouth Rock; Plymouth Rock landed on us.” How Israel will come to terms with its Arab citizens when its continued existence behind secure borders is assured will be a severe moral test of a nation and a people; luckily, the standard of “one law for the homeborn and the stranger” has been a Jewish text for much longer than it has been a concern of Israel’s critics. Would an Israel at peace eventually add an Arabic verse to ha-Tikva? It would be nice to have the luxury of finding out.)

As Machiavelli remarked, to be weak is to be despised.

Yiddish saying (attributed to Israel Zangwill, long before 1948): A loshn is a diyalekt mit an armey un a flot. (A language is a dialect with an army and a navy.)

Ho hum. As I predicted.

‘The Israeli military began preparing to reoccupy southern Lebanon on Thursday, and Israeli officials conceded that their three-week bombing campaign has had no significant impact on Hizballah’s ability to fire short-range rockets into northern Israel.

The dispatch of thousands of Israeli soldiers to retake as much as one-fifth of Lebanon — the operation must still be approved by the Israeli cabinet — would mark a major expansion in Israel’s Lebanon campaign and would reverse Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon six years ago after a troubled 18-year occupation.’

After invasion comes colonisation, as anyone with any sense could have predicted. And will the troops be home by Christmas? Perhaps. But Christmas in what year?

http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060804/NEWS07/608040379/1009

After invasion comes colonisation, as anyone with any sense could have predicted.

Which provides the perfect lead-in to my….

Two-state solution
(A modest proposal for peace in the Levant)

Allow Lebanon to become an independent country, with its own flag (maybe something friendly like Canada’s, only with a cedar?), a seat at the United Nations, and full formal recognition by the Great Powers. Let Beirut hold democratic elections, to create an accountable legitimate government that can coopt and rein in the extremists. Carefully delineate the international boundary, and then put UN observers at the fence, to make sure any border incidents are sharply deterred and promptly contained. Above all, pull the Israeli right-wing settlers out of Lebanon permanently, ending the territorial dispute. (Heck, evacuate the Israeli- tainted Druse and Christian partisans of the South Lebanon Army, with their families, to new homes in northern Israel, too.)

Once the benefits of lasting and secure peace are obvious to all the involved parties, apply some of the same ideas, as appropriate, to the other theaters in the conflict.