Life Imitates Ted (again)

Is Buckley proud he created this monster? If only he were properly ashamed.

Mr. Matt,

The Iraqi airforce (or much of what was left of it after a few days of bombing, probably most of the flyable aircraft) did indeed escape to Iran in January 1991. The Iranians kept the planes.

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0071.shtml

This incident is in all the histories.

My most Republican uncle told me years ago that the WMDs, along with Saddam Hussein himself, were smuggled out of Iraq in a Russian diplomatic convoy. He’d heard it on Fox, where he gets all his news. I’ve been meaning to ask him when they smuggled Saddam back in, but we generally try to avoid getting into conversations with him about politics or current events.

“He has just explained that he supported the war reluctantly, because Dick Cheney convinced him Saddam Hussein had WMD primed to be fired.”

Personally, I think that few people (semi-informed or better) actually believed Saddam had any weapons. Even though neo-cons, liberal journalists, national security/terrorism experts, Republicans, Democrats, intelligence agencies, etc. mouthed the words with frequency. The substance of the “unresolved issues” from Hans Blix and UNMOVIC involved unaccounted for weapons (probably long inert) from the 1980s. Powell’s presentation amounted to much the same.

IMO, people like Norman P. (or Cheney) didn’t believe Iraq had weapons.

They didn’t believe these weapons, even had they existed, constituted a threat worth invading over.

And it was mostly “wink wink nudge nudge” all the way down. This leaves unanswered the “why” so many people were in favor of, or went along with, bombing Iraq. Personally, I think it comes down to: they were Arabs/Muslims, which was good enough, and Saddam was bad, therefore they “could”.

Personally, I think it comes down to: they were Arabs/Muslims, which was good enough, and Saddam was bad, therefore they “could”.

You forgot to mention that for a large chunk of the American population, and an even larger chunk of our political and media elites, waging war (for any reason, or no reason at all) is an enormously gratifying activity, both economically and emotionally.

Mr. Matt,

So, whats the difference if banned weapons were “hidden in Syria” or “escaped to Syria” ?

The Iraqi airforce analogy is perfectly good; the Iraqis were willing to send these aircraft to Iran on the (desperate) chance that they would be able to negotiate their return later vs. their near-certain loss.

It is perfectly plausible that the Iraqis would have evacuated whatever chemical/etc. weapons or otherwise whatever evidence of their more egregious violations of the agreements they had to Syria for later use – as a bargaining chip at least, or to embarass the US. They seem to have evacuated most of their ready cash also, for the same resons.

Syria was far more friendly to the Iraqi regime in 2003 than Iran was in 1991, and the Saddam Hussein regime seemed to think it had a good chance of bouncing back after the US occupation was over.

Naturally the evidence for all this is very limited. In the Middle East there is a tall tale for every purpose, and the Syrian regime is not only inpenetrable but is also reputed to have a considerable armament of WMD’s of its own. It seems to be a great place to lose the Iraqi WMD’s.

Luis,

First, since “Matt” is my first name, it’s strange to call me “mr. Matt”. (You’ve got a habit of this odd trait. It’s not really very cute.)

Secondly, as said above, (not by me) it doesn’t seem the Iraqi planes were “hidden” in any sense. There is also _no evidence at all_ that WMD, in any plausible sense of that term, were moved to Syria. It’s conceivable, but since all the evidence points against it it’s a crazy thing to think it must be so. Insisting that it’s the _most likely_ thing, as in the passage quoted in the post, is a sign of being an idiot or liar. I’d expect that Podhoretz is a bit of both. What do you think?

So those thousands of Kurds who died during the Anfal campaign died of old age? And the tens of thousands of Iranians who died with blistered lungs? Asthsma?

Grow a brain.

Luis,
When someone specifically asks you not to use a form of address and you keep on using it, it sets the stage for people thinking you’re an ass hole.

As for your other claims, I find them highly dubious. No such claim has come from a source that wasn’t highly dubious. Given the level of scrutiny Iraq was under at the time it’s already highly likely that any such movements would be noticed. Given this and the other evidence it seems that there’s nothing but faith to back your claim. I hope you’ll forgive me if I have significantly less faith.

So this debate is about the difference between “plausible” and “have any shred of evidence for”? Seriously, if arguing the occurence of historical events based on whether they are “plausible” is the best case you can make, you really shouldn’t bother making the case.

Mr. Alegria,

You can call me “Mr. Bento”, you can call me “Martin”, you can even call me “Mr. Martin”, if you like, though I think it would be confusing.

In addition to what others have said (I would like to see any affirmative evidence too), consider that Saddam’s gambit in Iran involved two leaps of faith: 1) That the US would leave him in power, so he could later get the planes back, and 2) That he would be able to get Iran to return them. 1 panned out and 2 did not; but 2 made no sense unless he was banking on 1. In the case of Iraq War the 2nd, 1 was clearly not on the table unless Saddam could somehow compel it. If he had WMDs, therefore, he had every reason to use them; nothing to lose, perhaps something to gain, depending on the specifics. So the Syria gambit makes no sense even from the standpoint of strategy.

Mr. Bento,

(And thank you for using a real name, I like to imagine I am speaking with a real person.)

It seems obvious that Saddam Hussein, and more especially the people who constituted his regime, did not think that their destruction was an absolute certainty. They made elaborate preparations to survive and outlast a US occupation. Perhaps in this they were unrealistic, but that is not the first time Saddam Hussein misjudged a situation vis-a-vis an external enemy.

It was also likely that even SH knew that whatever WMD he had was useless against a dispersed mechanized army, and it was better preserved as a bargaining chip, or hidden away to embarass the US, or to wait in the wings in case of a civil war following a US withrawal.

I think mr. luis is right, except in his speculations about Saddam’s motivations. Surely, seeing the american invading his country, his first thought was that actually using the WMD would kill Americans. As we know, this planet exists only to make sure that Americans can invade countries with relatively few casualties, after which the flowers and candies are pulled out. The pity in Saddam’s heart was truly magnificent, and in some ways, he died as a WMD martyr, a sort of Jesus of the WMDs.

Meanwhile, to make sure there are enough WMDs for everyone, Britain and the U.S. are competing to sell delivery machines to the Saudis for their WMDs, i.e. those Pakistani atom bombs for which the Saudis have been generous in loans and underwriting. Is this a sweet world or what? One nation actually has the wmds, spends money supporting Al Qaeda, even has its secret police send money to the hijackers, and they become our best friends – Pakistan. Another country supplies the majority of the hijackers – and we sell them more fighter planes and bombers. The third we invade cause of their nasty WMDs, but do to the feelings of universal humanity that animate Saddam Hussein’s heart, they hide them in Syria. They do it with their invisible machine, so there will be no evidence. If we invade Syria, no doubt they will hide their WMDs in Iran. It is a fabulous world when you are a warmonger – just a little out of focus.

Surely the fanciful, blue sky thinking of Messrs. Podhoretz and Alegria underscores the Lack of Ideas on the lockstep Left.

John M, there was a bunch of inspecting and dismantling done in the early 1990’s. History didn’t start on 9/11. But nice try on blaming the lack of WMD’s on everybody – so even handed of you!

Luis Allegra: “All sources about any aspect of this situation is “highly dubious”, it seems to me. There is very little over there that can be taken at face value, that can be certified by unimpeachable sources.”

Continuing with the lies – there is one source which is not suspect. That is that the administration hasn’t coughed up jack sh*t, when it’s strongly in their interest to do so.

The “Saddam hid his WMDs in Syria” excuse goes back to when Hans Blix wasn’t finding them in Iraq. Scooter Libby told it to an otherwise smart guy I know, who told it to me. (No, I never had even indirect access to those people. The guy was researching a book and had to talk to several people in the administration.) Assuming for the moment that the WMD argument was serious, what didn’t make sense to me then, and still doesn’t, is why Assad would agree to hide Saddam’s weapons. When the US is threatening to invade Iraq because it has WMDs, why would Syria be so altruistic as to volunteer to become the target instead? But if Saddam did get Assad to agree to such a scheme, then the WMDs must still be in Syria. So why are we threatening to bomb Iran?

It’s pretty straightforward – where’s the evidence? So far, all Mr. Algeria and friends can bring to the table is a bit of he-said-she-said – Mr. Kay said that somebody else said they went to Syria!

That is, quite franky, pathetic. Open-source information detailing the Iranian nuclear program is availible in spades (armscontrolwonk, thank you), so we are able to conduct evidence-based discussions of the issue.

However, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and the complete lack of evidence supporting the assertion that Iraqi WMD went to Syria makes it clear what side we should err on. Iraq had no significant WMD capability or programs in early 2003. I knew that. Hans Blix knew that. Anybody who didn’t know that, but was supposed to be providing intelligence to our government’s decision-makers, should be fired for incompetance.

It’s that simple.

Let’s try to bring some sanity to the debate. Here are some indisputable propositions:

1. Saddam had and used significant amounts of WMD in the ’80s.

2. UN inspectors determined that Iraq had large stockpiles of WMD after the Gulf War.

3. The relevant UNSC resolutions required the regime to account for and relinquish its stockpiles of WMD.

4. The regime never accounted to the satisfaction of the UN inspectors for the whereabouts of the stockpiles.

5. There was utterly no argument from the nations opposed to US military action in 2002-03 that Iraq had complied with the accounting requirements of the UNSC resolutions; in other words, everybody agrreed that the regime was noncompliant. The only question on the table was what to do about it.

6. No rational observer would have dreamed that the regime destroyed its stockpiles without telling anybody that it had done so.

7. Nations, like other actors, can only act on reasonable appearances and, particularly in the intelligence sphere,have to rely on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inference.

Nat, search on Brad DeLong’s blog – he was posting excerpts from the National Review.

djd, you’re forgetting things like Iraq destroying a large amount of stuff under UN supervision, and UN inspectors having considerable access in ’02-03, and finding nada.

Little details there.

Ajay’s theory at #31 – which is a good deal better than the “theory” of evolution, which has been disproved again and again at the Billy Graham Institute of Higher Thinking – explains the only real mystery in our tremendously successful liberation of Iraq. Yes, stuff happens, but I do think that the Bush administration, early on, was much too modest in concealing the 150 percent approval for our liberation of their benighted land from the Iraqis and their longing to give us something in return. The evil Ba’athist forces, seizing the chocolate and the flowers and sending them to Syria, naturally caused the Iraqi population to search high and low for other candies to give to our boys – hence, the so called “looting”. Since then, everything has settled down. Only the terrorist supporting MSM doesn’t report it! Vast numbers of Iraqis are so secure, nowadays, that they are taking extended vacations outside the country – which, of course, Al qaeda supporters and their useful idiots represent as “refugees”.

The serious question is: is hiding mass confectionary a breach of UN security rules? Should we invade Syria to get our candies back? Or have they all melted by now?

Everything to do with this is covered with a fog of unknowns, filled with disinformation, unreliability and credulity in all directions.

Well, nothing clears away the fog like a little ak-shawn. Nuke Damascus!

He asserted that Saddam was blocking the inspectors because Saddam was. Saddam claimed that the inspection team had been infiltrated by US agents, which was, unknown to Ritter, true, so he had a reason to block under the agreement that governed the inspections. Ritter did not claim in 1998 that Saddam had weapons, and knew in 2003 that he still did not. And the facts proved him right, however, many fantasies about Syria the unreality-based community may try to spin.

It may be worth quoting Ritter at length, from his New Republic article in 1998. Martin bento and others sdeem to have forgfotten that when he was in a position to know best Ritter considered ther US/UN action against Saddam as too lenient and was completely convinced that he had not disarmed:

‘As a member of unscom since 1991, and its chief inspector responsible for investigating Iraq’s concealment mechanism from July 1995 until my resignation on August 26, 1998, I know that this is hardly the first time Saddam has pulled such tricks [removing weapons from sites before inspectors are allowed in]. In fact, they are at the heart of his strategy for preserving his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and, eventually, getting rid of U.N. economic sanctions (which he has largely succeeded in eluding anyway). Through skillful manipulation of the situation on the ground in Iraq, international public opinion, and rifts among the members of the Security Council, Saddam actually aims to cap his comeback by getting unscom to issue a clean bill of health. It is an audacious plan, but it may succeed, thanks in no small part to the mistakes of U.S. policymakers themselves.

If it succeeds, the consequences could be dire. The Baghdad regime– strengthened by having retained the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction and psychologically fortified by having outlasted the world’s sole remaining superpower–will rapidly restore its internal and regional constituencies and reemerge as a force to be reckoned with. Since his defeat in the Gulf war, Saddam has built up eight years’ worth of resentment and frustration that can only be released through renewed efforts at territorial expansion through armed aggression and blackmail, both economic and military.

Even today, Iraq is not nearly disarmed. Unscom lacks a full declaration from Iraq concerning its prohibited capabilities, making any absolute pronouncement about the extent of Iraq’s retained proscribed arsenal inherently tentative. But, based on highly credible intelligence, unscom suspects that Iraq still has biological agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin, and clostridium perfringens in sufficient quantity to fill several dozen bombs and ballistic missile warheads, as well as the means to continue manufacturing these deadly agents. Iraq probably retains several tons of the highly toxic VX substance, as well as sarin nerve gas and mustard gas. This agent is stored in artillery shells, bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. And Iraq retains significant dual-use industrial infrastructure that can be used to rapidly reconstitute large-scale chemical weapons production.

Meanwhile, Iraq has kept its entire nuclear weapons infrastructure intact through dual-use companies that allow the nuclear-design teams to conduct vital research and practical work on related technologies and materials. Iraq still has components (high explosive lenses, initiators, and neutron generators) for up to four nuclear devices minus the fissile core (highly enriched uranium or plutonium), as well as the means to produce these. Iraq has retained an operational long-range ballistic missile force that includes approximately four mobile launchers and a dozen missiles. And, under the guise of a permitted short-range missile program, Iraq has developed the technology and production means necessary for the rapid reconstitution of long-range ballistic missile production.