Dumb it up, Tyler!

by Daniel on July 30, 2003

Tyler Cowen’s got more of his Macroeconomics series up. It’s nothing like as bad as the monetary economics post that I objected to yesterday. Part Three on fiscal policy is OK ..ish. I don’t agree with him on Keynes, and think his comments on deficits and interest rates are naïve (I include by citation Brad Delong posts on this subject passim ad nauseam), but I can see how others would class my disagreements with it as probably political rather than technical. And Four on open economy macroeconomics is actually quite good, although the omission of any discussion of optimal currency areas is a bit of a lacuna. Part 2 has one very serious error, but in being bad, it is actually good, because it’s clued me into what went wrong in the train wreck which was Part One.

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by Brian on July 30, 2003

I’d like to say that LanguageHat has a grouse post about Aussie slang for you bludgers to go have a perv at next smoko, but sadly a few of those words are neither in my idiolect nor the Officially Approved Idiolect of Crooked Timber.

Ethical Naturalism reredux

by Brian on July 30, 2003

A long and winding post responding to some issues about morality and naturalism.

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Ethical naturalism redux

by Chris Bertram on July 30, 2003

In a comment to one of Brian’s earlier posts on ethical naturalism, I mentioned that Jerry Cohen’s argument that ethics must (ultimately) depend on fact-insensitive principles seemed to me to threaten the naturalist position (at least as Brian had formulated it). Larry Solum – who started this whole conversation – now has an extensive discussion of Cohen’s view (scroll down) as expressed in the latest Philosophy and Public Affairs. Larry thinks that even if Cohen is right, an Aristotelian naturalism might survive. I’m not sure what to think about that yet. One thing worth noticing about Cohen’s view is that even though most of the discussion is about ethics, it applies to normative principles quite generally. This being so, it ought to apply to such principles in other domains (including epistemology and the theory of rational action) and that if it threatens naturalism in ethics it also threatens naturalistic programmes in those areas.