Mary Kaldor on Iraq

Some people want America to fail in Iraq so that George W. Bush will lose the election. This kind of thinking prioritises domestic US concerns above the fate of Iraqis

Not necessarily, surely? I’ve never been a big fan of revolutionary defeatism, but shurely there must be a self-consistent point of view that believes that the only way things will ever get better for the Iraqis is if Bush goes, so it’s better for things to get worse between now and the election to get better later under the enlightened Democrat administration?

Kaldor’s column is more about the correct approach to reconstruction than it is about opposition or support of the occupation. But since the latter is the lede of Chris’s post, and is quite provocative, I want to address it. And, in this respect, Kaldor is wrong. It is appropriate, as Daniel says, to “support” current American failures in Iraq in the context of the greater good, which includes that of the Iraqi people.

First, some context.

While Kaldor rightly criticizes the American neocon naiveté, she does not acknowledge the essential rightness of their position (in regards to reconstruction), nor the reality that it is divergent from administration policy. This divergence is exactly why things have gone so terribly wrong.

The neocons place great emphasis on the rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and society, and the establishment of a democratic civil society. Had they their way, far more resources and planning would have been allocated to this project. Yes, again—they are terribly naïve and, not incidentally, ideologically blinded. But they are not squeamish about “nation building”.

The traditional conservatives are. And they are the majority in this administration, and include the President. The neocons supplied a rationalization and an ideological fervor for this invasion—the traditional conservatives exploited that for their own reasons, as did the more purely political operatives. For example, Rumsfeld, a key player, is not a neocon—his obsession has been to remake the military…to be remembered by history as a visionary Secretary of Defense who reshaped America’s military. His vision of military action is in accordance with the neocon vision in regards to its adventurism, but deviates from it in regards to nation building and the like. The neocon prosecution of the war would have used as much military force as necessary, and as much as necessary for the occupation. Rumsfeld, in contrast, needed to prove his “faster, leaner, cheaper” philosophy.

The result was that a broad consensus arose in this administration for an invasion, and the neocon rationale for it was proffered as its public face. However, the majority view in the administration was against large forces and extensive occupation. The neocons unwittingly supported this with their naïve expectations of how warmly the Americans would be welcomed. In the end, we had an invasion almost everyone in the administration supported, but with little agreement about what should come next. Thus, this disaster.

The preceding context is necessary in order to understand what is now actually possible for Iraq’s future. And the most important thing to understand is that this administration absolutely does not have the wherewithal to support an occupation and reconstruction necessary for a healthy Iraq. This is not an option. It’s not going to happen.

One of two things will happen with this administration:

1. A continuation of the status quo, resulting in a worsening situation and an early withdrawal. This would be a disaster for Iraq.
2. An early, effectively complete withdrawal. This would be an even bigger disaster for Iraq.

Kaldor’s plan is not a possibility with this administration. Neither of the possibilities above allows it. At this point, I think the first possibility is more likely under this administration.

One of three things will happen with a Democratic administration:

1. Same as #1 above.
2. Same as #2 above.
3. A restructuring of the American effort involving a large multilateral peacekeeping and reconstruction effort with contributions from primarily NATO, but also the UN and other bodies.

The third possibility is the one most likely to involve Kaldor’s view of a correct reconstruction. This possibility is absolutely not possible with this administration. It is possible with a Democratic administration.

Of the three possibilities with a Democratic administration, I believe that at this point, it’s not truly possible to say if one is more likely than the other. A President Dean, for example, would be more likely to embrace a complete withdrawal, as would some other Democrats. The first possibility (a unilateralist status quo) is probably less likely with any Democrat, as much of the world would be willing, even eager, to be involved in reconstruction were Bush not President. Even so, Democrats are not keen on foreign policy, and I can see a continuation of the status quo simply as a result of neglect.

So, if we’re only looking at what’s in Iraq’s best interests, it seems to me that a Democratic administration is obviously preferable to another four years of Bush. Given that the economy seems to marginally improving, Bush’s greatest political weakness a year from now will likely be a deteriorating situation in Iraq. It is in Iraq’s best interests, then, that the situation in Iraq deteriorate enough, or, at least not improve, such that Bush is defeated by a Democrat next year. Kaldor is wrong. Bad news from Iraq is good news for Iraq. For now.

However, really bad news makes a complete withdrawal more likely, and that is the worst outcome of all.

Additionally, one ought to consider the larger geopolitical consequences of a second Bush term in office. Suppose that conditions improve sufficiently enough in Iraq that perception of the occupation is greatly more positive. There is not a chance in hell that Kaldor’s Iraq will come to be under a Bush administration, but suppose that things do somewhat improve. That will give Bush credibility, and will give the neocons credibility. Within four more years, we may have a similar situation in Iran, or Syria, or who-knows-where, except with resources spread even more thinly, the likelihood of a positive outcome becomes even more remote. This would be, indeed, probably the worst of all possible worlds. Bad news in Iraq is still good news in this larger context.

It is appropriate, as Daniel says

Just to be clear; I don’t endorse that argument, because I’m always an opponent of jam-tomorrow reasoning. Just saying it exists.

A comment similar to the sentiment expressed by the post above is to be found in Dan Gross’ article today in Slate:

Bushenfreude began in the summer of 2001, when the first Bush tax cut rebates were sent. Back then it was easy to deal with those onetime windfalls if you resented the source. You could send the check back, or sign it over to People for the American Way. Refusing to spend it—and hence refusing to stimulate the economy—was a gratifying protest against Bush’s risky skewed-to-the-wealthy tax scheme.

Not to change the subject at all, but I think many journalists don’t comprehend how satisfying two-hundred or three-hundred dollar tax cuts were to the non-wealthy.

I hope the existing situation improves in Iraq, as I am sure does most of the world. The justifications offered for some unspoken rooting for turmoil to continue until the 2004 elections are both unspeakably naive and preposterous to any but a purely partisan hack.

If you find yourself hoping for failure, hang your head in shame. Your partisan feelings are stronger than your concern for either this countries soldiers or Iraqi civilian’s. Feel free to disagree with the policies that landed us in this mess, but if you think that disagreement permits the kind of rubbish rationale you offer for continued military and Iraqi deaths at the hands of Al Queda and former Baathists you are a seriously troubled individual who needs emotional help.

Sorry- missing quote from the Kaldor article-

‘There are in Iraq today many new democratic initiatives, especially among students and women’s groups, journalists, artists, and filmmakers… What is important at this moment is to find a framework for strengthening and empowering these and other groups and linking them to the new economy.’

Btw, any reason CT doesn’t have blogroll links for any of the Iraqi blogs?

Is a democratic government even possible in the current Iraq? The CIA and State department didn’t think so, from what I’ve read. I think this question is the other shoe waiting to drop. I think we’ll pull out and there will be some kind of civil war. How that will effect Bush’s political future I don’t know.

On Chris’ behalf and in his absence, get stuffed. He posted an interesting excerpted atricle, with precisely nine lines of comment (one of which is “and”) to call this “cheap hack” behaviour or a “smear” is downright ridiculous, as is your insinuation that Chris is a smear-merchant. Whatever you’re trying to achieve, all that you’re actually achieving is making a complete arse of yourself.

This “nine lines” defense is just as lame as the famous “sixteen words” one. And the “you criticize him for excerpting an interesting article” evasion is as bad as the “it was really a war to build schools” one. Chris chose to highlight the most dubious and deceptive paragraph of the article and go it one better. I called him on it. I stand by that. You can bugger off.

Mr. Kissinger has a couple of comments which match current US administration actions too well for comfort:

From _Does America Need a Foreign Policy_:
The road to empire leads to domestic decay because, in time, the claims of omnipotence erode domestic restraints. No empire has avoided the road to Caesarism unless, like the British Empire, it devolved its power before this process could develop. In long-lasting empires, every problem turns into a domestic issue [which should be handled very differently from international ones] because the outside world no longer provides a counterweight. And as challenges grow more diffuse and increasingly remote from the historic domestic base, internal struggles become ever more bitter and in time violent. A deliberate quest for hegemony is the surest way to destroy the values that made the United States great.

From _Diplomacy_:
[Early Bolsheviks] never dealt with the question of how to conduct foreign policy among sovereign states. They were certain that world revolution would follow their victory in Russia in a few months’ time; extreme pessimists thought it might take as long as a few years. Leon Trotsky, the first Soviet Foreign Minister, viewed his task as little more than that of a clerk who, in order to discredit the capitalists, would make public the various secret treaties by which they had proposed to divide the spoils of war amongst themselves. He defined his role as being to “issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop”.

I wasn’t aware of that from Dean. I stand corrected. But I think he’d be under significant pressure from a lot of groups to do so.

I agree that there’s much more risk of an abrupt withdrawal by Bush than is commonly thought. But the Bush administration’s current policies are awfully bad and they’re already signaling an accelerated withdrawal. The situation with them in charge is bleak. However, they’d pay a significant political price for a complete withdrawal, and I think they’d only pay that price if the alternative was much, much worse. That would only be the case if the situation in Iraq became far worse than it is. This is why I think bad news is good, but really bad news is bad.

Anyway, no one forces you to read anything I write, or, indeed to comment on it.

Actually, Chris, Aretino’s kids are in my basement at the moment, where they’ve been living a semi-feral existence for some years. If I don’t see evidence that he’s been reading your stuff, I cut their gruel allowance. It’s a labor-intensive way of securing readers, but that’s just a consequence of the ruthless competition for eyeballs in the blogosphere.

Good anecdote. I think Bush’s suporters and opponents are in danger of some kind of weird role reversal, with Republicans eager to cut and run and well-meaning opponents of the war arguing that the US has to clear up its own mess, stay the course, etc.

I made the point yesterday that a US/UK withdrawal is the only logical first step because every day of the American presence is (a) worsening the security situation (mostly because of anti-occupation attacks but also because Bush has turned Iraq into the next battleground against “foreign” Islamic radicals) and (b) gradually undermining and dividing Iraqi society.

In response, Keith Ellis said:

“An American withdrawal certainly would not decrease unrest. It is astonishingly naive and uninformed of you to think that it would. There are deep Shia and Sunni and Kurd conflicts (among others) that would boil over; as would there be a bloody political struggle between the Baathists and those who would replace them.”

But what do we really know about “deep Shia and Sunni and Kurd conflicts”? I think we are on the old “ancient ethnic hatreds” ground again a la Bosnia. Yes, Saddam’s anti-Shia and anti-Kurd policies created divisions, but that is not to say that Iraqi cannot sort these out. It is remarkable that all ethnic/religious groups seem to support the continued existence of Iraq rather than calling for secession or division. That indicates that there is a willingness to continue with a pluralist entity, which bodes well for the ability of Iraqis to solve their own problems post-withdrawal. As for “a bloody struggle between Baathists and those that woudl replace them” – do we really understand what the term “Baathists” means in this context? Baathists minus Saddam’s apparatus of state repression are little more than a nationalist political party, who presumably will continue to have a political role (ideally in opposition, of course) just as former communists do now in Eastern Europe. Maybe, just maybe, Iraqis are not hell-bent on killing themselves and each other….

Kaith also levels an accusation against me:

“Iraqi society cannot both be ancient, enduring and powerful and also easily destroyed by teenage grunts backed by neo-colonialists. The patronization is implied in the assertion of this incoherent idea. It’s sort of a “noble savage” view, idealizing “Iraqi” culture while seeing it as deeply vulnerable to foreign intervention.”

Iraqi CULTURE is ancient, enduring and, in my experience, superior to American anti-culture. However, Iraqi SOCIETY has been pulled apart first by late-stage Saddam (1991-2002) and then by the occupation. Iraqi society is certainly vulnerable to the effects of both ill-educated military grunts and over-funded corrupt corporates – indeed one might also add empty-minded well-meaning NGO peddlers of “democracy” to the list as well, if like me today you are feeling cynical.

The US didn’t really occupy Afghanistan in a classical sense, which is why aside from a massive increase in drug production and warlordism we haven’t seen the full effect of its “partnership” with the US. In Iraq, I fear we will see US influence in ful effect: from selling off the state’s assets to crooks, through prostitution and the commodification of women to a breakdown of family relations, etc.

Finally, say what you will about these views (they come across as more conservative than I intended), but please don’t bore me with the fantasy that this or that US president or party would do it better. Even Kuchinich can’t reform the USA. Right now, the United States is on a course that can’t be changed. Just look at the economic indicators. To paraphrase Robert Palmer: you’re gonna have to face it, you’re addicted to cheap oil and forcefully “opening up” new markets for your goods whilst protecting your own unsustainable economy.

“I think we are on the old “ancient ethnic hatreds” ground again a la Bosnia.”

Huh? You do realize, don’t you, that without the intervention and continued large numbers of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, there would be a bloodbath? There is a huge body of literature on both the war and the aftermath to this day that makes this abundantly clear.

Iraq was a totalitarian state. Like other totalitarian states before it, it suppressed simmering conficts between aggrieved groups and, importantly, often elevated one minority group’s interests above the others. You must be completely ignorant of the situation in Iraq to believe that there wouldn’t be a great amount of violence between Shia and Sunni, against and by the Kurds, and by and against the old Baathist party elite and functionaries.

The peacekeeping activities in Bosnia have been largely successful, and they’re an example of what can be achieved with a large, determined multinational force determined to build a civil society. The US alone *might* have the resources to do something like this in Iraq, but not the political will. However, a large multinational commitment to such an endeavor is possible, but only with a Democratic administration.

oh … go on then … just maybe Kuchinich would have done better – at least he wouldn’t have sold off the power company to KBR or Halliburton ;-)

Anyway, Keith says peacekeeping in Bosnia avoided a bloodbath because the savages there exist only to kill each other. First, Serb forces achieved most of their ethnic cleansing in 1992 before UNPROFOR got going. Second, Srebrenica – if that’s not a bloodbath, I don’t know what is. Finally, how do you account for the fact that there was little or no fighting at times when strategic interests (not blind hatred) were at stake? E.g. Serb withdrawal from Donji Vakuf and northern approaches to Vlasic in Autumn 1995. It was a political war that needed a political solution. The blue helmets saved some lives and delivered some food, but they were just a stop gap until the Americans decided to impose a solution on all parties. The solution is a bad one that goes against all the principles they claimed to be upholding. A better solution would have been to not intervene in the first place by imposing an arms embargo on the Bosnians.

Keith: it seems wherever you see “ethnic groups” you see civil war. Do you think that LA would burst into flames without the LAPD?

Yes, Iraq was a totalitarian state, and in that it was not alone. That does not mean that all totalitarian states exist only to suppress ancient ethnic hatreds. Iraqis are way more civilised than you realise.

There *might* be inter-communal violence post-withdrawal – it would hardly be surprising after everything that has happened. However, it is up to Iraqis to sort their country out. We just owe them a hell of a lot of apologies and money.

You are right that the British have achieved some good things around Basra. Maybe that could be built on in a post-occupation force, perhaps in conjunction with neutral forces from other countries or perhaps the OIC. But one thing is clear: US troops should be withdrawn or they will be defeated.

Fair enough. Neither of our underlying assumptions can really be proved or disproved, I guess.

I agree with the need for carefully “constructed institutional machinery” to keep society in order, and I am confident that Iraqis can do this themselves, perhaps with support and non-interventionist assistance from their friends.

I am still amazed at how civilised and hospitable Iraqis are towards most foreigners despite the many crimes committed by US forces against them. This is a feature of Islamic culture that non-Islamic cultures could learn from.

Thanks for the debate.