The latest podcast produced by the Center for Ethics and Education focuses on political disclosure in the classroom. I think a lot of CTers will find it interesting. Several students were interviewed, and they are quite insightful. For what it is worth, my view is that, in general, when teaching about controversial politically and morally-valenced issues it is usually pedagogically better for most of us not to disclose our substantive views about the issues we are trying to get the students to investigate (I can think of examples of people who do disclose where I think what they are doing is pedagogically superior to withholding in the way I do — Jerry Cohen springs to mind — but I think they are the exceptions). In the podcast my co-director Tony Laden expresses sensible disagreement. Well worth listening to, if I say so myself.
(By the way although I suggested the topic after discussing it with a couple of the students who are featured, as with all our podcasts I take no credit for its excellent quality (both in terms of production values and intellectual content), except in that I suggested to our program manager that she might make podcasts, having no idea quite how good she would turn out to be at doing it. A leading podcaster told me how excellent she thought one of them was, and then was horrified to find out just how much of a shoestring we have been operating on!)).
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At the Sydney Gleebooks launch of Graeme Turner’s new book Broken, an audience member said:
I spend more time on admin than doing my job.
I raised the microphone to my mouth to say ‘that is because of moral deskilling’. But it was not my gig, so I didn’t. It would have been very inappropriate. Look at how I’ve grown. Well. Sometimes.
Before I explain, let us go back a few years.
It was one of those Covid lockdowns. Like many others, we built nice rituals. Checking on the garden. De-slugging, by hand in the evenings (ok that was less nice). Bushwalks with such silence that the swishing of the trees seemed very loud. A drink while watching the sunset after a day of zoom meetings – sometimes from the empty outdoor cafe at the eerily abandoned theme park called Scenic World1.
And I was writing Virtue Capitalists.
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Tech regulation raises some of the thorniest questions of our time — about free speech versus hate speech, copyright versus fair use, truth versus manipulation. Yet these debates are increasingly irrelevant unless states can first establish digital sovereignty. Without the will to enforce laws on multinational corporations, “tech regulation” is a dead letter.
Both the EU and the Commonwealth countries have been trying to use regulation to chart a third path between the “laissez faire” of the US and the explicit state control of authoritarian regimes like China. But the shakedowns occasioned by Trump’s unilateral “reciprocal” tariffs demonstrates the pointlessness of these laws without the will to enforce them.
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… as long as they are healthy, well fed and well educated
Much of the panic about falling birth rates can be dispelled once we realise that (barring catastrophe) there will almost certainly be more people alive in 2100 than there were in 2000. But what about the distant future? Dean Spears, co-author of After the Spike has kindly provided me with projections showing that with likely declines in fertility the world population will decline by half each century after 2100, reaching one billion around 2400. Would that be too few to sustain a modern civilisation ?
We can answer this pretty easily from past experience. In the second half of 20th century, the modern economy consisted of the member countries of the Organization For Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). Originally including the countries of Western Europe and North America, and soon extended to include Australia and Japan, the OECD countries were responsible for the great majority of the global industrial economy, including manufacturing, modern services, and technological innovation.
Except for some purchases of raw materials from the “Global South”, produced by a relatively small part of the labour force, the OECD, taken as a whole, was self-sufficient in nearly everything required for a modern economy. So, the population of the OECD in the second half of last century provides an upper bound to the number of humans needed to sustain such an economy. That number did not reach one billion until 1980.
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The New York Times recently published a letter from me responding to a guest essay (op-ed) by Michael Geruso and Dean Spears, with whom I’ve been engaging on the question of pro-natalism. As a colleague who had such a letter published a few years ago observed, this will probably get more readers than any journal article I’ve ever written. The text is over the fold
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A cursory glance at the Jeffrey Epstein’s biography (1953 – 2019) shows it can be treated as a modern adaptation (and so adjustment) of Horatio Alger Jr.’s framework: Epstein’s life moves from (lower) middle-class respectability to incredible wealth and luxury (and associated criminal sordidness). Epstein was an immensely successful social climber, who didn’t just manage the wealth of the ultra-wealthy, but also used his own wealth and his access to the very wealthy to position himself into the role of Macher in politics and (unusually) in science, including non-trivial associations with (inter alia) MIT’s Media Lab, Harvard University’s evolutionary dynamics programs, and the Santa-Fe institute.*
The latter is especially notable because while as a kid Epstein skipped two grades, he was de facto an academic drop-out. Yet, back in 2002 already, an incredibly instructive New York Magazine profile by Landon Thomas Jr. reports:
Investing in people doesn’t mean providing them with an education. Rather, Epstein brought people together from business, science, and politics which allowed them access to funds, prestige, political decision-makers, Hollywood stars, media moguls, and young girls. While Epstein donated money, his real gift to others was that he facilitated other people’s plans by brokering one of the most scarce commodities in science and politics, attention. His perceived success at this kind of brokerage is my main interest below. (Here I use ‘brokerage’ and its cognates in order to refer to his role as enabler.)
But it would be remiss of me to fail to mention that in return for facilitating attention and funds Epstein got investment opportunities — including investment in scientific projects he cared about not the least ones associated with eugenics and transhumanism — and sexual access to children. He was, in fact, convicted of procuring a child for prostitution and of soliciting a prostitute. And there is very little doubt that the plea bargain only covered a small number of his life of sex crimes before and after the conviction.
Of course, part of the interest in documentation pertaining to Epstein’s life is to what degree and to whom he also brokered or trafficked in sexual access to children to people in his circle, and whether that allowed for opportunities for further financial gain (through payoffs or blackmail, etc.) I assume my readers are familiar with these sordid facts. They matter a great deal for the continued public interest in the handling of the case, but I will only emphasize them intermittently below.
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As President Trump continues to amass authoritarian power, we should consider the shocking role of the Supreme Court in facilitating his power grab. Trump v. United States declared the President immune from prosecution for breaking any criminal law as long as he uses his Presidential powers to commit his crimes. It allowed Trump to get away with gross violations of the Constitution’s foreign emoluments clause. It foreclosed all feasible paths for enforcing the 14th Amendment’s Insurrection Clause against Trump and other participants in the attempted coup of Jan. 6.
In the emergency docket this year, the Court has been overwhelmingly solicitous to Trump’s assertions of unconstrained Presidential power. For the time being, it’s a-okay with Trump destroying the Department of Education, deporting undocumented immigrants to countries where they may face torture, firing 16,000 civil servants from 6 agencies without cause, even firing heads of independent agencies, deporting U.S. citizens on the pretext that the 14th Amendment doesn’t establish birthright citizenship, canceling millions of dollars of research grants already awarded, etc.
As I have previously argued, the Supreme Court’s lawless and massively destructive actions regarding Presidential power have little to do with Constitutional reasoning (which it often doesn’t bother to present in the emergency docket), but with its authoritarian mindset. Here I’ll trace their mindset to a particular understanding of executive power derived from the authoritarianism of the capitalist workplace.
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One of my foundational theoretical commitments is that the technology of reading and writing is neither natural nor innocuous. Media theorists McLuhan, Postman, Ong and Flusser all agree on this point: the technology of writing is a necessary condition for the emerge of liberal/democratic/Enlightenment/rationalist culture; mass literacy and the proliferation of cheap books/newspapers is necessary for this culture to spread beyond the elite to the whole of society.
This was an expensive project. Universal high school requires a significant investment, both to pay the teachers/build the schools and in terms of the opportunity cost to young people. Up until the end of the 20th century, the bargain was worth it for all parties invovled. Young people might not have enjoyed learning to read, write 5-paragraph essays or identify the symbolism in Lord of the Flies, but it was broadly obvious that reading and writing were necessary to navigate society and to consume the overwhelming majority of media.
And it’s equally obvious to today’s young people that this is no longer the case, that they will not need to spend all this time and effort learning to read long texts in order to communicate. They are, after all, communicating all the time, online, without essentially zero formal instruction on how to do so. Just as children learn to talk just by being around people talking, they learn to communicate online just by doing so. In this way, digital culture clearly resonates with Ong’s conception of “secondary orality,” as having far more in common with pre-literate “primary oral culture” than with the literary culture rapidly collapsing, faster with each new generation.
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There’s a great anecdote about Roman Jakobson, the structuralist theorist of language, in Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan’s book, Code: From Information Theory to French Theory. For Jakobson, and for other early structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, language, cybernetic theories of information, and economists’ efforts to understand how the economy worked all went together :
By aligning the refined conceptual systems of interwar Central European thought with the communicationism of midcentury American science, Jakobson envisioned his own particular axis of global fraternity, closely tied to forces of Western capitalist production. (He colorfully illustrated this technoscientific fraternity when he entered a Harvard lecture hall one day to discover that the Russian economist Vassily Leontieff, who had just finished using the room, had left his celebrated account of economic input and output functions on the blackboard. As Jakobson’s students moved to erase the board he declared, “Stop, I will lecture with this scheme.” As he explained, “The problems of output and input in linguistics and economics are exactly the same.”*
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Now that the Trump government is relentlessly attacking higher education and abusing its power at the border to arbitrarily refuse entry to scholars, many academics wonder whether it’s still possible to travel to the US for conferences or other research purposes, especially if they have publicly criticized the Trump government or its allies. But where you can travel, under what conditions, for your academic work, has long been an issue for scholars who come from countries with “weak passports”: passports with which they require visas, often in long-winded, uncertain bureaucratic processes that they might not be able to finish before the conference in question has taken place, and for which they often have to pay with their private money.
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