Iraq: just about time to go

Most of the candidates are calling for withdrawal, so I can’t see what grounds the authors have for thinking a referendum is required. They say that “Iraqi leaders may be slow to show us the door if we are guaranteeing their security”, but there is precious little evidence that Iraqis see it that way. It is hard to see how a government can win respect by calling for foreign assistance against rebels.

I can’t seem to figure out if withdrawal would be a good idea or not (certainly during the election we were bombarded with the notion that any hint of early withdrawal was tantamount to treason, unless voiced by Bob Novak). It seems like withdrawal could reduce incentives for joining the insurgency, but wouldn’t it also be a green light for a full-scale internecine battle b/w the old baathists/sunnis, shiites, and kurds? What stops them from trying to wipe each other out (for fear that if you don’t wipe the other out, they will obliterate you)?

Please. The Baathist insurgents aren’t fighting to get the coalition troops out of the country so they can all go home, kick back, and relax–they’re fighting to get the coalition troops out of the way so they can launch the REAL battle to regain power.

They are a minority, yes, but they have plenty of money, plenty of arms, and decades of expertise in the ruthless use of violence to impose their will. What’s more, they have a history of coming back after defeat. You think they’d have no chance of success in the case of a complete, early withdrawal?

But the newly elected Iraqi government, whoever they are, will be perfectly aware of this. They may well want to negotiate a withdrawal schedule. But it will be a flexible one–either in its writing or its implementation.

Put yourself in the place of a newly elected, shiite-dominated government. Would you be certain that, with coalition troops gone, the insurgents could not overrun Baghdad? Would you get rid of the coalition forces that guarantee your government will not be overthrown by force? You might want them out of the way, camped out somewhere in the desert, but gone completely? I don’t think so.

It all depends on how many people you think are fighting just to fight Americans and how many people you think are fighting to try to gain power.

I tend to think that there is a large number of people who are fighting to gain power–suggesting that withdrawing would make things uglier. Of course if you want to take a very US-centric view perhaps it would make things uglier only for Middle Eastern people so a la Cambodia it wouldn’t really matter to the rest of the world.

Shit, this isn’t hard. Set aside all the macho postering and apelike chest beating–In what way is the occupation forwarding American interests in the region? I can’t find any angle where one can make the argument that it does.

Fostering democracy? Draining the “swamps” that breed terrorists? Scaring the bejeezus out of Ay-rabs? No, no, and most surprisingly no. Rather, the occupation seems to be a catalyst for violence that will lead at best to an autocract; it has blooded a whole new generation of jihadis, and has given them a rallying cry for further operations; and has exposed to Muslims (and, indeed, the wider world) numerous weaknesses in American warfighting capabilities–I doubt any nation is as half afraid of the U.S. as they were four years ago. Extending the occupation another year or two will not reverse those trends, but would rather lead to more repression in Iraq, more anti-Americanism in the Muslim community (and elsewhere) and a further degradation of American war-fighting ability.

The occupation has been a mistake of historic proportions, and continuing it is not in the American interest. That’s reason enough to end it today.

Rather, the occupation seems to be a catalyst for violence that will lead at best to an autocract

The occupation is not the ‘catalyst’ for violence. What’s behind the violence is the loss of power by the Sunni Baathist elite and their efforts to get it back.

Your metaphor implies that when the ‘catalyst’ is removed, the ‘chemical reaction’ will stop. But we have no good reason to expect that to happen. So ‘catalyst’ is a lousy metaphor.

Has exposed to Muslims (and, indeed, the wider world) numerous weaknesses in American warfighting capabilities—I doubt any nation is as half afraid of the U.S. as they were four years ago.

You’re nuts. Four years ago, before Afghanistan, there were many, many ‘experts’ who argued that US air power with a few special forces, and some rag-tag militias could not possibly succeed where the Soviets had failed (and the British before them). And even *after* Afghanistan, there were many predictions that Baghdad would turn into another Stalingrad (type ‘Baghdad AND Stalingrad’ into Google — there’ still some pretty entertaining stuff there).

After Iraq and Afghanistan, few governments could feel comfortable that they could hold out even for a few weeks against an American invasion — and that was not the general belief four years ago.

Where weaknesses have cropped up, of course, are in occupation and “nation building”, but it’s not much comfort to a tyrant to know that after he was gone, the US would likely run into difficulty trying to establish a democratic government in his place.

The occupation has been a mistake of historic proportions, and continuing it is not in the American interest. That’s reason enough to end it today.

Withdrawing and allowing a Baathist insurgency (allied with Al Queda) to regain control of Iraq (or a large part of it) or even callously allowing Iraq to descend into a vicious, all-out civil war (whoever ends up winning) would be a mistake of historic proportions.

MW: We have a disagreement on the facts. Most of us believe that the presence of US troops _is_ a catalyst that accelerates the chemical reaction.

The fact that the British are under constant fire and the Sadr rebellion does indicate that it is more than just old Baathist. I fear that Juan Cole is overly optimistic about a “Third Baath Coup” and that we really end up with Iraq controlled by coalition of Shiite and Sunni Islamists. Something that anybody with a brain could predict would be the result

That is, what makes you think that the insurgency is NOT composed mostly of Baathist Sunnis and Sunni Wahabbis from other Arab countries?

There’s actually a reasonably-informed Wikipedia article on the composition of the insurgency that collects most of the informed conjecture that I’ve seen. Unless you’re in possession of some particularly compelling secret informatioin that you’re about to share with the rest of us, the “it’s all just Baathist dead-enders” line is pretty thin at this point.

There’s actually a reasonably-informed Wikipedia article on the composition of the insurgency that collects most of the informed conjecture that I’ve seen.

Yes, exactly — Baathists providing the leadership and money, ordinary Sunni foot soldiers who are sympathetic to the Baathists and willing to plant IEDs for money and Sunni fundamentalist foreigners fighters (you know, the guys driving the car and truck bombs into the crowds of Iraqis) constitute the active insurgency. If this bunch wins, the Baathists end up running the place again.

Al Sadr’s group is a separate Shiite organization that is not actively fighting at present, is participating in the elections, and is NOT allied with the Baathists. (Let’s recall–the Baathists murdered Al Sadr’s father, the Wahabbis think the Shiites are infidels). The Sunni insurgency and Al Sadr’s group are not friends and allies–what they ARE are the two potential opposing sides in a full-blown civil war.

At this point, we’re stuck. The continued presence of US troops has granted the insurgency a legitimacy it never would have had. If we had not screwed up the reconstruction, or if we had made a transition to a legitimate Iraqi government earlier, the Baathists and foreign fighters would find it a lot harder to recruit sympathetic foot soldiers.