The War on Water Pressure

by Hannah Forsyth on April 29, 2025

I was not invited to the meeting where the left coordinated their war on water pressure. Sadly, then, it was over before I even knew it was happening.

One of those American executive orders (and gosh we’re getting tired of those, even from the other side of the world) to – seriously – make showers great again.

I was not the only one to think that this might have been a joke. I used three different browsers to get to the white house website to check.

Turns out, the left’s war on water pressure was over even before it even really began. Dammit.

So much is happening, and so much of it is contradictory, that whiplash is now just Tuesday. My prevailing (and perverse) hobby is to follow the live blogs on business and market matters and the mood is getting downright meh. But a kind of pissed off meh.

The relentless change started as stupid, but now it is getting boring. Every day a new set of journalism, here on substack and across the media, conducts analysis that tomorrow might be irrelevant.

This post is a rather superficial attempt to grasp what is evidently ungraspable, in the present moment. Warning: there might be sanewashing, who knows. And apologies, I intended to post this a couple of weeks when it was fresher. But events, y’know?

Is it the end of neoliberalism?

Undoing what we can surely not really call the ‘left’s’ war on water pressure smells, at first, like classic (if melodramatically articulated) neoliberalism. Too much wet, red tape when all we want is a decent shower. Get rid of the regulations, who cares about preserving water, the richest AI peddler, almond farmer or that member of the family who takes so long to masturbate in the shower that there is no hot water for anyone else. This is neoliberalism, winners can have it all.

But is it neoliberalism?

Gary Gerstle says

…neoliberalism’s career has been marked as much by heterodoxy as orthodoxy, by its capacity to make individuals as different as tech hippies and Ronald Reagan, as dissimilar as Barry Goldwater and long-haired university students who wanted to bring down “the system,” feel as though they held the key to unlocking a future of untrammeled personal freedom.

Mmm. Making showers great again. (Ok now I’ve linked this to wanking that sounds quite rude…but still on brand for the orange fella). Fits this, doesn’t it? And so, in keeping with the ‘Trump is just a continuation of neoliberalism’ cluster of thinkers, the shower heads thing holds.

And yet, Gerstle again:

Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders were inconsequential political figures during the order’s 1990s heyday. That the two became in the 2010s the two most dynamic forces in American political life provides the best evidence that the neoliberal order was losing its hold. It was no longer constraining political choice….During the neoliberal heyday, protectionism was a dirty word, not to be uttered by those pursuing high political office. Now it is favored by many on the right as well as on the left.

Quinn Slobodian, taking a more intellectual (than political) history stance, sees the present moment as a result of a split in neoliberal ideas. Neoliberalism still reigns, but it is divided.

And what a schism it is.

But. Remember back to Yanis Varoufakis’ Global Minotaur, in which he described the twin deficits of the United States. First, the budget deficit, allowing US Treasury Bonds to act as the safe offset to riskier financial activities. So that the demand for more US government debt was literally making money (and the finance world) go around. Second, the trade deficit, sending endless US dollars overseas to stabilise the globalise economy. The price? Imperial-level tribute flowing into Wall Street.

Powered by America’s twin deficits, the world’s leading surplus economies (e.g. Germany, Japan and, later, China) kept churning out goods that Americans gobbled up and then sent almost 70% of the profits, in the form of capital flows, to Wall Street which, at the speed of light, turned them into cheap loans, investments and, of course, a nice ‘little’ earner for the bankers themselves. Through this prism, everything seems to make more sense: the rise of financialisation, the triumph of greed, the retreat of regulators, the domination of the anglo-celtic growth model; all these phenomena that typified the era suddenly appear as mere by-products of the massive capital flows necessary to feed the twin deficits of the United States.

This was not real stability though – and came crashing in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. It was then artificially propped up, of course. And then propped up further (a lot further) during Covid. And then in February 2022 it stopped (well, it is complicated, but basically). Finally (sort of) we might see the consequences of the end of the material structured driving neoliberalism. Maybe that is what is going on now.

Is it the end of a central role for USD? And globalisation?

So let’s say the US trade deficits were about sending dollars into the global system, keeping the US dollar as the global currency that in turn props up Wall Street, what is all this reversal of the trade deficit thing all about?

Helen Thompson and Tom McTague, via their These Times podcast, suggest that undermining the value of the dollar is the plan. The dollar is overvalued because lots of people need it, ‘cos of how it is the global reserve currency. That makes for de-industrialisation with the US because it costs too much to buy ‘Murican stuff. And from there apparently it is a slippery slope to opioid crisis or something.

Obv the orange fella says he wants to keep the dollar’s dominance, but which he reckons can be paid for by other countries who now buy American rather than export there.

There was also some talk about undermining the current role of treasury bonds as global safe asset – which they are, of course, because of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of being the reserve currency ie. government debt could technically be paid by printing money. And though that is unlikely, it acts as a guarantee and makes the bonds, safe. Well, until now. Maybe. More about the plan for treasuries in a bit.

Trump has to drive down the debt because otherwise he can’t maintain the tax cuts for the wealthiest people, says Helen Thompson.

But hmm. Is this also the purpose of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve? That is, tariffs are there to end one side of the twin deficits, and this is there to end the other? Or is it related to the Trump and Musk’s visit to Fort Knox (did that happen in the end?) and their suspected plan to ‘liberate’ the gold reserves (also with the extra bitcoin?) for making more gain (aka the persistent personal enrichment thesis for what is going on), or else to devalue the dollar via that route ie. ‘OMG there’s less gold than we were told’, leading to a drop in the dollar.

Shrugs.

What about this whole Liberation Day business? Now the tariff thing looks less wholesale than it did, doesn’t that mean ending the trade deficit also won’t work?

This is why the cause of the apparent backflip(s) (multiple and counting) on tariffs matters. The first backflip was the Bond Vigilantes back in charge of the world’s ‘greatest democracy’ (extraordinary when you have to rely on those guys). Or that targeting China was the plan all along.

Then there is the personal enrichment thesis. Based on recent stock market chaos, at least part of the plan sure looks like selective inflows to the portfolios of people who magically have advance warning of political announcements that change the market’s direction.

The endgame, if there is one? Not sure.

Or maybe it isn’t even about the orange guy. A couple of years ago Perry Mehrling thought “the next few years will be a little rocky because we are now coming into the disciplined phase of this system”. Though the present moment, surely, is not just cyclical, or even merely (the first time surely we would say ‘merely’ for c.1979-82ish) an equivalent to the Volcker Shock?

Is it the end of American military hegemony?

Remember in the distant days before all this tariff shit that there was all the stuff pressuring Europe into funding their own military stuff and not relying on the American security guarantee. Leaders brought in and smiley stuff on camera (except for poor Zelensky ofc) with all sorts of threats that eventually led Germany to overturn its austere ways and buy its own guns?

Might be related to the other twin deficit business. From a paper in November 2024:

The US dollar’s status as the global reserve currency is perhaps more closely tied to America’s military power — and perceived likelihood of prevailing in conflicts — than previous economic analysis has accounted for.

Back to those treasury bonds, there was talk about forcing countries to whom the US has previously offered a security guarantee to hold these as 100 year zero interest bonds to make them pay for American military presence – but also with no security guarantee. In response, Germany and others are re-arming – which Helen Thompson reckons might have been the goal.

This is hardly demilitarisation, or, one suspects heading towards world peace.

And it is definitely not the end of American imperialism: there is still the whole buying Greenland business. The logic is rather closer to building a wall and making Mexico pay for it.

For decades the world has let this imperialism slide in exchange for a few things – security guarantees, USAID, that sort of thing. For now there is a lot of scrambling to keep something resembling the status quo, including Murica’s place in the world. But it is hard to imagine it staying that way indefinitely.

Here in Australia we still have to relinquish, y’know, whatever we would otherwise do with $368 Billion of our own money for some vague possibility of a submarine or two sometime, one day. One suspects hypothetical submarines are not actually the thing we are buying.

Is it the end of liberal democracy?

A combination of the failure to enforce the rule of law in relation to Trump’s illegal activities and the tendency of the law courts to uphold egregiously wrong shit is surely spelling an end to the wide-eyed, even sometimes saccharine faith in liberal institutions to work universally in the interests of a democratic population.

In Jacobin, Daniel Bessner points out that what seems extraordinary is actually pretty consistent with the ways America’s liberal institutions have worked. On the arrests of Badar Khan Suri and Mahmoud Khalil:

Tragically, arrests like these have many precedents in US history; the arrest and deportation of legal residents and even citizens — oftentimes for political radicalism — has been a recurring feature of American politics for a long time.

Then there’s the oligarchical power, linked not only to a wider version of the personal enrichment explanation for this regime, or technofeudalism/technofascism, but also to wider patriarchal white supremacy.

Turns out even the end of the left’s war against water pressure is part of the story of undermining democratic institutions.

This is Alan Kohler, whose article is not behind a paywall (unlike Noah Feldman’s original).

It’s not really about showers, wrote Feldman, but an attempt to gut the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, which is currently being used by federal courts to block Trump’s unlawful actions.

Feldman writes that this is a direct, overt violation of the law and contradicts the very reason that the APA exists. If the Supreme Court lets him get away with it, another judicial guardrail against a Trump autocracy will fall away.

Remember, he stacked the Supreme Court in his first term.

Remember that to impose the tariffs on April 2, Trump declared an emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, which gives him the power to bypass Congress for an emergency “originating outside the United States”.

The “emergency” that allowed him to up-end the global trading system and end 80 years of US-led stability is merely the existence of trade deficits, which his executive order says indicates “a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and US trading partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages and consumption”.

If that’s an emergency, anything is.

Of all the things that may be coming to an end, the left’s war on water pressure seems clearest.

 

{ 10 comments }

1

Tm 04.30.25 at 11:27 am

“the world’s leading surplus economies (e.g. Germany, Japan and, later, China) kept churning out goods that Americans gobbled up” (OP quoting Varoufakis)

This is an often repeated narrative but how realistic is it? I recently read an estimate that only 1% of total Chinese economic output is exported to the US. (https://www.briefingbook.info/p/the-economic-and-geopolitical-failings)

Trying to look that up, it seems more like 2% (ca. 500 billion out of ca. 25 trillion). This however depends on how Chinese GDP is converted into dollars. In any case while these are substantial numbers, the narrative that China’s economy is mainly producing stuff for the US doesn’t really hold up. The same is of course true for Germany /EU. If you take the trade surplus (as is in the logic of the quote above) as percentage of GDP, we are looking at the order of 1%. Sure it matters but maybe it’s getting a little bit overrated.

2

NomadUK 04.30.25 at 12:25 pm

There’s this little story from Leo Szilard that seems increasingly significant these days:-

I left Germany a few days after the Reichstag fire. How quickly things move you can see from this: I took a train from Berlin to Vienna on a certain date, close to the first of April, 1933. The train was empty. The same train on the next day was over-crowded, was stopped at the frontier, the people had to get out, and everybody was interrogated by the Nazis. This just goes to show that if you want to succeed in this world you don’t have to be much cleverer than other people, you just have to be one day earlier than most people. This is all that it takes.

3

Tm 04.30.25 at 4:54 pm

“In Jacobin, Daniel Bessner points out that what seems extraordinary is actually pretty consistent with the ways America’s liberal institutions have worked.”

Sure, fascism and liberalism are really indistinguishable. What Trump is doing is totally consistent with what every other president did. So whom did Biden or Obama or even Bush or Reagan arrest for writing op-eds?

The antiliberal tankies can’t keep their mouths shut. Total political and intellectual bankruptcy.

4

nastywoman 05.01.25 at 5:59 am

we just have to survive the remaining days of ‘the war on water pressure’ and if you stay most of the time in Konstanz Germany – Laguna Beach CA or Verona Italy you’re ALL going to be fine…
(and today is a BEAUTIFUL first of May anywhoo)

5

Aardvark Cheeselog 05.01.25 at 2:09 pm

Sure, fascism and liberalism are really indistinguishable

Way to burn the straw man there.

The US does in fact have quite the history of repressive use of immigration law. It’s just not recent, in the sense of being within living memory.

6

John Q 05.01.25 at 8:19 pm

Two things can be true at once.

  1. There are plenty of precedents, particularly in recent Republican administrations, for what Trump is doing
  2. Trump is a radical departure from the history of US democracy, at least since the Civil War

I had a go at this topic, using the idea of a phase transition, a few years back

https://crookedtimber.org/2020/07/20/the-republican-phase-transition/

7

JPL 05.01.25 at 11:03 pm

WRT your question, “Is it [i.e., the introduction of the Trump economic priorities into the mechanisms] the end of neoliberalism?”, Perry Anderson has also contributed his thoughts, Gellnerian in their big-picture point of view, in a recent lecture published in the LRB (3 Apr 2025). I’m no expert on economics, but I was wondering, are actual neoliberals outside the Trump administration OK with Trump’s tariff policy (and also his anti-immigration policy)? Are people like Scott Bessent playing a Janus-like role? Trump is not concerned with reducing economic inequality, as liberals might be, but more with indulging his lust for dominance and punishment, as well as his inclinations toward ethnic nationalism and relying on the prevalence of such attitudes in some areas of the country, all elements of a merely personal animus rather than economic theorizing; these don’t seem to me to be neoliberal desiderata. So can this kind of thing actually replace neoliberalism in the long run? How long can actual neoliberals tolerate this situation? (Sanders/Ocasio-Cortez seems to offer an alternative if the reality becomes chaotic.)

8

engels 05.01.25 at 11:22 pm

Helen Thompson and Tom McTague, via their These Times podcast

OT but what happened to this? The last episode Apple has is April 1.

9

steven t johnson 05.02.25 at 7:06 pm

The apparently new always has a past. Or, there are always precedents, maybe episodic and partial. So, yes, one can find multiple precedents for individual acts by Trump.
Nonetheless, there is always new context. Precedents when American society and economy was less industrialized, government was smaller, the world was not so interdependent or connected and wealth was less concentrated * function differently when followed again. What is so different is not so much what Trump specifically does in one act or another, but in who supports him. The support, explicit or tacit, by the truly wealthy changes Trump from his predecessors into something new, I think.

*And yes, I believe this is true. In constant dollars there were no billionaires in America till the twentieth century (Rockefeller was the first I gather.) And now things are so stratified that comparing a piker with a mere billion to someone like Musk et al. is dubious. A dude with nothing but a million or two may even convince himself he is a hardworking salt of the earth American patriot, put upon and even exploited, as well as unfairly despised.

10

Tm 05.07.25 at 7:56 am

Aardvark 5: “The US does in fact have quite the history of repressive use of immigration law.”

Once again, the quote: “Daniel Bessner points out that what seems extraordinary is actually pretty consistent with the ways America’s liberal institutions have worked.”

The term “liberal institutions” is doing interesting work in that statement. What is the premise, that American institutions are by definition “liberal”, or that “liberal” institutions, whatever they are, have a particularly repressive track record? For example, i nwhat sense is the Alien Enemies Act, which Trump is invoking (illegally, according to judges) to disappear mostly innocent members of an ethnic minority into concentration camps, and which in the past was only invoked during war time, a “liberal institution”?

None of this makes sense other than as an attempt to normalize fascism.

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