From this morning’s papers, a bit more light shed on the questions I raised below. It appears that explanation c) (that the Sadrist forces have been recruiting since April) is at least part of the reason for the discrepancy. I would imagine that the two Londoners who have shown up in Najaf are not particularly representative of what’s been going on, but it makes a useful hook for newspapers, and us, to have a look at what’s going on.
Another development in the Al-Mahdi army story that has to be taken into account is that there has been a qualitative change in Sadr’s forces as well as a quantitative one. As of March of this year, the Al-Mahdi forces were able to carry out the destruction of the town of Qawliya. In order to achieve this show of strength, they were apparently using bulldozers and artillery, and were clearly a well-disciplined force (the inhabitants of Qawliya were pretty well-armed themselves and not short of combat experience). This looked much more like a genuine private army; as part of the peace settlement in Najaf it was at one point seriously suggested that the Sadrists might provide the police force for parts of the town. As Dan Hardie pointed out in comments to the previous story, the current incarnation of Sadr’s forces looks somewhere between a rabble of irregular infantry and a street gang. This suggests that the quality of Sadr’s forces has declined significantly as the numbers have increased.
Good news and bad news, as far as I can tell (at least for those of us who are in the “tragic realist” camp, ie wishing that the coalition forces wouldn’t do such damn silly things, but hoping that they succeed with as little loss of life as possible when they do). Good news is that this confirms me in my opinion that the Americans aren’t many days from a decisive victory over Sadr – as I mentioned before, he’s already said that he’s going to “fight to the last drop of blood”, which is usually a late-stage statement. Bad news is that the inexperienced rabble he’s picked up won’t stay inexperienced for long, and it looks to me as if they’ve been recruited to the general cause of anti-Americanism rather than to any specific loyalty to Sadr. Hence, victory in Najaf is likely to just lead to the Sadrist forces going to ground, planting roadside bombs and waiting for another wannabe warlord to start up in business. It’s a known problem from the British Empire that this kind of whack-a-mole control of insurrections as and when they pop up, ends up amounting to simply running a training program for the troops and leadership of the anti-imperial forces. Oh dear, etc.
{ 16 comments }
Dan Hardie 08.11.04 at 5:09 pm
D-squared, I am worried that our relationship is degenerating into one of mutual civility. One of us must restore standards and hurl abuse at the other. In the meantime, I’ll just enter one or two slight reservations.
Re the failure to use artillery indicating a qualitative decline in Sadr’s forces: no, I think this is just tactical common sense. Back in March, Sadr’s boys used artillery against other Iraqis who didn’t have control of the air, didn’t have artillery-locating radar and didn’t have, probably, any or much artillery themselves. Using artillery against the Americans, who have plenty of all three, would be suicidal- it would take the US Army under a minute to locate and whack the source of artillery fire. (Mortars, on the other hand, make sense for guerrillas as long as they don’t fire them for too sustained a period- they have a smaller radar signature, and can be moved and concealed by two or three -strong- men, not needing wheeled vehicles, which isn’t true of artillery. Artillery is a nice fat target for an Army trained to fight conventional wars.)
I agree with Dsquared’s main point: Sadr is a politician, albeit of a loathsome, demagogic type, and whatever outcome increases his standing in the Shi’ite community is optimal for him. We could kill enough of his militiamen to seriously ‘degrade’ their fighting capacity, but that will be a defeat if it leads to a net radicalisation of the Shi’ite community.
To reiterate a point made by Juan Cole, and by the senior British officer in Basra, to the fury of various American chickenhawks: if crowds of Shi’ites numbering in the hundreds of thousands show up in the streets ordering the Western troops to leave, they have to leave. That or gun everyone down. It’s how the Iranian revolution played out, and if we manage to alienate the Shi’ite population enough, it could happen in Iraq.
Dan Hardie 08.11.04 at 6:00 pm
Not playing gotcha, but the WaPo had an excellent article this morning on the fighting in Najaf. Many points made, among them that the Mahdi army do sound reasonably sophisticated in infantry tactics- which, if true, makes me wonder what the hell they are doing actually coming out and fighting for ground in Najaf. Presumably al-Sadr has decided this is his best available strategy, rather than fighting a true guerrilla war- which if so means he has either taken leave of his senses or is aiming at a huge US over-reaction pushing more Shi’ite support his way. Article is at :http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53557-2004Aug10.html
Info on the Mahdi army includes this:
Soldiers said the insurgents showed signs that they had been training during a cease-fire that had kept violence here to a minimum since early June. U.S. units accustomed to the disorganized, hit-and-run strikes of insurgents in Baghdad and elsewhere were impressed to see the black-clad fighters of the Mahdi Army moving in coordinated units of five: typically three armed with rifles, which they fired to provide cover for the launch of rocket-propelled grenades, the weapon that has been most damaging to U.S. forces in Iraq.
Additional evidence of training: flash suppressors on rifles, simple Starlight-brand night-vision scopes and the evacuation of wounded. Weapons were secreted throughout the cemetery.
“These people are a trained militia,” said 1st Lt. Ronald C. Krepps of the 1st Cavalry, who added that one mausoleum contained photos of Mahdi fighters performing battle drills.
“More professional,” said Miyamasu, the 5th Regiment battalion commander whose troops provided Najaf reinforcement. “I don’t mean to give them too much, but they’re good. These guys really make us work to kill them, but in the end, they’re dead.”
Motoko Kusanagi 08.11.04 at 8:01 pm
This looked much more like a genuine private army; as part of the peace settlement in Najaf it was at one point seriously suggested that the Sadrists might provide the police force for parts of the town. As Dan Hardie pointed out in comments to the previous story, the current incarnation of Sadr’s forces looks somewhere between a rabble of irregular infantry and a street gang.
Could this not be part of a learning process, rather than a sign of crisis? No genuine army would stand a chance against overwhelming US power. But the more irregular and unpredictable they get, the more they blend in with the population, the more dangerous they are. If I remember it right, after going to Fallujah during the heaviest fighting there, Rahul Mahajan wrote on his blog how the men there would be regular folks one day, mujahedeen the next. That makes things quite difficult for an occupying force, especially one with a fondness for rhetoric about liberation.
John Quiggin 08.11.04 at 9:22 pm
If Sadr was acting on rational military calculation, he’d fight it out in Sadr city where his support is much stronger, and the chance of killing Americans much greater.
The fact that he’s fighting on in the holy ground of Najaf is an indication that his statements about “the last drop of blood” are not merely rhetoric – he’s appealing to the memory of his martyred father, and willing to take the risk of the same for himself. If he is killed or captured, I doubt that this will end the Sadrist uprising – there is always someone willing to claim the mantle.
The campaign against Sadr is a disaster all round. Rather than hoping for a fairly quick “victory”, we should be hoping that it’s called off now before anything worse happens.
Abiola Lapite 08.12.04 at 12:37 am
“Rather than hoping for a fairly quick “victoryâ€, we should be hoping that it’s called off now before anything worse happens.”
On the contrary, rather than calling it off now and perpetuating the delusion that his ragtag band can impose its will in the face of American might, they ought to be granted the martyrdom so many of them claim to desire.
I’m seeing a strange assumption at work here, which is that al Sadr is some sort of representative of mainstream Iraqi opinion, rather than a leader of a minority grouping seeking to impose its will on the rest of the Shiites by force of arms. In all this talk of “disasters” and whatnot, might it not occur to some of you to find out what the opinions of the rest of the Shiites are before making predictions about what the annihilation of his “army” will do for his popularity? On the (not unreasonable) assumption that most Shiites aren’t suicidal fools, the notion that a wipeout of al-Sadr and his troops will lead to a “radicalisation” of the Shiite community is highly unlikely. It isn’t as if there aren’t any historical parallels to draw on this respect – did the crushing of Simeon bar Kochba’s revolt in 136 CE lead to a radicalization of Judea?
One almost gets the feeling that some people on here actually want America to be embarassed by al-Sadr’s irregulars – almost.
Barry 08.12.04 at 2:41 am
Ah, yes, blaming the left for the right’s f*ck-ups.
nick 08.12.04 at 3:08 am
One almost gets the feeling that some people on here actually want America to be embarassed by al-Sadr’s irregulars – almost.
No. One gets the feeling that the people on here don’t want to wake up to TV pictures showing a huge fucking hole in the dome of the ‘Ali mosque. For some strange, inexplicable reason.
Because it’s one thing to be fighting a minority of radicalised Sunnis who’ve killed lots of people, but it’s another thing entirely to piss off the entire Shi’a population of the world.
Abiola Lapite 08.12.04 at 3:24 am
“but it’s another thing entirely to piss off the entire Shi’a population of the world.”
Which begs the question of how exactly you know that’s what we’re doing. How do you know that the Shiites aren’t even more pissed off that al-Sadr’s holding Najaf’s holy places hostage to further his own ambitions? It isn’t as if the far more respected Shiite clerics haven’t said they wanted him to leave, is it?
I’m not a Bush supporter by any means, but the willingness of some on here to overlook inconvenient facts in order to paint the blackest possible picture disturbs me intensely. Do you really imagine that Iraqis are just a bunch of dumb religious sheep who’ll automatically get angry at whoever CNN tells them shot a hole in the roof of the mosque, without bothering to ask why they should have been provoked into doing so?
If most of you really cared about what Iraqis are actually thinking – as opposed to what you hope they’re thinking – you’d expand your reading of what they have to say beyond just the River Bend Blog you all love to quote from: you might be surprised to learn that Iraq’s citizens aren’t as stupid as you seem to think they are, that they don’t all yearn to live under the thumbs of theocratic strongmen, and they just might see al-Sadr for what he really is.
dsquared 08.12.04 at 3:46 am
Abiola: but you will admit that the apparent facts about the growth in the size of Sadr’s forces are more consistent with him becoming a more rather than less popular figure?
nick 08.12.04 at 4:21 am
Do you really imagine that Iraqis are just a bunch of dumb religious sheep who’ll automatically get angry at whoever CNN tells them shot a hole in the roof of the mosque, without bothering to ask why they should have been provoked into doing so?
If a bunch of renegade Mormons took over Salt Lake City, and in the course of liberating the city, the US blew large chunks out of the Temple, do you think that any Mormons expressing a small measure of displeasure at such consequences would be ‘dumb religious sheep’?
Of course the Sadrists are fuckers for using their sacred sites as a battleground (although they’re also playing off the Shi’a history of glorious martyrdom) and of course plenty of Iraqis are very much pissed off with them. But the US has to pick its battles with a bit of care here.
You’re the one throwing out filthy aspersions by suggesting that we’re rooting for the Sadrists here. (And please, that ‘almost’ is the sleazy equivalent of ‘if I offended anyone, I apologise’. I don’t buy it for a split-second.)
weasel 08.12.04 at 6:51 am
Nice lively back and forth going on here. I’m reminded of some things I’ve read (possibly even on Riverbend) about how Sadr may not be widely admired, but if he were to be killed by the occupation forces, or any of the holy sites damaged, even folks that don’t like Sadr would perhaps be a tad pissed. Playing up that whole us v them thing, ya know?
What do you folks think about Sistani’s sudden departure from the country in regards to all of this?
Dan Hardie 08.12.04 at 10:29 am
JQ- from what I can read in the NYT, the US forces have more or less completely vacated Sadr City- two days ago the Sadr City inhabitants downed a US helicopter and there doesn’t seem to have been much in the way of reprisal. Maybe you’re right that he’s acting entirely irrationally. From the evidence available, I really can’t say. Btw, I re-read your post about publicising enemy casualties and I did mis-interpret you: apologies, and hopefully no offence caused.
Abiola: ‘One almost gets the feeling that some people on here actually want America to be embarassed by al-Sadr’s irregulars – almost.’I am slated to go out to Iraq probably next year. For that reason, and for the reason that a bunch of my mates have served in Basra, and for the reason that I’ve got some kind of basic moral sense, no I don’t want to see Sadr ’embarrass’ (translation into English: kill) Coalition troops. Clear on that, Patriot Boy?
Yes, that’s an ad hominem remark- given that you’ve ‘almost’ accused people of sympathising with murderers, I think we might say that you’ve ‘almost’ made an ad hominem remark yourself. And don’t come whining back with some rhetoric about my seeking to close off debate. You’re not debating anyone: you’re alleging sympathy, on zero evidence, for the killers of American and British troops (and of Iraqi civilians), and seeking to cover yourself behind repetitions of the word ‘almost’. An NCO who trained me was badly wounded in Amarah last year. Are you going to say that I ‘almost’ sympathise with the guy who shot him?
Abiola Lapite 08.12.04 at 1:47 pm
“(And please, that ‘almost’ is the sleazy equivalent of ‘if I offended anyone, I apologise’. I don’t buy it for a split-second.)”
Whatever. I won’t be losing any sleep over it.
“and don’t come whining back with some rhetoric about my seeking to close off debate.”
You’re the one whining, not I.
“You’re not debating anyone: you’re alleging sympathy, on zero evidence”
On the contrary, all the evidence one needs is available right here in the previous comments to this post.
“Are you going to say that I ‘almost’ sympathise with the guy who shot him?”
And why not? For all I know you might loathe your NCO. You’re a fine one to talk about logical fallacies when your entire response is a sterling example of the genre.
JamesW 08.12.04 at 1:56 pm
Abiola Lapite asks: “did the crushing of Simeon bar Kochba’s revolt in 136 CE lead to a radicalization of Judea?”
It didn’t because the Romans cleansed Judaea of Jews in revenge. Dio Cassius: “Thus nearly the whole of Judea was made desolate, a result of which the people had had forewarning before the war. For the tomb of Solomon, which the Jews regarded as an object of veneration, fell to pieces of itself and collapsed. And many wolves and hyenas rushed howling into the cities.” (Cited on http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/revolt1.html)
A few Jewish survivors hung on, but Judaism became essentially a religion of exiles.
Contrariwise, the ruthless crushing of the previous Great Revolt in AD 65-70, ending in the destruction of the Second Temple, failed to extinguish Jewish national radicalism.
It is possible for an empire to crush all-out colonial rebellion, but not an empire that pays any respect to the rights of man.
Dan Hardie 08.12.04 at 1:58 pm
Shorter Abiola Lapite: Joining the reserve or regular British military of one’s own country is prima facie evidence of unpatriotic and cowardly sympathy with Islamicist terrorism and hatred for the British military.
Even shorter Abiola Lapite: members of the British military awaiting a posting to Iraqwish Islamic militiamen to kill or wound members of the British military in Iraq.
Really short Abiola Lapite: Yes, I am a cretin, aren’t I?
dsquared 08.12.04 at 5:40 pm
By the way, Abiola, until you get the distinction between “wanting something to happen” and “thinking something will happen” sorted out, I would stay away from both the Army and the stock market, as they can both be quite expensive places to learn the difference.
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