From the monthly archives:
April 2025
Back in November, when I concluded that Trump’s dictatorship was a fait accompli lots of readers thought I was going over the top. In retrospect, and with one exception, I was hopelessly over-optimistic. I imagined a trajectory similar to Orban’s Hungary, with a gradual squeeze on political opposition and civil society, playing out over years and multiple terms in office,.
The reality has been massively worse, both in terms of speed and scope. Threats of conquest against friendly countries, masked thugs abducting people from the street, shakedowns of property from enemies of the state, concentration camps outside the reach of the legal system, all happening at a pace more comparable to Germany in 1933 than to the examples I had in mind.
{ 108 comments }
And then the light of an older heaven was in my eyes
and when my vision cleared, I saw Titans.
— Alan Moore
Today’s Occasional Paper comes to us from the James Webb Space Telescope.
So let’s start with some basics: nothing can travel faster than the speed of light. So when a telescope looks out into space, it’s also looking back into time. Look at the moon? You’re seeing it as it was when the light left it’s surface about 1.5 seconds ago. Look at the Sun? You’re seeing it as it was 8 minutes ago. The Sun could have exploded 5 minutes ago, and there’s no way you could possibly know about it until 3 minutes from now.
Okay, so keep going. Look at the nearest star? You’re seeing it as it was about four years ago. Look at the center of our galaxy? 30,000 years. The light from there left around the high point of the last Ice Age. Look out of our galaxy, at our neighbor galaxy Andromeda? About 3 million years.
Now it starts to get weird and interesting. Because as we start to look at things that are billions-with-a-b light years away — very distant galaxies — things start to change. That’s because we’re looking back into the distant past of the Universe. And the Universe is only 13.5 billion years old, so… yeah. In theory, if you had a strong enough telescope, you could see back to the Big Bang and the beginning of everything.
Of course it’s not that simple. The Universe is expanding. Distant galaxies are receding from us. More distant galaxies are receding faster, often at significant fractions of the speed of light (from our perspective). This means that the distance to them is greater than you might expect. It also means that their light is “red shifted” by the Doppler effect. Also, while the Big Bang was very bright, once it cooled down the Universe was just a hot dark cloud of gas, mostly hydrogen with a bit of helium mixed in. In that earliest pre-dawn epoch, there was not much to see, and no light to see with… until the first stars switched on.
And now for a brief historical digression.
{ 23 comments }
Thanks to James Wimberley for prompting me to write this, and alerting me to the data on China’s emissions
Most of the news these days is bad, and that’s true of the climate. Even as climatic disasters worsen, the Trump regime is doing its best to dismantle US and global efforts to decarbonize our energy systems. But there is still some surprisingly good news.
First, China’s emissions from coal-fired electricity appear to have peaked. Thermal power generation fell 5.8 per cent in January and February this year, relative to 2024. The only times this has happened previously were during the Covid lockdowns and in the aftermath of the GFC. On this occasion, total power demand fell by 1.5 per cent due to a warm winter, but the big decline in coal was due to increased solar generation.
And China’s solar industry keeps on growing on all fronts. China added another 277 GW of PV last year, more than all the capacity installed in the world up to 2015. Recorded exports were 236GW, another record. Since production was estimated at more than 600 GW, it seems likely there are some unrecorded installations.
All this is happening even though new coal-fired power stations are still being built, largely for political rather than economic reasons. It seems likely that these plants will see limited operation as solar power (augmented with storage) meets more and more demand.
Second, the great AI boom in electricity demand has turned out to be a mirage, at least so far. This isn’t always obvious from the breathless tone of coverage. For example, this story leads with the claim that “Electricity consumption by data centers will more than double by 2030”, but leaves the reader to calculate that this implies an increase of just 1.5% in global demand.
Notably, Microsoft which was one of the leading promoters of claims about electricity demand is now scaling back its investments. And large numbers of data centres in China are apparently idle
Even Trump is helping in perverse ways. His policies are already reducing projections of US economic growth, which will accelerate the decline of coal-fired power in particular. His attempts to defy economic reality by keeping coal plants open are unlikely to have much effect in this context.
And coal is on the way out in many other countries. Finland just closed its last coal-fired powerand even laggards like Poland are making progress
The picture is less promising with the transition to electric vehicles, which has slowed in most places. But once we complete the transition to solar, wind and storage, electricity will be massively cheaper. And once again, China is a bright sport, with electrics taking 25 per cent of the market in 2024, and new vehicles becoming cheaper and cheaper. BYD is now offering an electric car in Australia for less than $A30 000 (a bit under $20 000 US).
As I argued a year ago, the irresistible force of ultra-cheap solar PV will overcome the seemingly immovable barriers in its way.
Note Links got lost in copying from my Substack. You can find them here
{ 11 comments }
With collapsing stock markets, retirement portfolios, and consumer confidence, there is an all-too-human tendency to focus on the economic effects of tariffs by their critics: they are a tax on consumption, they will raise inflation, reduce efficiency, and reduce take-home income, etc. This is familiar.
But this mistakes the full significance of a tariff-centric public policy. First and foremost, tariffs are an exercise in political agency. In Trump’s administration they are an assertion of political control by the executive branch. And, in fact, political decisionism is (see here; here; and here) a core commitment of the so-called ‘unitary executive theory,’ which I prefer to call (with a nod (here) to Benjamin Constant) ‘Bonapartism.’ According to Bonapartism the will of the American people generates a presidential mandate to take charge. If you were to have a certain conspiratorial sensibility this is a control over ‘Globalists’ or the ‘Woke;’ a certain progressive-democratic sensibility this is the exercise of control over ‘the economy.’ For Bonapartists it’s control over the ‘deep state,’ which turn out to be code for ordinary ‘civil servants and scientists with at-will employment, sanctity of contracts be damned.’
From my own, more (skeptical) liberal perspective tariffs are an expression of mistrust against individuals’ judgments; they limit and even deny us our ability to shape our lives with our meaningful associates as we see fit. And tariffs do so, in part, by changing the pattern of costs on us, and, in part, by altering the political landscape in favor of the well-connected few. Of course, in practice, tariffs are always hugely regressive by raising costs on consumer products. This is, in fact, a familiar effect of mercantilism and has been a rallying cry for liberals since Adam Smith and the Corn league. Tariffs are also regressive as tax instruments displacing the income tax.